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Foreword 
It has been a long journey. From the day of our swearing in on 3 August 2009, to the 
handing of this Report to the President, we have experienced every emotion; from joy, to 
frustration, to exhilaration, to humility. 
This Commission collected the largest number of statements of any truth commission 
in history. With the tireless help of the over 300 statement takers we hired, and the more 
than a hundred that were seconded to us by civil society organizations, we collected over 
40,000 statements. It is difficult to discern the significance of this singular achievement. 
While the statement taking form was pronounced by international experts in the field 
as one of the best they had ever seen, we acknowledge that there is a wide variety of 
detail and accuracy in the statements we collected. We also acknowledge that, as far as 
we are aware, we deployed by far the largest number of statement takers of any other 
truth commission, thus perhaps contributing to the large numbers of statements we 
collected. 
What we can say with confidence, however, is that the record number of statements 
collected affirms our individual perceptions as we travelled the length and breadth of 
the country:  there is a hunger, a desire, even a demand for the injustices of the past to 
be addressed so that those individuals who have borne the brunt of those injustices, 
and the nation as a whole, may move on. The 2003 Task Force on the Establishment 
of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission reported that over 90 percent of 
Kenyans wanted a truth justice and reconciliation commission. We are not in a position 
to confirm that percentage, but we can with full confidence, on the basis on our 
collective experience, report that the vast majority of Kenyans not only wanted such 
a commission, but were willing to spend a significant amount of their own time, and 
sometimes money and other resources, to participate in a truth-telling process.  
This is a Report. It is written with words, and printed on paper or converted into 
electronic bits and bytes.  Yet it is the product of, in some cases literally, the blood, 
sweat and tears of the stories that were told to us as we travelled the country. The 
written word, no matter how poetic, cannot convey accurately the passion with which 
people demanded to tell their stories and the integrity and dignity with which they 
related their experiences.  It cannot convey the silence, the tears, and the emotions that 
engulfed the venue at which a man described how he lost his entire family during the 
2007/2008 Post Election Violence (PEV). It cannot convey the traumatic experience of a 
woman who was raped during the PEV and her fear that the same could happen to her 
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during the 2013 elections. Nor can it convey the horrid experience of a woman who had 
to carry the head of her slain husband all the way from Nakuru to Kisumu. It can neither 
convey the tears that were shed before this Commission nor the tears that were shed 
by the Commission’s staff and Commissioners. The stories in these pages are horrid but 
they did happen, here on our land. In a nutshell, there has been, there is, suffering in 
the land. 
So while this Report is the final product of this Commission, and with the passage 
of time will be viewed as the primary legacy of our work, we know that the work of 
the Commission is also written in the hearts and souls of each and every person who 
interacted with the Commission: the statement takers and statement givers; victims, 
adversely mentioned persons, and those who reside simultaneously in both categories; 
witnesses who testified in public, and those who testified in camera; those employed 
by the Commission, and those who took on the task of monitoring and reporting on 
the work of the Commission; and finally, the millions of others who may have viewed 
a news story, or read an opinion piece, or seen the Commission’s truck with our logo, 
Tusirudie Tena! blazoned on its side. Each of these individuals, and the interactions they 
had with the Commission, whether positive or negative, are a part of this Report, and 
thus a part of the legacy of our work.  
This has been a Commission that, like many that went before it, both in Kenya and abroad, 
has faced its challenges. Some of those challenges at times threatened the very existence 
of the organization, and took its toll on many of us, both physically and emotionally. We 
lost our original Vice Chair, Betty Kaari Murungi, because of some of those challenges. She 
was never replaced, and we end this process with only eight, rather than the original nine, 
Commissioners.  
We faced the many challenges, both anticipated and unanticipated, with courage, 
conviction, and commitment. How well we succeeded in the end is not for us to say. 
Instead it is for the people of Kenya, both today and in the future, to determine how much 
what we have provided in these pages – and perhaps more importantly, how much our 
work throughout the four corners of the country over the last four years – contributes to 
truth, justice, national unity and reconciliation.  
We know that some have been frustrated by the fact that we spent four years on a 
task for which we were originally given a maximum of two and a half years. At times it 
frustrated us.  In the best of circumstances, compiling a complete and accurate history 
of historical injustices and gross violations of human rights (including violations of not 
just the traditional bodily integrity rights, but all of the aforementioned plus socio-
economic rights, corruption, land, and economic marginalization) over a forty-five 
year period would be a daunting task to complete in four years, much less two and 
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a half years.  In fact it was clear to us from the early days of the Commission that ours 
was not to provide the definitive history of the broad range of violations committed 
and suffered during that forty-five year period.  Rather, we took our task to be making 
a significant contribution to our collective understanding of that past, particularly 
through the experiences and voices of those who experienced it first-hand.  It is our 
hope that this Report, and the other work of the Commission, has at least done that.  
After four years, we are truly humbled by the enormity of the task facing this great 
country of ours. While we have made a small, yet we hope significant, contribution to 
addressing the legacy of gross violations of human rights and historical injustices, there 
is much still to be done. Yet, we take faith in the reforms that have already occurred, 
including the adoption of the 2010 Constitution, and those currently in process. Even 
more importantly, we are humbled by and also draw strength from the millions of 
Kenyans who, in the face of sometimes insurmountable odds, struggle to provide for 
themselves, their families, their communities, and the nation at large. It is that spirit of 
perseverance in the face of adversity, the willingness and ability to rise up above such 
challenges with dignity and integrity, which we saw in Kenyans throughout this great 
land that gives us hope for the future of this beautiful country. 
God bless Kenya.
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The Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commis-
sion (the Commission) has been produced at a critical mo-
ment in Kenya’s history. Just two months earlier in March 
2013, Kenyans concluded a largely peaceful General Elec-
tion, adding impetus to the need for solutions that will en-
trench a lasting spirit of peace, national unity, dignity, heal-
ing, justice and reconciliation.
Established in the wake of the tragic and devastating events 
of the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence (PEV), the Commis-
sion has produced this Report as the culmination of a pro-
cess that lasted four years and took the Commission to all 
regions of the country. 
The violence, bloodshed and destruction of the PEV 
shocked Kenyans into the realisation that their nation, long 
considered an island of peace and tranquillity, remained 
deeply divided since independence from British colonial 
rule in December 1963. It prompted a fresh opportunity for 
the country to examine the negative practices of the past 
five decades that contributed to a state that still holds sway 
in Kenya: normalization and institutionalization of gross 
violation of human rights, abuse of power and misuse of 
public office.
Although the PEV was the trigger that led to the estab-
lishment of the Commission, proposals for such a Kenyan 
truth commission had been on the agenda since the 1990s 
as part of the campaign for a new constitution. The pursuit 
for a national transitional justice mechanism entered of-
ficial circles following the election into power of the Na-
tional Rainbow Coalition (NARC). In April 2003, the NARC 
government established the Task Force on the Establish-
ment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
to ascertain public interest in the establishment of a truth 
commission. After a period of collecting and collating the 
views of Kenyans from across the country, the Task Force 
concluded that indeed a truth commission was necessary. 
It recommended the establishment of such a commission 
no later than June 2004. However, this was never to be. 
Instead, the report and the recommendations of the Task 
Force were shelved by the NARC government. 
The idea to establish a truth commission revived in the 
aftermath of the 2007/2008 PEV and in the context of the 
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) pro-
cess. The KNDR process resulted in the adoption of, inter 
alia,  the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the 
Coalition Government (Coalition Agreement) on the basis 
of which, the National Assembly enacted the National Ac-
cord and Reconciliation Act on 18 March 2008. The National 
Accord paved the way for the establishment of a coalition 
government with a President, Prime Minister and two Dep-
uty Prime Ministers. 
As part of the KNDR process, an agreement for the es-
tablishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation com-
mission (TJRC Agreement) was also adopted. Pursuant 
to the TJRC Agreement, the National Assembly enacted 
the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act (TJR Act) on 23 
October 2008. The Act received Presidential Assent on 28 
November 2008 and came into operation on 17 March 
2009.
In terms of the TJR Act, the Commission was inaugurated on 
3 August 2009. The broad mandate of the Commission was 
to inquire into gross violation of human rights and historical 
injustices that occurred in Kenya from 12 December 1963 
when Kenya became independent to 28 February 2008 
when  the Coalition Agreement was signed
The work of the Commission was structured into four mu-
tual and overlapping phases:  statement-taking, research 
and investigations, hearings and report writing. Staff at all 
levels were trained and prepared for their various roles to 
ensure that they were sensitive and observed confidenti-
ality of all those who gave testimony to the Commission. 
The Commission also carried out civic education and out-
reach activities in partnership with civic organisations and 
community based bodies to permit full and active public 
participation in its work and processes. Gender equality 
was a priority in staff composition at all levels and was par-
ticularly important as a means of ensuring that men and 
women felt comfortable testifying before the Commis-
sion. To decentralise its presence and reach out to as many 
Kenyans as possible, the Commission established regional 
offices in Eldoret, Garissa, Kisumu and Mombasa. 
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Primary findings
 The Commission finds that between 1895 and 1963, the 
British Colonial administration in Kenya was responsible 
for unspeakable and horrific gross violations of human 
rights. In order to establish its authority in Kenya, the 
colonial government employed violence on the local 
population on an unprecedented scale. Such violence 
included massacres, torture and ill-treatment and various 
forms of sexual violence. The Commission also finds that 
the British Colonial administration adopted a divide 
and rule approach to the local population that created 
a negative dynamic of ethnicity, the consequences of 
which are still being felt today.  At the same time the 
Colonial administration stole large amounts of highly 
productive land from the local population, and removed 
communities from their ancestral lands. 
 The Commission finds that between 1963 and 1978, 
President Jomo Kenyatta presided over a government 
that was responsible for numerous gross violations of 
human rights. These violations included:
o in the context of Shifta War, killings, torture, 
collective punishment and denial of basic needs 
(food, water and health care);
o political assassinations of Pio Gama Pinto, Tom 
Mboya and J.M. Kariuki; 
o arbitrary detention of political opponents and 
activists; and 
o illegal and irregular acquisition of land by the 
highest government officials and their political 
allies
 The Commission finds that between 1978 and 2002, 
President Daniel Arap Moi presided over a government 
that was responsible for numerous gross violations of 
human rights. These violations include:
o Massacres;
o unlawful detentions, and systematic and 
widespread torture and ill-treatment of political 
and human rights activists; 
o Assassinations, including of Dr. Robert Ouko; 
o Illegal and irregular allocations of land; and 
o economic crimes and grand corruption.
 The Commission finds that between 2002 and 2008, 
President Mwai Kibaki presided over a government that 
was responsible for numerous gross violations of human 
rights.  These violations include:
o unlawful detentions, torture and ill-treatment;
o assassinations and extra judicial killings; and 
o economic crimes and grand corruption
 The Commission finds that state security agencies, 
particularly the Kenya Police and the Kenya Army, have 
been the main perpetrators of bodily integrity violations 
of human rights in Kenya including massacres, enforced 
disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, and sexual 
violence.
 The Commission finds that Northern Kenya (comprising 
formerly of North Eastern Province, Upper Eastern and 
North Rift) has been the epicenter of gross violations of 
human rights by state security agencies. Almost without 
exception, security operations in Northern Kenya has 
been accompanied by massacres of largely innocent 
citizens, systematic and widespread torture, rape and 
sexual violence of girls and women, looting and burning 
of property and the killing and confiscation of cattle. 
 The Commission finds that state security agencies 
have as a matter of course in dealing with banditry 
and maintaining peace and order employed collective 
punishment against communities regardless of the 
guilt or innocence of individual members of such 
communities.
 The Commission finds that during the mandate period 
the state adopted economic and other policies that 
resulted in the economic marginalization of five key 
regions in the country: North Eastern and Upper Eastern; 
Coast; Nyanza; Western; and North Rift. 
 The Commission finds that historical grievances over 
land constitute the single most important driver of 
conflicts and ethnic tension in Kenya. Close to 50 percent 
of statements and memorandum received by the 
Commission related to or touched on claims over land. 
 The Commission finds that women and girls have been 
the subject of state sanctioned systematic discrimination 
in all spheres of their life. Although discrimination 
against women and girls is rooted in patriarchal cultural 
practices, the state has traditionally failed to curb harmful 
traditional practices that affect women’s enjoyment of 
human rights. 
 The Commission finds that despite the special status 
accorded to children in Kenyan society, they have been 
subjected to untold and unspeakable atrocities including 
killings, physical assault and sexual violence. 
 The Commission finds that minority groups and 
indigenous people suffered state sanctioned systematic 
discrimination during the mandate period (1963-
2008). In particular, minority groups have suffered 
discrimination in relation to political participation and 
access to national identity cards. Other violations that 
minority groups and indigenous people have suffered 
include: collective punishment; and violation of land 
rights and the right to development.
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Structure of The Report
The Report is structured into four volumes. This volume of 
the Report (Volume I) provides an account of how the Com-
mission was formed, how it interpreted its mandate and 
conducted its work, and the challenges it faced in carrying 
out its mandate. 
The second volume (Volume II) is further divided into three 
sub-volumes. Volume IIA focuses on the major violations 
of bodily integrity rights that were committed during the 
Commission’s mandate period.  These are: unlawful killings 
and enforced disappearances (that is, massacres, extra-ju-
dicial killings, and political assassinations); unlawful deten-
tions, torture and ill-treatment; and sexual violence. While 
much of this volume is focused on violations directly com-
mitted by the state, it also includes descriptions of killings, 
severe injury and violence, sexual violence, detention, and 
other similar violations committed by non-state actors.  
The volume starts with a general overview of the political 
history of Kenya. This chapter provides the overall political 
context for understanding not only the other specific viola-
tions in this chapter, but also the violations and other ma-
terials in the rest of the Report.  This general political over-
view is then supplemented by a description of the history 
of the state security agencies. While other agencies of the 
state were responsible for historical injustices and gross 
violations of human rights during the mandate period, the 
security agencies were both primarily responsible for many 
of the acts of commission discussed in this volume, as well 
as the acts of omission (the failure to provide security) that 
allowed many of the violations committed by non-state ac-
tors to occur.
Volume IIB focuses on some of the unique parts of the Com-
mission’s mandate concerning historical injustices in Kenya. 
The volume has three chapters: land and conflict; economic 
marginalization and violation of socio-economic rights; and 
economic crimes and grand corruption.
Volume IIC focuses on the stories and narratives of groups of 
people that are provided special protection under domestic 
and international law because of a history of discrimination 
and oppression. These are: women, children and minority 
and indigenous people. Historically members of these groups 
were not recognized as having the same rights as others. The 
drafters of the TJR Act clearly had such history in mind, and 
empowered the Commission to put in place special arrange-
ments and adopt specific mechanisms for addressing the 
experience of historically vulnerable populations. The Com-
mission thus established a Special Support Unit that focused 
on, among other things, ensuring that the Commission’s ac-
tivities adequately addressed and were accessible to histori-
cally vulnerable groups. The Commission also held thematic 
hearings that focused not only on the plight and rights of 
the aforementioned three groups but also the experiences 
of persons with disabilities (PWDs). Indeed, the Commission 
did put into place specific procedures in its statement taking 
exercise and public hearings to accommodate persons with 
disabilities. The experiences of PWDs are reflected across the 
various Chapters of this Volume.   
The third volume (Volume III) of the Report focuses on is-
sues relating to national unity and reconciliation in Kenya. 
The Commission was mandated to inquire into the causes 
of ethnic tension and make recommendations on the pro-
motion of healing, reconciliation and coexistence among 
ethnic communities.
The final volume of the Report (Volume IV) provides a cata-
logue of the findings and recommendations of the Com-
mission. In this volume is also included the Commission’s 
recommendation relating to the implementation mecha-
nism and reparation framework. 
Thematic Overviews 
Political History: A general overview 
In order to contextualize gross violations of human rights 
and historical injustices that occurred during the mandate 
period, the Commission divided the political history of Ken-
ya into four distinct epochs. These epochs correspond with 
the four political administrations that governed the country 
prior to and during the Commission’s mandate period: 
 British colonial era (1895 to 1963); 
 President Jomo Kenyatta’s era (1963 to 1978); 
 President Daniel arap Moi’s era (1978 to 2002); and 
 President Mwai Kibaki’s era (2002 to 2008). 
A review of the colonial period by the Commission revealed 
a litany of offences and atrocities committed by the British 
administration against the people now known as Kenyans. 
These violations included massacres, torture, arbitrary deten-
tion, and sexual violence, most of which were committed, 
initially, when the British government forced its authority on 
the local population, and later, when it violently sought to 
quash the Mau Mau rebellion. Between 1952 onwards, the 
British administration established detention camps in which 
suspected members of Mau Mau and/or their sympathisers 
were tortured and ill-treated. Others were detained in re-
stricted villages where they were used as forced labour under 
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harsh and inhuman or degrading conditions. The colonial 
government was also responsible for massive displacement 
of thousands of people from their lands. More than five mil-
lion acres of land were taken away from the original inhabit-
ants. This displacement created the conflicts over land that 
remain the cause and driver of conflict and ethnic tension in 
Kenya today. 
On 12 December 1963, Kenya gained independence from 
British rule. Independence came with high expectations and 
hopes. It signalled an end to practices that had been insti-
tutionalised under British rule; the end of racial segregation, 
detention camps, torture, massacres, unlawful killings and 
similar practices that had been institutionalised under colo-
nialism. To the citizens of a new free nation, independence 
meant the return to lands from which they had been forcibly 
evicted and of which they had been dispossessed in order to 
pave the way for British settlers. It was supposed to be the 
beginning of political and economic emancipation; the start 
of respect for the rule of law, human rights and dignity and 
the laying down of the foundations and tenets of democracy. 
Many envisioned a newly invigorated, united nation.
These expectations never materialized. President Kenyatta 
made no substantial changes to the structure of the state. 
Nor did he commit to or put in place mechanisms to redress 
the land problems that had been created by the colonial ad-
ministration. Instead, President Kenyatta embarked on con-
solidating his power. Under his administration, any political 
dissent was met with quick rebuke and reprisals in effect 
forcing the populace into a silence of fear. Reprisals included 
harassment,various forms of intimidation, attacks on the per-
son, detention and even assassination. Many fled into exile 
for fear of their lives and to avoid the heavy hand of the Keny-
atta administration. It was also during President Kenyatta’s 
administration that Kenya waged a war in Northern Kenya to 
quash a desire harboured by residents of this region to se-
cede to Somalia. This war has come to be popularly known 
as the ‘Shifta War’. State security agencies committed various 
forms of atrocities during the Shifta War and the Commission 
has dedicated a chapter in this Report that documents those 
atrocities. 
Under President Moi the status quo remained for a couple 
of years before becoming notably worse after the coup at-
tempt of 1 August 1982. In the aftermath of the coup, mem-
bers of the Kenya Air Force were rounded up and trans-
ported to prison facilities and other locations where they 
were tortured and subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. Thereafter, President Moi stepped up measures 
aimed at controlling the state and further consolidating his 
power. He filled government positions with loyalists, mainly 
from his own Kalenjin community. His government, which 
had in June 1982, amended the constitution to make Kenya 
a de jure one party state, removed security of tenure for 
constitutional office holders such as judges. The patterns 
of violence that started under Kenyatta continued under 
President Moi’s administration. Notably, members of state 
security agencies routinely committed atrocities against a 
people they had sworn to protect. Security operations, par-
ticularly in Northern Kenya often resulted in the massacres 
of innocent citizens. Almost without exception, security 
operations entailed the following atrocities: torture and ill-
treatment, rape and sexual violence, looting of property 
and burning of houses. These systematic attacks against ci-
vilians have all of the attributes of a crime against humanity. 
Factors that encouraged perpetuation of gross violations of human rights 
 The failure of the first government in independent Kenya (led by President Jomo Kenyatta) to dismantle the repressive state 
structures established by the colonial government 
 The use of and subsequent enhancement of repressive laws, policies and practices initially employed by the colonial 
government by post-independence political administrations (President Jomo Kenyatta’s and President Daniel Arap Moi’s 
administrations)
 The creation of a de jure one party state by President Moi’s administration, resulting in severe repression of political dissent 
and intimidation and control of the media.  Repression of political speech and the media allowed many violations to occur 
with little public scrutiny, much less accountability.     
 Consolidation of immense powers in the person of the President, coupled with the deliberate erosion of the independence 
of both the Judiciary and the Legislature. 
 The failure of the state to investigate and punish gross violations of human rights. The Commission finds that in most cases, 
the state has covered-up or down-played violations committed especially by state security agencies. During the entire 
mandate period (1963-2008), the state demonstrated no genuine commitment to investigate and punish atrocities and 
violation committed by its agents against innocent citizens. 
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When movements arose to advocate for opening up of the 
democtatic space and respect for human rights, President 
Moi’s government unleashed a reign of terror. Between 
1986 and 1997, hundreds of individuals were detained and 
tortured because they were suspected to be members of 
illegal organizations. The infamous Nyayo House torture 
chambers were designed and built during this period spe-
cifically for the purpose of terrorizing those who were criti-
cal of, or perceived to be critical of, the established regime.  
In 1991, in response to local and international pressure 
prompted by the end of the Cold War, President Moi yielded 
to demands for a multi-party state. However, with the advent 
of multi-party politics, elections began to be identified with 
violence. Ethnicity became an even more potent tool for po-
litical organising and access to state resources. Like his pre-
decessor, President Moi lacked the commitment to address 
grievances related to land. Instead, irregular and illegal allo-
cation of land became rampant during his era in power. 
In December 2002, KANU was dislodged from power by 
NARC under the leadership of President Mwai Kibaki. As 
a political party, NARC came to power on a platform that 
promised to curb and ultimately eliminate the political 
transgressions and human rights violations that had be-
come so common during the 39 years of KANU’s rule. NARC 
also pledged to address and rectify historical injustices. True 
to its commitment and in response to concerted calls by po-
litical activists and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the 
first few months of attaining power, the NARC government 
initiated numerous legislative and institutional reforms and 
a range of activities aimed at redressing past injustices. 
However, it was not long before autocratic tendencies and 
KANU-like practices began to emerge in the Kibaki adminis-
tration. An informal clique of powerful individuals who were 
keen on promoting narrow and regional interests formed 
around the President. Like President Moi before him, Presi-
dent Kibaki purged the public service of his predecessor’s 
nominees and filled it with people from his Kikuyu commu-
nity and the larger GEMA community. The administration 
paid lip service to the struggle against corruption. In 2005, all 
pretensions by the  Kibaki administration that it was pursuing 
reforms and a transitional agenda faded after the rejection 
of the Proposed New Constitution of Kenya in 2005 by the 
majority of Kenyans. 
The period leading up the 2007 General Election was char-
acterised by intense violent activities by militia groups, es-
pecially the Mungiki sect and Sabaot Land Defence Force 
(SLDF).The government responded to the violence with 
excessive force. In effect, the General Elections of 27 De-
cember 2007 were conducted in a volatile environment in 
which violence had been normalised and ethnic relations 
had become poisoned. Fertile ground had been prepared 
for the eruption of violence. Therefore, when the results of 
the Presidential Election were disputed, and both PNU and 
ODM claimed victory, violence erupted. 
The scale of the post-election violence (PEV) was unprec-
edented. It lasted for a period of two months and subsan-
tially affected all but two provinces in the country. It is esti-
mated that 1,133 people were killed, thousands assaulted 
and raped, hundreds of thousands more displaced from their 
homes, and property worth billions of shillings destroyed. It 
was one of the darkest episodes in Kenya’s post-independ-
ence history
Security Agencies: The police and the military 
The police and the military forces are at the centre of Kenya’s 
history of gross violations of human rights. While other agen-
cies of the state were responsible for historical injustices and 
gross violations of human rights during the mandate period, 
security agencies were both primarily responsible for many 
of the acts of commission documented in this Report, as well 
as the acts of omission (the failure to provide security) that 
allowed many of the violations committed by non-state ac-
tors to occur.  
Across the country, the Commission heard horrendous ac-
counts of atrocities committed against innocent citizens by 
the police and the military. The history of security operations 
conducted by these two institutions, either jointly or sever-
ally, is dominated by tales of brutal use of force, unlawful kill-
ings (sometimes on a large scale), rape and sexual violence, 
and burning and looting of property. In security operations, 
the police and the military often employed collective punish-
ment: the indiscriminate rounding up of individuals in a spe-
cific area, then brutally punishing them, all with the expec-
tation that this would yield the desired results of increased 
security. Thus, since independence, the police and the mili-
tary in Kenya have been viewed and invariably described as 
rogue institutions; they are still feared and seen as perennial 
violators of human rights rather than protectors of the same. 
In this regard, the Commission sought to trace the origins of 
practices employed by security agencies during security op-
erations. What emerged is that the practices adopted by the 
police and military forces in independent Kenya are starkly 
similar to those employed by the same forces during the 
colonial period. In essence, Independent Kenya inherited a 
police force that was deeply and historically troubled. From 
the 1890s right through to the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 
Kenya police force clearly structured itself around the polic-
ing needs of a small and politically powerful elite and racial 
minority. Kenya’s police force was from the outset built to 
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cater to these privileged few.  When, however, the Kenya Po-
lice Force did encounter African populations it was with a force 
and devastating violence. Throughout the temporal period of 
the Commission’s mandate this resort to brutality by the secu-
rity agencies never changed. The police force remained a law 
unto itself. The Kenya Police Force of today largely resembles 
the Kenya Police Force of the colonial period: narrow in out-
look, unclear in mission and violent in tendency. 
It is therefore not surprising that the use of excessive and fa-
tal force by security agents, especially by the police, against 
citizens has been a recurring theme throughout Kenya’s 
post-independence. Indeed, incidents of extra-judicial kill-
ings go back to colonial period. The practice continued into 
the post-colonial period. Research and investigations con-
ducted by the Commission, coupled with testimonies it re-
ceived during its hearings, show that during the mandate 
period, there was a common trend and pattern of extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances of members 
of illegal organizations such as Mungiki and Sabaot Land 
Defence Force. 
Moreover, whenever the police force has had to disperse 
crowds or stop riots, it has used excessive and dispropor-
tionate force,  an approach which has always resulted in the 
deaths of largely innocent citizens. Yet, successive govern-
ments have always and consistently denied any involvement 
by the police or other security forces in extra-judicial killings. 
Statements made in Parliament by successive ministers re-
sponsible for Provincial Administration and Internal Security 
reveal a pattern of blatant denials and mere justifications of 
what are otherwise horrible tragedies.
The history of the military paints a similarly grim picture. 
During the colonial period, and especially during the emer-
gency period, the military was engaged in the screening and 
interrogating of people in order to extract information from 
them concerning Mau Mau. It is from these twin processes 
of screening and interrogation that the most astonishing 
evidence of widespread and institutionalized torture has 
emerged. The military would continue to use similar brutal 
tactics way into the post-independence era and as recently 
as March 2008 during Operation Okoa Maisha in Mt. Elgon.
Shifta war
The Shifta War, waged between 1964 to 1967, represents a 
period in Kenya’s history during which systematic and wide-
spread violation of human rights (including mass killings) of 
Kenyan citizens occurred. Officially, the death toll stands at 
2,000. Unofficial estimates place the death toll at 7,000. The 
Shifta War acts as a bridge from the violations committed by 
the colonial power prior to independence and the violations 
committed by the newly independent government. The War 
arose out of a long history of political unrest in Northern 
Kenya where ethnic groups resisted centralised colonial rule. 
After independence state security agents alongside military 
personnel were deployed in what was called the Northern 
Frontier District to quell the continuing resistance.
Witness testimonies before the Commission brought to the 
surface the long history of violation of human rights and 
related activities in Northern Kenya. From the colonial days, 
Northern Kenya had been administered differently from the 
rest of the country. Travel and movement restrictions were 
imposed and administrators were given extraordinary pow-
ers to arrest and detain members of what the state referred 
to as ‘hostile tribes’.
The Commission did not get much information about the 
war itself because of the secrecy around military operations 
and the government’s reluctance to provide the information 
in its possession. However, individuals and communities af-
fected by the war submitted memoranda and information 
to the Commission which enabled it to set out the broad 
characteristics of the war. The Commission established that 
the Shifta War was characterised by unimaginable brutality. 
Mass killings featured prominently in the witness testimo-
nies and narratives. Pastoralist communities lost almost 90 
percent of their livestock through heavy handed strategies 
in which livestock were shot dead or confiscated. Many resi-
dents of the region trace the high levels of poverty experi-
enced by communities of Northern Kenya to the excesses of 
the Shifta War. 
Women narrated horrible stories of rape and other forms of 
sexual violence and the military and police were reported 
as major perpetrators. During the war, some communities 
fled to Somalia to escape the violence and only returned 
decades later, in 2000.
The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in Arusha, 
Tanzania on 28 October 1967 between the governments of 
Kenya and Somalia marked the formal end of the war. Wit-
nesses complained that they had no idea what was decided 
during the bilateral negotiations between the Somali and 
Kenyan governments as the contents of the agreement were 
never revealed to the people of the Northern Kenya, includ-
ing the citizens residing in the north.
Massacres 
The history of massacres in Kenya predates colonialism in 
Kenya. There were inter and intra-ethnic killings, as illustrat-
ed by the Maasai wars of the 1800s. This was the context in 
which the colonialists entered the scene and opened fresh 
horizons for mass violence.
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The Commission studied the history of massacres in Kenya 
to identify broad trends and patterns of mass violence that 
have recurred throughout Kenya’s history. The first prop-
erly documented massacre in Kenya’s colonial past was the 
Kedong Massacre of 26 November 1895. Other massacres 
include those committed in the context of the Giriama Re-
bellion of 1912-1914,  and the Kollowa Massacre of 24 April 
1950. Other massacres were committed during the Mau 
Mau uprising between 1952 and 1959. In this regard, the 
Lari and Hola Massacres stand out. In all these massacres, 
the colonial state was present and was always unapologet-
ic. Indeed, the colonial state always tried to minimise, cover 
up or flatly deny the occurrence of such mass killings.
At independence, the country was blood-drenched with a 
history of massacres and entered its future with historical 
baggage that was to affect future events. The Commission’s 
research, investigations and hearings revealed that most 
massacres in Kenya have occurred in Northern Kenya and 
have always occured in the context of what the state refers 
to security operations. The Commission has document-
ed the following massacres committed by state security 
agents: Bulla Karatasi Massacre; Wagalla Massacre; Malka 
Mari Massacre; Lotirir Massacre; and Murkutwa Massacre. 
To date, no government official has been prosecuted or 
otherwise publicly held to account for these atrocities.  The 
Commission also focused on a few massacres committed by 
non-state actors: Turbi Massacre and Loteteleit Massacre. 
Political Assassinations 
Kenya has lost some of its best and brightest to political as-
sassination:  Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya, Josiah Mwangi 
Kariuki (popularly known as JM Kariuki), Robert Ouko, Father 
Antony Kaiser, Bishop Alexander Muge, and many others.  A 
number of these deaths have been the subject of high pro-
file investigations; in some cases they have been subject to 
repeated investigations. Yet despite all of the investigations 
in these and other similar cases, the uncertainty concerning 
who was responsible for the killings and why specific indi-
viduals were killed is often as unclear as it was on the day the 
body was found.  Given the failures of past investigations, the 
Commission was fully aware that solving any of the mysteries 
surrounding these deaths would be difficult and challenging. 
Nevertheless, the Commission gathered information, un-
dertook research and investigations, and solicited testi-
mony to understand the context in which such killings took 
place; the circumstances and thus probable causes of such 
killings; the impact of such killings, particularly on the fam-
ily and friends of the victim; and the failure of investigations 
to solve the mystery of why a person was killed and who 
was responsible. The Commission’s work in relation to po-
litical assassinations confirms that the state was complicit 
in the assassination of Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya,  and 
Josiah Mwangi Kariuki.
Detention, torture and ill-treatment
In many ways, and despite the many challenges that it con-
tinues to face, Kenya is a country whose democratic and 
political space is relatively wide and dynamic. At least from 
2003, the state has more often than not respected citizens’ 
freedom of expression, assembly and the right to associa-
tion. However, it was not always this way. The freedom that 
Kenyans enjoy today is the result of many years of activism 
and struggle against dictatorship and state repression or 
violence. It is a freedom that came at a high price for many 
men and women who dared criticize or oppose Jomo Keny-
atta’s and Daniel Arap Moi’s political administrations. Many 
of them were detained without trial, tortured, and subjected 
to inhuman and degrading treatment. Their families were 
equally subjected to untold sorrows by state operatives. 
Many others succumbed to torture or were killed after un-
dergoing torture. 
Research and investigations conducted by the Commis-
sion coupled with the testimonies it received, shows that 
widespread and systematic use of torture occurred in the 
following contexts: 
 during the Shifta War; 
 in the aftermath of the 1982 attempted coup; 
 between 1982 and 1991 purposely to quell dissenting po-
litical voices and as part of the crackdown on Mwakenya; 
 between 1993 to 1997 as part of the crackdown on the 
February Eighteenth Revolutionary Army (FERA); 
 in 1997  following a raid on a police station in Likoni; and 
 most recently in 2008 during Operation Okoa Maisha, a 
security operation to flush out members of the  Sabaot 
Land Defence Force (SLDF) in the Mount Elgon region. 
On the basis of its research, investigations and hearings, 
the Commission has made, amongst others, the following 
findings: 
 systematic use of torture was employed by the Special 
Branch during interrogations of detained persons in 
Nyayo House, Nyati House, police stations, prisons, and 
other locations.
 Nyayo House basement cells and the 24th, 25th and 26th 
floors were used for interrogations and torture after the 
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attempted coup of 1982, during the Mwakenya crack-
down, and the FERA/M crackdown, and that the state 
purposely designed and built  these places for torture 
purposes. 
 the State established a task force for the specific pur-
pose of interrogation and torture of suspects. The Com-
mission has recommended the prosecution of the mem-
bers of the this task force. 
 the Judiciary frequently cooperated with the prosecu-
tion and security forces in the commitment of violations 
by refusing bail and by admitting evidence obtained 
through torture. The judiciary was also complicit in 
these violations to the extent that they conducted trials 
beyond working hours. 
To prevent the recurrence of torture, the Commission has 
recommended the enactment of legislation prohibiting all 
forms of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment committed both by state 
and non-state actors. The Commission has also made the 
following recommendations:
 that the President offer a public apology to all victims 
of torture and unlawful detention and acknowledge 
the role of the state in the design and use of the Nyayo 
House torture cells for torture purposes
 that Nyayo House be converted into a memorial after 
consultation with victims of torture
 the establishment of the Office of the Independent In-
spector of Prisons and All Places of Detention. This office 
shall be charged with the function of inspecting prison 
conditions and investigating allegations of torture. The 
Office shall also be mandated to investigate all cases of 
death in custody. The office shall issue periodic reports 
to the public on the condition of prisons in Kenya and 
other matters under its mandate.
The Commission has also recommended the provision of 
reparation for victims of unlawful detention, torture and ill-
treatment as per the framework described in the Chapter 
on Reparation Framework.
Sexual Violence 
Sexual violence is a crime that intimately impacts the victim 
both physically and psychologically. It uses the victim’s own 
sexual anatomy to dominate, suppress and control. For a 
long time, women and girls were believed to be the main, if 
not the only, victims of sexual violence. Over time, there has 
been acknowledgement that men and boys are also victims 
of sexual violence. 
The Commission received hundreds of statements from 
women, men and children outlining serious sexual violations 
perpetrated by individuals and groups of people including 
ordinary citizens and state officials. A total of 1,104 state-
ments from adults were received in regard to sexual viola-
tions, representing a victim count of 2,646 women and 346 
men. The Commission acknowledges that due to shame and 
stigma associated with sexual violence, many victims of sexu-
al violence did not report sexual violence to the Commission. 
Recognizing that sexual offences are ordinarily complex to 
investigate, the Commission adopted specific measures to 
ensure that sexual offences were effectively and sensitively 
investigated. Firstly, investigators who had previous experi-
ence in investigating sexual offences and who had under-
gone training on the same, including on the Sexual Offences 
Act, were recruited. Secondly, a set of guidelines outlining 
the approach to be taken in investigating sexual violence was 
prepared. The overall goal of the guidelines was to ensure 
that survivors of sexual violence were treated with dignity.
In acknowledgement of the stigma, shame and embarrass-
ment associated with sexual violence, the Commission of-
fered victims of sexual violence the option of testifying ei-
ther in camera or in public. The idea was to provide victims 
of sexual violence with not only a platform to be heard, but 
also a safe environment in which they could share their ex-
periences freely. The Commission also engaged the services 
of counsellors to offer psycho-social support before, during 
and after the hearings to enable the victims not only to nar-
rate their experiences but also to cope with what they had 
experienced. 
The Commission’s research, investigations and hearings re-
vealed the following in respect of sexual violence:
 Kenyan security forces (particularly the Kenya Police and 
the Kenya Army) have often raped and sexually violated 
women and girls during security operations;
 Sexual violence has always escalated during conflicts 
and periods of generalized violence;
 members of the British Royal Army stationed in Kenya 
for military training has been responsible  for the rape 
and sexual violation of women and girls in Samburu and 
Laikipia
 in one particular case, the Commission received about 
30 statements from women who were raped in Kitui 
during an eviction referred to as ‘Kavamba Operation’. 
The Commission has recommended the prosecution of 
Nganda Nyenze who supervised the evictions and the 
rape of the women. 
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Land and conflict 
For the majority of Kenyans, land is the basic, and in most 
cases, the only economic resource from which they eke out 
a livelihood. The ability to access, own, use and control land 
has a profound impact on their ability to feed and provide 
for their families and to establish their socio-economic and 
political standing in society. However, tensions and struc-
tural conflicts related to land have simmered in all parts 
of Kenya throughout the years of independence. In recent 
years, many land related problems have degenerated into 
social unrest and violence. 
Illegal acquisition of large tracts of land from indigenous 
communities during the colonial period rendered many 
communities at the Coast and in mainland Kenya landless. 
While affected communities expected redress through re-
settlement, restoration of their land and compensation 
from the Kenyatta and subsequent post-independence 
administrations, the government, instead alienated more 
land from already affected communities for the benefit of 
politically privileged ethnic communities and the political 
elite. This led to deeply held resentments against specific 
ethnic communities who benefited from resettlement at 
the expense of those who believe they are the rightful own-
ers of the land.
The Commission confirmed that land has been and remains 
one of the major causes of intra and inter-ethnic conflicts in 
the country. However, addressing historical and post-inde-
pendence land injustices has not been genuinely prioritised 
by successive governments despite the critical importance 
of land to the country’s economic development. There has 
never been any sustained effort to address land injustices 
that have occurred since colonial times.
The Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry established in 1998 
to look into the ethnic clashes related to the 1997 General 
Election vividly demonstrated how the skewed land alloca-
tion and ownership has fuelled ethnic tension and led to vi-
olent conflicts throughout Kenya and particularly in the Rift 
Valley and Coast regions. During the mandate period, land-
related grievances led to the emergence of militia groups in 
some parts of the country. The stated  aims of these militia 
groups often relates to the reclamation of lands, and the 
removal by violent means, of current occupants who they 
claim rendered them squatters. The Sabaot, for example, 
took up arms in 2006 in the Mount Elgon region to reclaim 
what they consider to be their land. 
Politicians often exploit the real or perceived land injus-
tices especially around election time, for personal gain. The 
dangerous mix of land-related claims with political aspira-
tions of specific groups or individuals remains a tinderbox 
that could ignite at any time. 
The Commission found that the ‘willing-buyer, willing-sell-
er’ land tenure approach was grossly abused and is one of 
the major factors causing disinheritance and landlessness, 
especially in the face of rising human populations. 
The unresolved land injustices have led to discriminatory 
and exclusionary practices that work against nationhood. 
The increasing feeling among the long-disadvantaged 
pastoral communities and the Kalenjin in particular (both 
herders and farmers) that they should fight at all cost to re-
claim their ‘stolen’ land from the rich ‘foreign’ (non-Kalen-
jin) settlers is one example. Although no attempt was 
made by President Moi’s government to revoke the land 
settlements of President Kenyatta’s regime, it became in-
creasingly difficult for ‘non-indigenous’ people to buy land 
north of Nakuru. Non-Kalenjin individuals and groups who 
bought parcels of land in Kalenjin-dominated areas found 
it hard to get them demarcated or obtain title deeds.
Negative ethnicity appears to be reflected even in the set-
tlement of internally displaced persons; those who get re-
settled often come from communities able to access politi-
cal power. 
The litany of historical injustices relating to land involves a 
complex variety of permutations. Almost every type of pub-
lic land was affected: from forest land, to water catchments, 
public school playgrounds, road reserves, research farms, 
public trust lands and land owned by public corporations 
and private individuals. Perpetrators of the injustices were 
equally varied and include holders of public office and gov-
ernment leaders at every level, the political and economic 
elite, church organisations, individuals and communities. 
Those who held sway usurped the institutions of govern-
ment to their bidding including the legislature, the execu-
tive and the judiciary. 
Officials who were supposed act as custodians of public 
land under the public trust doctrine, became the facilitators 
of illegal allocation, increasing landlessness and land scar-
city. The practice of land grabbing in many cases resulted 
in violence, as squatters resisted eviction from government 
land that was often subsequently lost to land grabbers. 
State corporations became conduits for ‘get-rich-schemes’ 
in which public lands were transferred to individuals 
and then quickly bought off at exorbitant prices by state 
corporations.
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Economic marginalisation and violation of 
socio-economic rights
The TJR Act mandated the Commission to ‘inquire into and 
establish the reality or otherwise of perceived economic 
marginalisation of communities and make recommenda-
tions on how to address the marginalisation’. 
Evidence shows that while the majority of Kenyans may not 
have been detained without trial or subjected to torture 
and other physical integrity violations, government’s exclu-
sionary economic policies and practices in the distribution 
of public jobs and services inflicted suffering on huge sec-
tions of society at different historical moments. As the Com-
mission travelled the country collecting statements and 
conducting public hearings, the pervasiveness of socio-
economic violations was evident. 
In terms of its mandate, the Commission identified a num-
ber of regions as economically marginalised in the post-
independence era:
 North Eastern (including Upper Eastern) Province; 
 Nyanza;
 North Rift; 
 Coast; 
 Western Province. 
Although poverty was found to be prevalent all over the 
country it was disproportionately so in these marginalised ar-
eas. By definition the Commission noted that marginalisation 
involves direct and indirect discrimination in the distribution 
of social goods and services. The economically marginalised 
also tend to be marginalised culturally, socially and politi-
cally. The Commission found that in almost all cases, the state 
played a direct role in increasing or decreasing inequality in 
communities. 
The Commission experienced a challenge in getting reli-
able and quality data, particularly on state funding of social 
programmes and infrastructure over the years in regions 
identified as marginalised. In making its assessment the 
Commission used a number of indicators of marginalisation 
including physical infrastructure, employment (especially 
in the public sector), education, health, housing, access to 
land, water, sanitation and food security. 
Although Central, Nairobi, South Rift Valley and Lower East-
ern provinces were not profiled as economically marginal-
ized regions, this does not mean that poverty is not evident 
in these regions. In fact, some residents of these regions 
also considered themselves marginalised at one time or 
another. 
Other examples of marginalisation include narratives from 
within specific regions based on local rather than national 
forces. In Nyanza, the Kuria blamed their plight on the Luo 
and the Abagusii, while in Nyandarua the residents consid-
ered themselves marginalised by their neighbours within 
the region. In the Western region, Bungoma and Vihiga were 
seen as beneficiaries of the limited social goods through co-
option of individuals by the Moi regime. Co-option of lead-
ers from the region often camouflaged the reality of mar-
ginalisation giving the sense of political inclusion that did 
not necessarily translate to economic inclusion. 
Marginalisation has been used deliberately as a political 
tool to punish recalcitrant politicians by punishing their 
ethnic group or region. The 1966 fallout between Jomo 
Kenyatta and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga was the beginning 
of the disintegration of the Kikuyu-Luo alliance, which was 
at the core of KANU at independence. It marked the start of 
the marginalisation of Nyanza and the first blatant use of 
negative ethnicity at a political level. Later similar disagree-
ments between Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki led to the 
blacklisting of Luo Nyanza both in terms of access to capital 
development and appointments to public positions. Testi-
mony before the Commission suggested that Nyanza had 
been in the economic and political cold for all but 10 years 
since independence. This isolation increased poverty and 
left various social and economic problems unaddressed. 
In the case of North Eastern Province, employment, land, in-
frastructure, poverty, education and the institutional frame-
work and capacity were the key indicators of the margin-
alisation of the region. One of the greatest impediments to 
development of the region is the lack of land registries in the 
region. As for infrastructure, which includes public utilities 
and is a major determinant of development and progress, 
the region has no tarmac road except the Isiolo-Moyale road, 
which is still under construction. The region has the highest 
rural population living under the poverty line at 70 percent, 
compared to 32 percent for Central province. Lack of food 
security is compounded by the erratic and low rainfall and 
declining pastures and other resources. This in turn creates 
conflict over these resources, further depleting the limited 
resources and the livestock. The paucity of schools and their 
relatively prohibitive cost in an area of widespread poverty 
has affected access to the limited education opportunities. 
School enrolment stands at about 18 percent for primary 
schools and 4.5 percent for secondary schools compared to 
the national average of about 88 percent and 22 per cent 
respectively for primary and secondary schools respectively. 
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Service delivery for health, water and sanitation were also 
way below the national average figures.
The face of marginalisation was found to be different in dif-
ferent regions. The relatively fertile land and relative secu-
rity of Western province tended to underplay the indicators 
and perceptions of marginalisation. While marginalisation 
has not reached the extent of that in North Eastern or Nyan-
za, Western was found to be forgotten in the development 
agenda with cash crops and related industries (cotton, sug-
arcane, rice and fisheries) completely ignored or badly mis-
managed when compared to those of other regions. 
The North Rift Valley region was found to have been mar-
ginalised from colonial times through to the present. In-
security, a harsh climate and regular inter ethnic and cross 
border conflict make the region difficult to live in. Absence 
of security personnel has led to a localised small arms race 
as groups accumulate arms to protect themselves. Succes-
sive governments maintained the same closed area policies 
as the colonialists preventing interaction with the rest of 
the country effectively marginalising the region. Indicators 
for education, health, infrastructure, water, housing and 
sanitation were very low compared to the rest of the coun-
try. Only one hospital serves the six districts of Turkana.
Landlessness is the major indicator of marginalisation at the 
Coast; land is the most intractable of the problems because 
of its historical origins. The original local inhabitants were 
dispossessed of their land, first by the colonialists, and later 
by fraudulent transactions that again ignored the original 
owners of the land. This left most of the land in the 10-mile 
Coastal Strip in the hands of absentee landlords. After inde-
pendence, the dispossession of the local people was con-
firmed and certified instead of being rectified, which led to 
a palpable sense of a conspiracy against coastal communi-
ties orchestrated by people from up-country. 
Hearings of the Commission were dominated by this prob-
lem. The most affected areas were Taita Taveta, Lamu, Malindi 
and Tana River districts. The Coast lags behind in terms of 
almost all indicators from infrastructure to health, educa-
tion, housing, water and sanitation. The regions also exhibits 
gender marginalisation attributed to religious and cultural 
dynamics of the region. Rural areas are served by dilapidated 
road networks compared to Mombasa, Kilifi, Malindi and 
Kwale. 
Grand corruption and economic crimes 
The fight against corruption is central to the struggle for 
human rights. Corruption has always greased the wheels of 
exploitation and injustice which characterize our world. As 
such, corruption is not just a crime that provides an unde-
served benefit to a private individual (often an enormously 
large such benefit).  It is a crime that lessens the availability 
and access to the fundamental needs of human life:  food, 
education, health care, shelter, etc.  In other words, the crime 
of corruption is directly related to the violations of socio-
economic rights. 
While corruption violates the rights of all those affected by 
it, it has a disproportionate impact on people that belong to 
vulnerable groups. Examples of these are minorities, indig-
enous people, persons with disabilities, persons living with 
HIV/AIDS, refugees, prisoners, the poor, women and children. 
They are more exploited and less able to defend themselves. 
Their vulnerability makes them easy victims of corruption.
Kenya’s post- independence history has been marred by 
successive cases of huge scandals. In order to appreciate 
the magnitude and scale of grand corruption in Kenya, the 
Commission resorted to documented cases of grand corrup-
tion from as early as the KenRen scandal in the 1970s up to 
the IEBC’s procurement of biometric voter registration kits in 
2013. In the last two decades, the media and civil society ex-
posed numerous multimillion dollar financial scams in Kenya 
including the following: Ken Ren Scandal; Goldenberg Scan-
dal; Charter House Bank Scandal; and Anglo Leasing Scandal. 
In its Chapter on Grand Corruption and Economic Crimes, the 
Commission has demonstrated the linkages between these 
crimes and the enjoyment of human rights and the huge 
cost that Kenya is paying through corruption and economic 
crimes. 
Women
Men and women experience violations of human rights and 
injustices differently. Building on the provisions of the TJR 
Act, the Commission adopted policies and took measures 
that ensured that the experiences of and violations suf-
fered by women were appropriately and comprehensively 
covered both in its work and this Report. These policies and 
measures related to the Commission’s statement-taking 
process, hearings, focus group discussions, and other activi-
ties undertaken by the Commission. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Commission held separate 
hearings for women in order to encourage women to speak 
about their own experiences. The women’s hearings were 
framed as ‘conversations with women’. They were presided 
over by female Commissioners and staff, and were thus 
designed to be safe spaces where women could freely talk 
about violations that were specific to them. The women’s 
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hearings were conducted in all regions of the country. In to-
tal, over 1000 women attended the women’s hearings across 
the country, with an average of 60 women in each hearing. 
The Commission’s chapter on gender deliberately focuses on 
the various injustices that women faced during the mandate 
period. Although women have always constituted half  of 
Kenya’s population, they have been traditionally relegated to 
a subordinate status by patriarchal cultural norms and prac-
tices. Harmful traditional practices in Kenya include, amongst 
others, preference for male children, early or forced marriag-
es, wife beating, female genital mutilation and widow inher-
itance. These norms were normal and sanctioned by law in 
the greater period covered by the Commission’s mandate. As 
such the Commission has found that women were the sub-
ject of systematic discrimination and/or gender-based perse-
cution throughout the mandate period. 
An important finding made by the Commission is that in sit-
uations of conflicts women are specific targets of violence, 
particularly sexual violence which is often accompanied by 
other forms of violations. The Commission has documented 
atrocities committed against women during the following 
three selected conflicts: Mau Mau War; Mount Elgon conflict 
and the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence. 
Conflicts always result in the forced displacement of popu-
lations. The Commission’s hearings revealed that the state’s 
response to the plight and needs of internally displaced 
women was less than satisfactory. Generally, the state’s re-
sponse fell short of its obligations as stipulated in relevant 
human rights instruments. 
Although most women who testified before the Com-
mission were victims of displacement occasioned by the 
2007/2008 PEV, many of them had been victims of prior 
evictions and displacement. During the PEV, women suf-
fered violations during flight to the camps or to places 
where they hoped they would find refuge. On resettlement 
of IDPs under Operation Rudi Nyumbani, the Commission’s 
hearings revealed that the corruption and mismanagement 
which marred the entire process had a particularly devastat-
ing impact on women. A considerable number of displaced 
women told the Commission that they received neither the 
start-up capital nor the payment in lieu of housing. 
Kenyan Refugee women in Uganda face a peculiar problem. 
During its women’s hearings, it became evident that many 
women found themselves in a dilemma as to whether they 
should return to Kenya or not. While some women were 
willing to return, their husbands were not. As such, they 
could not return to Kenya without straining or breaking 
their marriages. The general feeling among the Kenyan 
refugees in Uganda is that of a people who have been ne-
glected and abandoned by their government. 
Kenyan women were also victims of state repression dur-
ing the mandate period. As primary victims of state repres-
sion, scores of women, especially politicians, academics or 
human rights activists, were targets of state violence both 
during Kenyatta’s and Moi’s administrations. A number of 
female members of parliament who were vocal in their op-
position to repressive rule would be subjected to trumped-
up charges, detained, or even tortured. The vast majority of 
women were however secondary victims of state repres-
sion. Many women were widowed after their husbands 
were killed in security operations or died in police custody 
after undergoing torture. Some were subsequently thrown 
into destitution since husbands are the main breadwinners 
in many households in Kenya. Those whose husbands or 
sons were detained faced similar fate
In sum, women have suffered terrible atrocities just because 
of their sex and gender. The Commission has documented 
these atrocities not only for historical purposes, but also as 
a bold statement to political leaders and policy makers that 
achieving a just and fair Kenya partly depends on the initia-
tives they will take to heal the soul of the Kenyan woman. As of 
now, the vast majority of women feel abandoned by the state. 
Although in recent years many reforms have taken place to 
ensure women’s empowerment, much more still needs to be 
done for these reforms to make substantive and real contribu-
tions in the lives of women. There is need for special attention 
to the most vulnerable among women: women in rural and 
slum areas, internally displaced and refugee women, women 
with disabilities, women living with HIV/Aids and women be-
longing to minority and indigenous groups. 
Children
Children occupy a special place in any effort to understand 
the impact of gross human rights violations and historical 
injustices.  Children are, on the one hand, some of the most 
vulnerable people in a community and as such are less able 
to defend themselves against those who would do them 
harm, and are more likely to suffer both short- and long-
term effects from gross violations of human rights.  At the 
same time, children are the future of the country.  Their ex-
periences of their community, of their peers, of officials, and 
of other people in authority have profound impacts on their 
future, including how they trust, or don’t trust, those in au-
thority.  In addition, experience throughout the world con-
firms that children who are themselves the victims of abuse 
are more likely themselves to be abusers of others when 
they become adults.  Some, as the Commission discovered, 
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were both victims and perpetrators while still under the age 
of eighteen; being forced, for example, to join a militia and 
then committing violations as a member of that militia.  
Thus, while the mandate of the Commission did not have 
a child-specific focus, the Commission made deliberate ef-
forts to facilitate participation of children and young peo-
ple in its proceedings and to ensure that their interests and 
views both as direct and indirect witnesses and victims of 
human rights violations were captured. The Commission 
designed child-friendly processes to promote the partici-
pation and protection of children. Most notably, the Com-
mission held a thematic hearing in Nairobi that included an 
opportunity for children to testify in their own words in an 
environment that was safe and supportive.
The Commission heard horrific and heart-rending stories of 
abuse, violence, and other gross violations of the rights of 
children. The Commission also heard the anger of some of 
these children – some going so far as to say they wanted 
to kill the people who had abused them.  As such, the chil-
dren’s chapter provides a cautionary tale for the future of 
the nation.  The roots of tomorrow’s conflicts and violations 
are found in part in the treatment of our children today.
Minority groups and indigenous people
Testimony before the Commission clearly indicated that the 
rights of minorities and indigenous people have been violat-
ed repeatedly since independence. The problem is systemic. 
Many oppressive laws sanctioned the collective punish-
ment of minority and indigenous communities. While the 
laws were supposed to apply across the country in practice 
they only applied to communities in Northern Kenya where 
a significant number of minority groups and indigenous 
people are to be found. The anti-stock theft law, for in-
stance, legalised the collective punishment of a community 
for the offences of individual members of that community. 
Witness testimony before the Commission showed minori-
ties and indigenous peoples routinely had their collective 
identity marginalised. National data classified them as 
‘others’ creating deep-seated feelings of exclusion among 
groups such as the Munyoyoya, Nubians, Suba,Waata, 
Ogiek, Sabaot, Kuria, Kona, Bajuni, Hara, Saakuye, Burji, 
Isaak, Sengwen whose existence was effectively denied by 
the state and unknown to the majority of Kenyans. Yet the 
right to identity is an important right as it is associated with 
several other rights such as the right to culture. 
The forced displacement of pastoralists and hunter-
gatherers from their ancestral lands also increased their 
marginalisation, deepened their poverty and created con-
flict with neighbours. For instance, the Endorois were bru-
tally evicted from the trust land they inhabited around lake 
Bogoria when the government declared the area a game 
reserve. They were displaced, lost property and denied ac-
cess to traditional cultural and religious areas.  
The small population size that characterises minorities and 
indigenous groups has denied them influence and left them 
out of policy and decision making – even where decisions 
directly affect them.  During the mandate period, minority 
groups and indigenous people were unable to access jus-
tice at many levels frustrating their efforts to protect other 
rights. Minority and indigenous women suffered multiple 
forms of discrimination. They bore the brunt of inter-ethnic 
conflicts and insecurity and had difficulty accessing social 
services and goods from education to health services. 
The 2010 constitution has several provisions aimed at se-
curing an efficient legal framework for the protection and 
promotion of the rights of minorities and indigenous peo-
ple. However, it needs statutory and institutional mecha-
nisms for the realisation of these objectives. 
Ethnic tension 
The Chapter on Ethnic Tension documents the main causes 
and effects of ethnic tension in Kenya. The chapter is based 
mainly on testimonies that the Commission heard during its 
hearings across the country. In addition to holding such hear-
ings, the Commission also organized a thematic hearing on 
ethnic tension and violence on 2 February 2012 in Nairobi. 
During this thematic hearing the Commission heard presen-
tations by experts and relevant institutions such as the Na-
tional Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC). 
Through its research and hearings, the Commission iden-
tified several causes and drivers of ethnic tension in the 
country. The roots of most of these causes are traceable to 
the practices of colonial administration. Firstly, the colonial 
government pursued a policy of ‘divide and rule’ in order 
to consolidate their hold on the country, and to lessen the 
possibility that the African population would resist colonial 
rule. To that end, they magnified the differences between 
the various communities and regions, and stereotyped 
each community in a manner that would sow suspicion, ha-
tred and create a sense of ‘otherness’. 
Secondly, the colonial government created ethnically de-
fined administrative boundaries. In determining such bound-
aries, little serious thought, if any, was given to historical 
inter-ethnic interactions and relations. Thirdly, the colonial 
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government focused on developing infrastructure and so-
cial services in productive areas of the country (the so called 
‘white highlands’) at the expense of the rest of the country. 
The resulting inequality remained largely unaddressed in the 
policies and practices of independent Kenya. The preferen-
tial treatment given to some areas of the country because of 
their clear productivity thus led to differential treatment of 
ethnic communities that were patterned around the ethnic 
enclaves created by the colonial government. 
Fourthly, the colonial land policy, particularly in the so-
called ‘white highlands’ contributed enormously to regional 
and ethnic marginalisation from the economy. Colonial 
land policies resulted in displacement, the creation of ‘na-
tive reserves’, as well as the movement of masses of people 
from areas of their habitual residence to completely differ-
ent regions and settling them on lands that traditionally 
belonged to other communities.  
Thus, Kenya entered the era of independence with a height-
ened sense of ethnicity that continued to divide rather 
than unite the country. However, ruling elite in independ-
ent Kenya did not have the political will or commitment to 
create a truly democratic and prosperous Kenya for all its 
citizens.  The result was the worsening of ethnic relations 
such that by 2007, long standing grievances erupted into 
an unprecedented scale of violence. 
In the post-independence period, causes of ethnic tension 
include the following: 
 Insider/Outsider dynamics: Ethnic tension and violence 
occur when communities assert a superior claim over a 
territory at the expense of or to the exclusion of others. 
Such superior claims are based on the assumption that 
ownership or occupation at some point in the past cre-
ated an exclusive claim for such ownership or occupation 
in the present. Such exclusive claims to territory inevita-
bly create classes of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. This percep-
tion of people as outsiders as opposed to fellow citizens 
often lead to increased tension based on ethnicity which, 
in turn, create the potential for ethnic violence.
 Of names and their meaning: In Coast and Rift Valley 
alike, a thorny issue that is intricately tied to the notion 
of insiders and outsiders relates to names of places. In 
particular, local communities in these two regions are 
aggrieved that places occupied by those they consider 
outsiders have been given ‘outside names’.
 State sanctions of outside/insider notions: The des-
ignation of a community as ‘other’ or as an outsider has 
sometimes found support in state policy. In the northern 
region of the country, particularly in those areas that 
made up the former North Eastern Province, the Gov-
ernment has institutionalised the disparate treatment of 
Kenyans based on ethnicity by requiring that Kenyans of 
Somali origin carry a special pass
 Negative perceptions and stereotypes: Negative per-
ceptions and stereotypes are a major cause of ethnic 
tension in the country. Labels have been put on certain 
communities, portraying them in broad, often negative 
terms that generalise certain traits and apply them to all 
individuals belonging to the described community, re-
gardless of how individuals perceive themselves. For ex-
ample, the Kikuyu are sometimes described as thieves, 
the Maasai as primitive, the Somali as terrorists, etc.
 Culture and stereotypes: While the colonial govern-
ment played an important role in cultivating ethnic stere-
otypes, the Commission also received evidence that some 
stereotypes are drawn from and driven by traditional cul-
tural beliefs and practices. For instance, the Commission 
heard that men from communities that do not practice 
male circumcision have always been stigmatised and re-
garded as lesser or weaker men, and therefore, incapable 
of or unsuitable to take political leadership of the country.
 Ethnicity and access to public office: The perception 
that ethnic representation in government results in direct 
economic and other benefits to the represented commu-
nity is pervasive in Kenya. While the Commission acquired 
evidence that such benefits do not necessarily accrue to 
those communities who are represented - even in the 
highest offices of the land - the perception that they do 
leads to intense competition for such representation, and 
thus increases the likelihood of violence during elections. 
To demonstrate the complicated mix of land, ethnicity, poli-
tics and violence, the Commission includes an analysis of 
ethnic violence in the Mt. Elgon region.  While the history of 
violence in Mt. Elgon is unique, many aspects of the causes 
of violence and its impact are typical in many other parts of 
the country.  
Reconciliation 
For decades, Kenya has remained a nation in which com-
munities stand divided along ethnic and regional lines sus-
picious and distrustful of one another. Over the decades 
feelings of inter-communities distrust, even hatred, have fes-
tered mainly because a myriad of issues which are at the core 
of nation building have largely remained unresolved. These 
issues include conflicts over land, inequality and regional 
imbalances, and impunity combined with a lack of transpar-
ency and accountability. These issues have eroded a sense of 
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belonging, nationhood, and public trust in political and gov-
ernance institutions. 
Since independence, successive governments have em-
ployed silence, denial and selective amnesia whenever indi-
viduals and agencies have raised the need to address these 
fundamental issues. Painful memories of have been passed 
from one generation to another, and as a consequence, pre-
sent generations continue to hold grudges for violations 
and historical injustices meted against their forefathers and 
mothers. Until now, the scale and impact of human rights 
violations and historical injustices have neither been fully 
acknowledged nor sufficiently addressed.
In its work, the Commission recognised that meaningful 
reconciliation is not an event, but rather a long process. At 
the individual level,  the decision to reconcile is a personal 
one, aimed at setting the stage and establishing the basis 
for the beginning of a reconciliation process. Accordingly, 
the Commission worked towards ensuring that its activities 
in the course of its life and the result of its work would sub-
stantially contribute to the process of reconciliation.
As part of its reconciliation activities, the Commission con-
ducted reconciliation workshops across the country. It also 
conducted  Workshops on Trauma Healing and Strategy 
Formulation in selected places in the country. 
The Commission found that the views of victims on reconcili-
ation are varied. There are those who willingly forgave their 
perpetrators and did not even need to meet them. There 
are those who simply wanted to know why atrocities were 
committed against them. But there are also those who were 
unwilling to forgive and wanted to see their perpetrators 
prosecuted for the wrongs they committed. Adversely men-
tioned persons, on the other hand, were largely unwilling to 
acknowledge any responsibility for events that resulted in 
unspeakable atrocities. 
Implementation Mechanism 
Past experiences with the work of truth commissions and 
commissions of inquiry around the world have shown that 
a major challenge lies in the implementation of the recom-
mendations contained in the reports of these commissions. 
More often than not, the life of these commissions ends 
at the point of submission of their final report, leaving the 
implementation to other actors who often do not follow 
through with the recommendations. This challenge has also 
characterized the work of many commissions of inquiry in 
Kenya in the past.
The consequences of this challenge have been to limit the 
impact of the work of these commissions and to contribute 
to public fatigue and disappointment about such commis-
sions after expectations were raised. The drafters of the TJR 
Act must have had this challenge in mind when they em-
powered the Commission to recommend an implementa-
tion mechanism to ensure its recommendations are duly and 
timely implemented, and to monitor progress in that imple-
mentation. The government is expressly obligated under the 
TJR Act to create the implementation mechanism as set out 
in this Report.  
The Commission was sensitive to balancing a number of 
important objectives in its recommendation for an im-
plementation mechanism. First, it is imperative that the 
Commission’s Report, the result of close to four years of 
work, be widely disseminated and accessible to the Ken-
yan public, and in particular to the thousands of Kenyans 
who directly participated in and contributed to the Com-
mission’s work. 
Second, it is imperative that the Commission’s recommen-
dations, including but not limited to recommendations re-
lated to reparations, be fully implemented. Third, given the 
importance of many of the recommendations of the Com-
mission, including the recommendations related to repa-
rations, the Commission realized that the implementation 
mechanism would need to be independent of those bod-
ies to which such recommendations are directed in order 
to monitor them effectively.  In addition, the Commission 
was concerned that the implementation mechanism be 
sufficiently resourced in terms of time and staff to ensure 
effective monitoring and that its recommendations were in 
fact implemented.  
Based upon these and other considerations, the Commis-
sion decided to recommend  the establishment of a Com-
mittee for the Implementation of the Recommendations 
of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (the 
“Implementation Committee’). The Implementation Com-
mittee shall be established by legislation. 
Reparation Framework 
The TJR Act required the Commission to make recommen-
dations with regard to the policy that should be followed 
or measures that should be taken with regard to the grant-
ing of reparation to victims or the taking of other measures 
aimed at rehabilitating and restoring the human and civil 
dignity of victims. In this regard, the Commission has rec-
ommended the establishment of a reparation fund that 
shall be used to compensate victims of gross violation of 
human rights and historical injustices. The Reparation 
Framework recommended by the Commission sets out the 
caterories of victims who would access the fund and the cri-
teria for such access. 
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List of Abbreviations 
ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes 
ASK Agricultural Society of Kenya 
CAJ Commission on Administrative Justice
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CIPEV Commission of Inquiry into the Post 
Election Violence
CKRC Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission
CoE Committee of Experts
COTU Central Organization of Trade Unions
CSOs Civil Society Organizations
FDGs Focus Group Discussions
FKE Federation of Kenya Employers
HURIDOCS Human Rights Information and 
Documentation Systems
ICT Information Communication Technology 
ICJ  International Commission of Jurists 
FIDA Federation of Women Lawyers 
IEC Information Education Communications 
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IOM  International Organization for Migration 
IREC Independent Review Committee on the 
2007 General Elections
KAG Kenya Assemblies of God 
KANU Kenya African National Union
KBC Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
KMA Kenya Manufacturers Association
KNCHR Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights
KNDR Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation
KNUT Kenya National Union of Teachers
KTN Kenya Television Network
LSK Law Society of Kenya
NARC National Rainbow Coalition
NCIC National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission
ODM Orange Democratic Movement
OHCHR Office of the High Commission for 
Human Rights
PEV Post Election Violence
PWDs Persons with Disabilities
TJRC Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission
UN United Nations
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CHAPTER
ONE    
Background to the Commission
Introduction
1. The horrific violence that followed the disputed 2007 Presidential Election results 
deeply shocked Kenyans. It forced the tragic realisation that long-standing 
resentments and historical grievances had left communities so deeply divided that 
it threatened the stability of the nation and the ability to move forward together. 
2. Long considered an island of peace and stability, Kenya tottered on the brink of 
collapse, begging for answers. Why at all did it become necessary that as a nation 
Kenya should confront its past through the establishment of a truth commission 
and other mechanisms? The short answer to this question lies in the preamble 
to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act,1 the legislation which established 
the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC’). The preamble reads as 
follows: 
Desirous that our nation achieves its full potential in social, economic and political 
development; Concerned that since independence there has occurred in Kenya gross 
violation of human rights, abuse of power and misuse of public office; 
Concerned that some transgressions against our country and its people cannot be 
properly addressed by our judicial institutions due to procedural and other hindrances 
and conscious, however, that we must as a nation address the past in order to prepare 
for the future by building a democratic society based on the rule of law;
1 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act, No. 6 of 2008 [Hereinafter TJR Act].
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Aware that the process of achieving lasting peace and harmonious co-existence among 
Kenyans would be best served by enabling Kenyans to discard such matters in a free and 
reconciliatory forum; 
Deeply concerned that the culmination of the polarisation of our country and the feeling 
of resentment among Kenyans was the tragic post-election violence that followed the 
announcement of the 2007 Presidential election results;
Desirous to give the people of Kenya a fresh start where justice is accorded to the victims 
of injustice and past transgressions are adequately addressed: 
Now, therefore, be it enacted by the Parliament of Kenya [the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Act].
3. This Chapter is structurally divided into two broad parts. The first part traces 
the historical background leading to the establishment of the Commission. The 
second part describes the actual establishment of the Commission. This includes 
a description of the following: the selection and appointment of Commissioners; 
and the management and administration of the Commission.  
Commissioners and Staff of the Commission with the Deputy Prime Minister, Honourable Musalia Mudavadi.
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Historical Context 
Independence, high expectations and hopes
4. Few events in Kenya’s history are as memorable as the Independence Day 
celebrations across the country on 12 December 1963 when British colonial rule 
came to an end. The joy, pride, excitement and euphoria witnessed that Thursday 
morning was unprecedented. Independence was made possible by the gallant 
Kenyan men and women who risked and sacrificed their lives and limbs fighting 
for freedom from colonial rule. With relentless courage they fought and died, not 
only for their own freedom, but also for the freedom of their children and their 
children’s children – the generations not yet born. 
5. Independence came not only at a great price but also with high expectations and 
hopes. Independence signified an end to practices that had been institutionalised 
under British rule; the end of racial segregation, detention camps, torture, 
massacres, unlawful killings and similar practices that had been institutionalised 
under colonialism. 
6. To the citizens of a new free nation, independence meant the return to lands from 
which they had been forcibly evicted and of which they had been dispossessed in 
order to pave way for British settlers. It was supposed to be the beginning of political 
and economic emancipation; the start of respect for the rule of law, human rights 
and dignity and the laying down of the foundations and tenets of democracy. 
Many envisioned a united nation.  The high expectations and hopes of Kenyans at 
independence were succinctly summarised in the national anthem:
Oh God of all creation 
Bless this our land and nation 
Justice be our shield and defender
May we dwell in unity 
Peace and liberty 
Plenty be found within our borders 
Let one and all arise
With hearts both strong and true
Service be our earnest endeavour 
And our homeland of Kenya 
Heritage of splendour 
Firm may we stand to defend
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Let all with one accord 
In common bond united 
Build this our nation together 
And the glory of Kenya 
The fruit of our labour 
Fill every heart with thanksgiving
7. What followed this moment of renewal and optimism was a history of political 
repression, blatant injustices and widespread, systematic violation of human rights. 
Lost dreams 
8. The first political administration in independent Kenya – under the leadership of 
President Jomo Kenyatta – gradually returned to the ways of the colonial master. The 
government and the ruling political party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), 
not only retained repressive colonial laws, but also became increasingly intolerant 
of political dissent and opposition. Political assassinations and arbitrary detentions 
were turned into potent tools for silencing dissenting voices and ultimately for 
dismantling opposition political parties. For the larger part of Kenyatta’s reign 
Kenya was a de facto one-party state. 
9. In addition to these vices, the resettlement of Kenyan citizens on lands that they 
previously owned and lived on was riddled with corruption. As a consequence, many 
including those who had put their lives on the line for liberty were left landless. 
Moreover, ethnicity became rooted in political governance. By the time President 
Kenyatta died in August 1978, the high expectations and hopes that accompanied 
independence had been effectively dashed. 
10. Following the death of President Jomo Kenyatta, the then Vice-President, Daniel 
Toroitich arap Moi, took over the presidency as directed by the constitution. Upon 
his ascension to power, Moi ordered the release of political prisoners detained during 
the Kenyatta era. This action suggested the entry of a leader who had the political 
will to respect and protect human rights. However, his apparent goodwill did not last 
long.
11. The larger part of President Moi’s reign was characterised by intolerance to political 
dissent. In June 1982, the government pushed through Parliament a constitutional 
amendment that made the country a de jure one party state. In effect, KANU became 
the only lawful political party in the country. Following an attempted coup in August 
1982 the government resorted to even more vicious and repressive ways of dealing 
with dissent. 
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12. Political activists and individuals who dared oppose President Moi’s rule were 
routinely detained and tortured. Security agencies systematically committed untold 
atrocities against citizens they were sworn to protect. The judiciary became an 
accomplice in the perpetuation of violations, while parliament was transformed into 
a puppet controlled by the heavy hand of the executive. Corruption and especially 
the illegal and irregular allocation of land became institutionalised and normalised. 
Political patronage and centralisation of economic power in the hands of a few 
characterised the Moi era. 
13. In 1991, in response to local and international pressure prompted by the end of 
the Cold War, President Moi yielded to demands for a multi-party state. However, 
political and ethnic violence, reportedly orchestrated by the state became integral 
to multi-party elections held in 1992 and 1997. Ethnicity was used as a political 
tool for accessing power and state resources and for fuelling violence. 
14. By 2002, when KANU was dislodged from power by the National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC), Kenya was a ravaged state with a history burdened by ghastly accounts 
of gross violations of human rights and historical injustices. In effect, the KANU 
government had created an authoritarian, oppressive and corrupt state. It created a 
traumatised nation of thousands of individuals living with physical and psychological 
wounds in a country that had no time or space for their experiences and stories. It 
A meeting between donors and TJRC international commisioners.
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was a nation in which communities stood divided along ethnic and regional lines 
suspicious and distrustful of one another. It was a nation that had to confront the 
truth of its painful past and heal in order to chart the path towards a shared future. 
The Road to Establishing a Truth Commission 
15. The road to establishing a truth commission in Kenya was bumpy, long and marked 
by several false starts. Advocacy for a truth commission initially emerged as part of 
the campaigns for a multi-party system of governance. With the reintroduction of a 
multi-party state in 1991, the campaign for a mechanism to address past injustices 
was integrated into the wider campaign for a new constitution. It was, however, 
only after KANU’s fall from power in 2002 and the ascendancy to power of the 
NARC government that the official quest for a national transitional justice agenda 
began to take root. Several key events led to the creation of the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission. A discussion of these events follows hereunder. 
NARC and the promise of a truth commission 
16. The 2002 general election, unlike preceding multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997, 
was not characterised by political violence. Significantly, President Moi did not 
contest the transfer of power to Mwai Kibaki. NARC came to power on a platform 
that promised to curb and ultimately eliminate the political transgressions and 
human rights violations that had been regularised during the 39 years of KANU’s 
rule. NARC also pledged to address and rectify historical injustices. In his inaugural 
speech to the country on the day he was sworn in as the third president of the 
Republic of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki spelt out the vision of the new government - a 
vision that embodied the pursuit of transitional justice:
One would have preferred to overlook some of the all too obvious human errors and 
forge ahead, but it would be unfair to Kenyans not to raise questions about deliberate 
actions or policies of the past that continue to have grave consequences on the present 
[…] We want to bring back the culture of due process, accountability and transparency 
in public office. The era of ‘anything goes’ is gone forever. Government will no longer 
be run on the whims of individuals. The era of roadside policy declarations is gone. My 
government’s decisions will be guided by teamwork and consultations. The authority 
of Parliament and the independence of the Judiciary will be restored and enhanced as 
part of the democratic process and culture […] Corruption will now cease to be a way 
of life in Kenya, and I call upon all those members of my government and public officers 
accustomed to corrupt practices to know and clearly understand that there will be no 
sacred cows under my government.
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17. True to its commitment and in response to concerted calls by political activists 
and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the first few months of its operations the 
NARC Government initiated numerous legislative and institutional reforms and a 
range of activities aimed at redressing past injustices. These reforms and activities 
included, but were not limited to:
	 establishment by the President, in February 2003 of the Judicial Commission 
of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair; 
 establishment by the Chief Justice in March 2003 of the Integrity and Anti-
Corruption Committee of the Judiciary (Justice Aaron Ringera Committee) to, 
amongst other things, investigate and report on the magnitude of corruption 
in the Judiciary; 
 lifting of the ban on operations of the Mau Mau movement, a ban that had 
been imposed by the British government during the colonial era;
 initiation of an inquest into the murder of Father John Kaiser who was 
killed in 2002 under circumstances that had raised suspicion of a political 
assassination;
 establishment by Parliament of a Select Committee to inquire into the death 
of Dr Robert Ouko, who at the time of his death was the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in President Moi’s government;
 establishment by the President, in June 2003, of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land; and
 enactment of legislation creating the Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights.
The Task Force on Establishment of a Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission  
18. Of great importance was the establishment of the Task Force on the Establishment 
of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission in April 2003. The Task Force, 
chaired by Professor Makau Mutua, was mandated to recommend to the 
Minister for Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs whether the 
establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission was necessary for 
Kenya and if so to recommend:
 how and when such a commission should be established;
The people of 
Kenya have 
spoken, and 
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 the membership of such a commission;
 the terms of reference of such a commission;
 the powers or privileges to be conferred upon the commission in execution of 
its mandate; and 
 the historical period to be covered by the commission’s investigations.
19. The Task Force was officially launched in May 2003. Soon thereafter it began to 
conduct public hearings to solicit views that would form the basis of its findings and 
recommendations. The Task Force commissioned research papers from individuals 
who had studied truth commissions to inform its work. In addition, it convened an 
international conference where experiences of truth commissions from around the 
world were shared and explored.
20. After a period of collecting and collating the views of Kenyans from across the 
country, the Task Force concluded that a truth commission was necessary. It 
recommended that a commission to be referred to as the ‘Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission’, be established no later than June 2004. It summarised 
the views of Kenyans thus:
The people of Kenya have spoken, and the Task Force is privileged to report that 
Kenyans want a truth, justice, and reconciliation commission established immediately. 
The overwhelming majority of Kenyans, over 90 per cent of those who submitted 
their views to the Task Force, want the government to establish an effective truth 
commission, a vehicle that will reveal the truth about past atrocities, name perpetrators, 
provide redress for victims, and promote national healing and reconciliation. Kenyans 
believe that a truth commission will renew the country’s morality in politics, law, in the 
economy, and throughout the society. They want a state founded on the rule of law and 
respect for the human rights of every individual who resides in Kenya. In other words, 
Kenyans want a human rights state.2
21. The recommendation by the Task Force that a truth commission be established 
not later than June 2004 was informed by comparative experience that had 
shown that truth commissions are effective when established within the first two 
years of regime change. Studies suggest that where a truth commission is not 
formed soon after regime change, the possibility that a government in office will 
consolidate power and revert to practices that had in the first place warranted 
the creation of a truth commission is high. Unfortunately, this turned out to be 
the case in Kenya.
2 Government of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
(2003) 9 [hereinafter referred to as the Makau Mutua Report]
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Retrogression to the past 
22. The NARC government entered into office with a publicly declared commitment 
to address past injustices through reform and a number of stated activities 
Indeed, the Task Force cited some of these reforms and activities and concluded 
that they were ‘irrefutable testimonials of a break with the past and the 
undeniable transition which the state has embarked on’.3 Expectations were 
therefore high that a truth commission would be established in accordance with 
the recommendations of the Task Force. 
23. As time passed, it became clear that the promise of change and the fanfare around 
it were not to be. It did not take long for observers and analysts to begin to point 
out that a number of old practices had started to slowly but steadily become part 
of the NARC government. Writing shortly after NARC came to power, Professor 
Crispin Odhiambo-Mbai (who would later be assassinated) warned that autocratic 
tendencies had begun to emerge in the Kibaki regime.4 He indicated that ‘a cabal of 
shadowy behind-the-scenes operating self-seekers’ were already building around 
Kibaki to promote narrow and regional interests and if this group were to succeed 
in its mission, then it would most likely ‘promote patronage and intrigue politics, 
which are some of the key characteristics of an autocratic state’. He proceeded to 
predict that:5 
The emergence of this cabal around the president is already creating intense power 
rivalry and division in the Kibaki government. If the bickering and divisions continue, 
the government will obviously fail to fulfil countless campaign pledges it made to the 
electorate and, therefore, the high expectations that the majority of Kenyans invested 
in the NARC government. This is bound to create discontent among the population 
who would react by challenging the government in various ways. To counter the 
challenges, the government may be tempted to result to repressive tendencies – 
another characteristic of an autocratic state.
24. It was, therefore, not surprising that June 2004 – the deadline that the Makau Mutua 
Task Force had set for the establishment of a truth commission – passed without the 
establishment of such a commission. Despite a de jure regime change it appeared 
the government was gradually retrogressing to past practices. In this particular 
case, the new government fell back on an old practice perfected under the previous 
regime: the government of President Moi had consistently and deliberately failed to 
implement recommendations of task forces and commissions of inquiry. 
3 Makau Mutua Report (n 2 above) 12. 
4 See C Odhiambo-Mbai ‘The rise and fall of the autocratic state in Kenya’ in W Oyugi et al The politics of transition in Kenya 
(2003) 51, 93-94
5 As above. 
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25. Subsequent events confirmed the return to past practices and pointed to an 
unspoken but evident decision to abandon the transitional justice agenda. Most 
of the reforms and activities initiated in 2003 were abandoned midway or were 
pursued with substantially reduced rigour and commitment. For instance:
 The ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation 
of Land’ was presented to the President in June 2004, but no immediate or 
prompt actions were taken to implement its recommendations;
 The Parliamentary Select Committee investigating the Death of Dr Robert 
Ouko was dogged by controversy throughout its operations (including the 
resignation of a number of Committee members and the refusal of other 
Committee members to sign the final report).  The Committee did not table its 
Report before Parliament despite concluding its investigations in March 2005. 
The Report was later tabled in Parliament in December 2010. 
 The inquest into the murder of Father John Kaiser was inconclusive. However, 
the Presiding Magistrate recommended further investigations. Such further 
investigations have never been conducted. 
The Constitution of Kenya Review Process
26. An important process which returned Kenya to the old ways related to the process 
of adopting a new constitution and the aftermath of this process. Upon coming 
into power, the NARC government sought to bring to completion the constitutional 
review process that had started but stalled under the previous government. As part 
of its political campaign, NARC had promised to deliver a new constitution within 
100 days if elected to power. On being elected, the NARC government reconvened 
the National Constitutional Conference at Bomas of Kenya, Nairobi, for purposes of 
discussing, debating, amending and adopting a draft constitution. 
27. Despite delays and many challenges that threatened to scuttle the renewed 
constitutional review process, including the assassination of one of the delegates, 
Prof Odhiambo-Mbai, the National Constitutional Conference adopted the Draft 
Constitution of Kenya (popularly known as the ‘Bomas Draft’) on 23 March 2004.
28. The constitutional review process revived calls for a transitional justice mechanism 
to redress past injustices. In particular, during CKRC’s public hearings across the 
country, Kenyans had asked for the creation of a commission which would deal with 
past abuses and injustices.6 In response, the CKRC recommended the formation of a 
6 Government of Kenya The final report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (2005) 314 [Hereinafter CKRC 
Report) 
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Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice. It would comprise of three 
individuals – the People’s Protector (Ombudsman), a Human Rights Commissioner, 
and a Gender Commissioner – with the general mandate to, inter alia:7 
 investigate and establish, as complete a picture as possible, of the nature, 
causes and extent of gross violations of human rights;
 give an opportunity to victims and their families to relate the violations they 
suffered through hearings or other means;
 address the question of granting of amnesty to persons who were involved and 
who make disclosure of all the relevant acts associated with the crimes;
 make recommendations on reparation and the rehabilitation of the victims or 
families of the abused;
 propose measures aimed at the restoration of the human and civil dignity of 
victims; and
 report its findings to the nation.
29. Essentially, it had been envisaged that the Commission for Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice would have the mandate and discharge the functions 
of a truth commission. This recommendation was incorporated into the Draft 
Constitution of Kenya. The seventh schedule of the Bomas Draft addressed issues 
relating to the transitional period following the adoption of the Draft Constitution. 
Article 18 in particular dealt with the question of ‘past human rights abuses’ and 
provided as follows: 
Parliament shall, within six months after the effective date, enact a law to empower the 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice to –
(a)  investigate all forms of human rights abuses by any person or group of persons before 
the effective date;
(b)  investigate the causes of civil strife, including massacres, ethnic clashes and 
political assassinations, and identify those responsible; and(c) make appropriate 
recommendations regarding –
(i)  the prosecution of those responsible;
(ii)  the award of compensation to victims;
(iii)  reconciliation; and
(iv)  reparations.
7 CKRC Report (n 6 above) 317. 
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30. On receiving the Bomas Draft, however, the government altered its contents and 
pushed through Parliament a revised draft (popularly known as the ‘Wako Draft’ - in 
reference to the then Attorney-General Amos Wako, who crafted it). In contrast to 
the Bomas Draft, the Wako Draft watered down legislative powers and retained most 
of the presidential powers that many had hoped would be shared out to other arms 
of government. It also diluted the devolution framework that had been proposed in 
the Bomas Draft. 
31. The revision and dilution of the Bomas Draft led to a split of opinion in the 
government, necessitating a referendum. Seven Cabinet members joined the 
opposition in rallying the country to reject the Wako Draft. The members of 
government supporting the adoption of the watered down draft campaigned 
vigorously for the ratification of the Wako Draft. The campaign was filled with 
distortions and ethnic-based incitements. Long standing political grievances were 
revived during the referendum campaigns for or against the Draft. 
32. At the National Referendum held on 21 November 2005, 57 percent of Kenyans 
rejected the Wako Draft. While the outcome of the referendum was accepted, the 
referendum process had effectively exacerbated ethnic divisions in the country. 
Following the conclusion of the referendum, the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights (KNCHR) issued a report in which it concluded that: 
The referendum was about a new constitutional dispensation only in name. Rather, it 
was a moment to settle various political scores, up-end different political players, and 
assert political superiority. And in this zero-sum game between politicians, ethnicity, 
patronage and incitement became the preferred tools of the trade, with the people of 
the country bearing the brunt of their antics.8
33. Following the rejection of the Wako Draft, all pretensions by the government that it 
was pursuing reforms and a transitional agenda faded. President Kibaki dissolved his 
Cabinet and formed a government of national unity which incorporated prominent 
members of the previous KANU government. The NARC members who had opposed 
the proposed Constitution were dropped from Cabinet. They subsequently formed 
the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), while politicians and political parties 
allied to the government, and President Kibaki in particular, formed the Party of 
National Unity (PNU). The two parties, under the leadership of Raila Odinga and 
President Mwai Kibaki respectively, would later be at the centre of the disputed 2007 
Presidential election. 
8 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Behaving badly: Referendum report (2006) 5. 
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34. With the government having reneged on its general promise to pursue transitional 
justice, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) and civil society 
organisations continued to push for the formation of a truth commission. In 
particular, the KNCHR organised a series of events to honour and celebrate the life 
of prominent individuals who had been assassinated since Kenya’s independence. 
The first such event recalled the life of Tom Mboya and his assassination.9 The 
expectation of this particular event was two-fold: 
 to educate the public on who Tom Mboya was and why his assassination must 
not be forgotten; and
 to enable the country to begin to understand the need to push for a truth 
commission to bring out the truth or as much of it as possible, regarding the 
assassination of Tom Mboya and others who had suffered in defence of human 
rights and political freedoms, as part of the mechanisms of transitional justice 
in Kenya.
 
 However, these efforts did not yield any immediate results. In addition, the KNCHR 
and CSOs continued to work with victim groups in pushing for the establishment 
of a truth commission. In June 2006, they organized an international conference 
on transitional justice with the main objective of creating a forum for sharing 
comparative lessons on transitional justice mechanisms. 
The 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence  
35. Public debate on transitional justice resurfaced in the period running up to 
the 2007 general election. On 7 December 2007, Kituo cha Katiba organized a 
workshop in Nairobi on the theme ‘Revisiting Transitional Justice: A non-partisan 
and non-governmental engagement’. The objective of the workshop was to make 
truth and justice ‘an election issue Kenyans could vote on during the December 
2007 elections and to pressure politicians to state their stand on the issue’.10 
36. Instead, political campaigns leading up to the general election were dominated 
by corruption, hate speech and negative ethnicity. In December 2007, the KNCHR 
published its second periodic report entitled ‘Still Behaving Badly’.11 The Report 
documented blatant violations of the electoral code, including misuse and 
misappropriation of public resources, the participation of public officers in political 
campaigns and incitement to and incidences of violence. 
9 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights An evening with Tom Mboya (2006). 
10 Kituo cha Katiba Report of the convening on transitional justice in Kenya, Nairobi, 7 December 2007. 
11 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Still behaving badly: Second periodic report of the Election-Monitoring Project 
(2007). 
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37. The period towards the general election was also characterised by intense violent 
activities by militia groups, especially the Mungiki sect and Sabaot Land Defence 
Force (SLDF). The government responded to the violence with great force. In 
November 2007, the KNCHR published a report on extra-judicial killings. The 
report concluded that the police could be complicit in the killing of an estimated 
500 individuals suspected to be members of the outlawed Mungiki sect,12 which 
had wreaked terror in many parts of Central Kenya and areas of urban informal 
settlements in the capital city Nairobi. 
38. Thus, the general elections of 27 December 2007 were conducted in a volatile 
environment in which violence had been normalised and ethnic relations had 
become poisoned. In effect, fertile ground had been prepared for the eruption of 
violence. Therefore, when the results of the presidential election were disputed, 
and both PNU and ODM claimed victory, violence erupted. The scale of the post-
election violence (PEV) was unprecedented. It lasted for a period of two months 
and affected all but two provinces in the country.13 It is estimated that 1,133 people 
succumbed to the violence while approximately 350 000, were displaced from 
their homes14 and property worth billions of shillings destroyed through arson and 
other forms of attacks. It was the darkest episode in Kenya’s post-independence 
history. 
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
39. News of the PEV quickly spread across the world. Shocking images of a nation 
engulfed by violence were splashed on local and international media outlets. Yet, 
the protagonists at the centre of the disputed presidential election, President Mwai 
Kibaki of PNU and Raila Odinga of ODM (hereinafter referred to as the Principals), 
took hard-line positions, each insisting they had won. 
40. The international community, with the African Union (AU) taking a lead, 
responded almost instantly, with all efforts channelled towards unlocking 
the political gridlock and bringing to cessation the violence that was steadily 
pushing the country towards disintegration.15 From 8 to 10 January 2008, then 
AU Chairman, His Excellency John Agyekum Kufuor, President of Ghana, visited 
the country and initiated a mediation process between the Principals. After he 
12 KNCHR The cry of blood: Report on extra-judicial killings and disappearances (2008). 
13 See Republic of Kenya Report of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (2008) (hereinafter CIPEV Report). 
14 CIPEV Report (n 12 above) 346, 352. 
15 Prominent individuals who visited Kenya with a view to broker peace included former Presidents Ahmad Tejan Kabbah 
of Sierra Leone, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, Ketumile Masire of Botswana and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Others 
included Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa and the then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Fraser. 
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left, and with the blessings of the two Principals, the mediation process was 
taken over by a three-member Panel of Eminent African Personalities (hereafter 
referred to as the Panel) composed of three African icons: former United Nations 
(UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan, former Mozambican Minister and First Lady 
Graça Machel and former President of the United Republic of Tanzania Benjamin 
Mkapa. 
41. The Panel, chaired by Kofi Annan, arrived in Kenya on 22 January 2008 and 
immediately proceeded to hold meetings with relevant stakeholders. Two days 
later, on 24 January 2008, the Panel managed to convene a meeting between the 
two Principals. A few days later, on 29 January 2008, the Kenya National Dialogue 
and Reconciliation (KNDR) was formally launched by the Principals in the presence 
of the Panel. 
42. With the Panel as mediators, the KNDR negotiations were conducted by 
representatives of the two opposing sides: the PNU side was represented by Cabinet 
ministers Martha Karua, Sam Ongeri, Moses Wetangula and Mutula Kilonzo, while 
the ODM side was represented by Musalia Mudavadi, James Orengo, William Ruto, 
and Sally Kosgei.
43. The negotiating team agreed on an agenda comprising four main items:16 
 immediate action to stop the PEV and restore fundamental rights and liberties;
 immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation, 
healing and restoration; 
 how to overcome the political crisis; and
 address long-term issues and solutions. 
44. In respect to Agenda Items 1 to 3, the negotiation team concluded a series 
of public agreements, laying out the agreed modalities for implementing the 
broader objective of the KNDR process, which was ‘to achieve sustainable peace, 
stability and justice in Kenya through the rule of law and respect for human 
rights’.
 Agreed Statement on Security Measures, 1 February 2008. Under this 
Agreement, the parties committed themselves to take action to halt the 
violence.  The Agreement called on the police to act in accordance with the 
law and to carry out their duties and responsibilities with impartiality. It called 
16 ‘Annotated Agenda for the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation’ reprinted in AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities 
& The Kofi Annan Foundation Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: Basic Documents (2010) 1. 
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on all leaders to embrace and preach peace and further listed a range of 
measures to be taken towards restoring fundamental rights and civil liberties. 
 Agreed Statement on Measures to Address Humani-tarian Crisis, 4 February 
2008.  This Agreement laid out measures for the assistance and protection of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). It also proposed the operationalisation of 
the Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation of Effects and Resettlement of Victims of 
Post-2007 Election Violence. With respect to immediate measures to promote 
reconciliation, healing and restoration, the Agreement proposed that a truth, 
justice and reconciliation commission that includes local and international 
jurists should be established. 
 Agreed Statement on How to Resolve the Political Crisis, 14 February 2008. 
This Agreement, in the first instance, outlined a number of options that were 
available for resolving the political crisis, with the strengths and weaknesses 
of each option. It then charted the way forward, including: a forensic audit 
of the electoral process; comprehensive constitutional reform; establishment 
of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission; and the identification and 
prosecution of perpetrators of PEV.  
45. On 28 February 2008, after 41 days of intense mediation,17 the formal negotiations 
were concluded with the signing of the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership 
of the Coalition Government (hereinafter referred to as the Coalition Agreement) 
between the Principals. Upon the signing of the Coalition Agreement the PEV 
ceased. 
17 See E Lindenmayer & J Kaye A choice for peace? The story of forty-one days of mediation in Kenya (2009). 
Photo: The Nation online
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46. On the basis of the Coalition Agreement, the National Assembly enacted the 
National Accord and Reconciliation Act on 18 March 2008. The National Accord 
paved way for the establishment of a coalition government and the offices of 
Prime Minister as well as those of two Deputy Prime Ministers. 
47. Following the signing of the Coalition Agreement, the Panel appointed Ambassador 
Oluyemi Adeniji, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, to conclude 
negotiations on Agenda Item Four. On 4 March 2008, the following agreements 
were signed. 
 General Principles and Parameters for the Inde-pendent Review Committee 
on the 2007 General Elections (IREC). Pursuant to this Agreement and the 
Commissions of Inquiry Act, the Independent Review Commission headed by 
Justice Johann Kriegler of South Africa was appointed on 14 March 2008. After 
conducting a forensic audit of the electoral process IREC concluded that the 
polling process was undetectably perverted and that the recorded and reported 
results were so inaccurate as to render any reasonably accurate, reliable and 
convincing conclusion impossible.18 
 General Principles and Parameters for the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Post Election Violence (CIPEV). This Agreement, together with the 
Commissions of Inquiry Act, formed the basis for the appointment of a 
Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV) headed by Justice 
Philip Waki on 22 May 2008. The CIPEV carried out investigations and issued its 
report in October 2008. The Report found that while the PEV was spontaneous 
in some areas, it was planned and financed in other places.19 
 CIPEV generated a sealed list of individuals alleged to have borne the greatest 
responsibility for the PEV and recommended the formation of a special tribunal, 
within a specified time, for the prosecution of these individuals, failing which 
the list would be handed over to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) for appropriate action. Parliament failed to establish such a tribunal 
within the specified time and the sealed list of names was as a result handed 
over to the then ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo. A series of events 
followed thereafter, leading to the indictment of six Kenyan individuals before 
the ICC. 
 General Principles and Parameters for the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC Agreement). This Agreement formed the basis for the 
18 Republic of Kenya Report of the Independent Review Commission (2008). 
19 CIPEV Report. 
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establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The 
details of the Agreement are discussed in detail below. 
 Roadmap for a Comprehensive Constitutional Review Process. This 
Agreement outlined a five-step process for the enactment of a new constitution. 
It formed the basis for the enactment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act 
2008 and the appointment on 23 February 2009 of a Committee of Experts (CoE) 
charged with the function of spearheading the constitutional review process. 
After an elaborate consultative process, the CoE produced the proposed new 
Constitution of Kenya, which was subjected to a national referendum on 4 August 
2010. The referendum returned positive results, leading to the promulgation of 
the new Constitution of the Republic of Kenya on 27 August 2010. 
48. On May 28 2008, the KNDR parties signed another agreement in which they 
reaffirmed their commitment to address long-term issues listed under the KNDR 
Agenda Item Four.20 The KNDR process came to a formal end on 30 July 2008, with 
the adoption of an Implementation Framework. The Implementation Framework 
indicated action points, timeframes and focal points for each of the issues identified 
under Agenda Item Four. 
The TJRC Agreement 
49. The TJRC Agreement spelt out the general parameters, guiding principles and the 
broad rules that would govern the creation and operation of the Commission. In 
particular, the following general parameters were agreed upon:
 A truth, justice and reconciliation commission was to be created through an 
Act of Parliament and adopted by the Legislature within four weeks.
 The Commission would inquire into human rights violations, including 
those committed by the State, groups or individuals. Such inquiry was to 
include but not be limited to politically-motivated violence, assassinations, 
community displacements, settlements and evictions. The Commission was 
also to inquire into major economic crimes, in particular grand corruption, 
historical land injustices and the illegal and irregular acquisition of land, 
especially as related to conflict or violence. Other historical injustices were 
also to be investigated.
 The Commission was to inquire into events which took place between 
December 12, 1963 and February 28, 2008. However, it was also mandated to 
20 Statement of Principles on Long-Term Issues and Solutions reprinted in AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities & The Kofi 
Annan Foundation Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: Basic Documents (2010) 885.
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look at antecedents to this period where necessary in order to understand the 
nature, root causes, and context that led to such violations, violence, or crimes.
 The Commission was to receive statements from victims, witnesses, communities, 
interest groups, persons directly or indirectly involved in events, or any other 
group or individual; undertake investigations and research; hold hearings; 
and engage in activities as it determined to advance national or community 
reconciliation. The Commission was permitted to offer confidentiality to 
persons upon request, in order to protect individual privacy or security, or for 
other reasons. The determination as to whether to hold its hearings in public or 
in camera was left to the sole discretion of the Commission.
 Blanket amnesty would not be provided for past crimes. Provision was made for 
the proposed commission to recommend individual amnesty in exchange for 
the full truth. Serious international crimes including crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, or genocide were not amnestied, nor were persons who bore the 
greatest responsibility for crimes that the Commission would cover. 
 The Commission was to complete its work and submit a final report within two 
years. The final report was to state its findings and recommendations which 
would be submitted to the President, and made public within fourteen (14) 
days before being tabled in Parliament.
50. It was also agreed that the proposed Commission would reflect the following 
principles and guidelines, taking into account international standards and best 
practices:
 Independence: The Commission was to operate free from political or other 
influence. It would determine its own specific working methodologies and 
work plan, including those adopted for investigation and reporting. It would 
also set out its own budget and staff plan.
 Fair and balanced inquiry: In all its work, the Commission was to ensure that it 
sought the truth without influence from other factors. In representations to the 
public through hearings, statements, or in its final report, the Commission was 
to ensure that a fair representation of the truth was provided.
 Appropriate powers: The Commission was given powers of investigation, 
including the right to call persons to speak with the Commission and powers 
to make recommendations to be considered and implemented by the 
government or others. These recommendations could include measures to 
advance community or national reconciliation; institutional or other reforms, 
or whether any persons were to be held to account for past acts. 
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 Full cooperation: Government and other state offices were to provide information 
to the Commission on request, and to provide access to archives or other sources 
of information. Other Kenyan and international individuals and organizations 
were also urged to provide full cooperation and information to the Commission 
on request.
 Financial support: the parties were to encourage strong financial support to the 
Commission. The Government of Kenya was expected to provide a significant 
portion of the Commission’s budget. Other funding could be obtained by the 
Commission from donors, foundations, or other independent sources. 
51. On the composition of the Commission, the TJRC Agreement stated that: 
 The Commission would consist of seven members, with gender balance taken 
into account. Three of the members were to be international. The members 
were to be persons of high moral integrity, well regarded by the Kenyan 
population, and to possess a range of skills, backgrounds, and professional 
expertise. As a whole, the Commission was to be perceived as impartial and 
no member was to be seen to represent a specific political group. At least two 
and not more than five of the seven commissioners were to be lawyers. 
 In keeping with international best practices and to ensure broad public trust in 
and ownership of the process of seeking the truth, the national members of the 
Commission were chosen through a consultative process.  The Commissioners 
were to be named no more than eight weeks after the passage of the Act that 
established the Commission.
 The three international members were to be selected by the Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities, taking into account public input. 
The legislative process 
52. Parties to the TJRC Agreement had anticipated that the Commission would be 
created within four weeks of signing the Agreement. This timeline was both 
ambitious and impractical for two significant reasons. Firstly, four weeks was 
too short a period for the legislative cycle to run full course, considering that 
the National Assembly was required to enact several other pieces of legislation 
emanating from the KNDR process. 
53. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, four weeks was too short a period to allow 
for sufficient consultations with and meaningful participation of stakeholders in 
the legislative process. The legislative process officially commenced on 9 May 2008, 
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with the publication in the Kenya Gazette of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission Bill by the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional 
Affairs (Ministry of Justice).21 This was slightly more than one month outside the 
timeline given in the TJRC Agreement. 
54. The publication of the Bill was greeted with much criticism, especially because 
stakeholders claimed that they had not been meaningfully engaged in its 
drafting. Moreover, several of its provisions on the mandate and operations of a 
truth commission (such as provisions on amnesty) did not reflect internationally 
accepted standards. This prompted civil society organizations to prepare reviews 
of the Bill for consideration by the Ministry of Justice and the National Assembly. 
55. The Multi-Sectoral Task Force on the TJRC, an umbrella body of CSOs which 
later evolved into the Kenya Transitional Justice Network, prepared a detailed 
memorandum proposing amendments to the TJRC Bill, especially in relation to its 
provisions on the following: objectives and functions of the Commission; economic 
crimes; independence of the Commission; amnesty; and implementation of the 
recommendations of the Commission.22 Amnesty International raised similar issues 
and even expanded the concerns.23 
56. Some of the concerns and proposals made by the various CSOs were taken up 
by the Ministry of Justice and ultimately by the National Assembly. For example, 
the hitherto broad amnesty provisions were amended to allow for conditional 
amnesty for a very narrow list of crimes.
57. After going through the full legislative cycle, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Act became law on 23 October 2008.  The Act received Presidential Assent on 28 
November 2008 and came into operation on 17 March 2009.
21 Special Gazette Notice No. 23 of 2008. 
22 The Multi-Sectoral Task Force on the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Process Memorandum on the proposed amendments 
to the TJRC Bill, 2008. 
23 Amnesty International Kenya: Concerns about Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bill, May 2008, AFR 
32/009/2008. 
In keeping with international best practices and to ensure 
broad public trust in and ownership of the process of seeking 
the truth, the national members of the Commission were 
chosen through a consultative process.
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Establishment of the Commission  
58. There were three milestones in the establishment of the Commission: the selection 
and appointment of Commissioners, their inauguration, and the setting up of the 
Commission. These three milestones are discussed here in turn. 
Selection and appointment of Commissioners   
59. The TJR Act provided for the appointment of nine Commissioners; six Kenyan 
citizens appointed through a national consultative process and three non-citizens 
selected by the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities. The Act 
required gender equity (and geographical balance in the case of Kenyan citizens) 
in the selection of the Commissioners.24  
60. The selection of the Kenyan Commissioners was done through a broadly 
consultative process that involved civil society and Parliament.25 The process 
began with the creation of a Selection Panel composed of nine individuals 
nominated by various religious and professional organisations in the following 
proportion: 
 two individuals nominated by a joint forum of religious organisations; 
 one person nominated by the Law Society of Kenya (LSK); 
 one person nominated by the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA Kenya)
 one person jointly nominated by the Central Organisation of Trade Unions 
(COTU) and the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT); 
 one person nominated by the Association of Professional Societies of East Africa; 
 one person nominated by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
(KNCHR); 
 one person jointly nominated by the Kenya Private Sector Alliance and the 
Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE); and 
 one person nominated by the Kenya Medical Association (KMA).26   
24 TJR Act, sec 10.  
25 But see C Alai ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission’ in L Mute & L Young (eds) Transitional justice in Kenya: 
Looking forward, reflecting on the past (2011) 111, 120 (noting that ‘the selection process was void of public participation 
and had limited input or scrutiny from civil society and victims’ groups’. 
26  TJR Act, sec 9.  
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61. In April 2009, the Selection Panel placed an advertisement in the Kenya Gazette 
and in three daily newspapers inviting applications from persons who met the 
qualifications set forth in the Act for nomination as commissioners. The Act required 
that the Commissioners include individuals with knowledge and experience in 
human rights law, forensic audit, investigations, psycho-sociology, anthropology, 
social relations, conflict management, religion and gender issues. 
62. The Act also included a broadly worded qualification designed to protect the 
process and the broad mandate of the Commission from any interference due to 
conflict of interest. The Act thus required that commissioners be persons who had 
‘not in any way been involved, implicated, linked or associated with human rights 
violations of any kind or in any matter which is to be investigated under this Act’.27 
63. The Selection Panel sub-contracted a human resources firm to conduct short-
listing of applicants on its behalf. The firm received a total of 254 applications. Out 
of these, 47 applicants were selected for interview by the Panel. After conducting 
interviews, 15 names were forwarded to the National Assembly for consideration. 
The National Assembly deliberated the suitability of the 15 individuals and 
narrowed the number of candidates to nine.28 The Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities forwarded three names to the National Assembly, which in turn 
forwarded those names together with those of the nine Kenyans to the President. 
64. By Gazette Notice dated 22 July 2009, the President appointed the following nine 
individuals to serve as members of the Commission:29 
 Bethuel Kiplagat (Kenya); 
 Kaari Betty Murungi (Kenya); 
 Tecla Namachanja Wanjala (Kenya); 
 Gertrude Chawatama (Zambia); 
 Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia); 
 Ahmed Sheikh Farah (Kenya); 
 Tom Ojienda (Kenya); 
27 TJR Act, sec 10(6) (b).  
28 Prior to the amendment of the Act in July 2009, the First Schedule did not specify the number of individuals to be forwarded 
from the National Assembly to the President. As such, the National Assembly forwarded nine (9) names to the President from 
whom he was required to appoint six as commissioners. Later, the Act was amended to require Parliament to forward only six 
names to the President, but this amendment was of no effect because it had been overtaken by events. 
29 See Appendix 1 for the personal profiles of the Commissioners.
24
Volume I    Chapter O N E  
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
 Margaret Shava (Kenya); and 
 Ronald Slye (United States).
65. From among the Commissioners, the President appointed Ambassador Bethuel 
Kiplagat as Chairperson to the Commission. The President also appointed 
Betty Murungi as Vice-Chairperson, though the Act made it clear that the Vice-
Chairperson was to be chosen by the Commissioners themselves and not the 
President.30  Shortly after the members of the Commission were appointed, the 
Cabinet issued a statement indicating that instead of establishing a special tribunal 
to try those who were allegedly responsible for the 2007/2008 Post Election 
Violence, it would be seeking an expansion of the Commission’s to include dealing 
with these cases.  This decision was highly criticized by a broad sector of Kenyan 
society and would later have an impact on the work of the Commission although 
the decision never saw the light of day. Firstly,  the decision created the impression 
that the government was inclined to using the Commission as a shield against 
those who were alleged to bear responsibility for the PEV. Secondly, a section 
of CSOs and donors resolved not to work with or fund the Commission until the 
Cabinet’s decision is reversed.
Inauguration of the Commission 
66. The Commissioners were sworn into office on 3 August 2009. As is discussed in 
Chapter Four of this Report, the oath of office taken by the Commissioners was one 
of the grounds on which a group of activists filed legal suit challenging the existence 
of the Commission.31
67. During their inaugural meeting, and in accordance with Section 11(2) of the TJR 
Act, Commissioners elected Betty Murungi as the Vice-Chairperson. However, 
as will be discussed in detail later, Betty Murungi subsequently resigned, first as 
Vice-Chairperson and then as a Commissioner.  While the President was required 
to gazette her vacancy within seven days of her resignation so that a replacement 
could be chosen, such notice was never published and thus no replacement was 
ever provided.
68. From mid-April 2010 the Commission operated with only eight full-time 
Commissioners.  When Ambassador Kiplagat stepped aside in November 2010 for 
sixteen months, the Commission operated with only seven full-time Commissioners.
30 TJR Act, sec 11(2). 
31 Augustine Njeru Kathangu & 9 Others v TJRC & Bethuel Kiplagat, High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 470 of 2009. 
25
Volume  I    Chapter O N E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
69. With the resignation of Betty Murungi as Vice Chairperson, Tecla Namachanja 
Wanjala was elected the Commission’s Vice-Chairperson. She later served as the 
Commission’s Acting Chairperson from 2 November 2010 to 27 February 2012 
while Ambassador Kiplagat had temporarily stepped aside from office. 
Foundational Tasks 
70. The TJR Act Setting up the Commission involved four foundational tasks: 
 establishing the Commission’s secretariat; 
 developing internal policy and procedural documents to guide the work of 
the Commission; 
 conceptualising and interpreting the Commission’s mandate; and 
 informing the public about the Commission’s existence and the purpose of its 
work. 
71. Chapter Two of this volume of the Report discusses in detail the Commission’s 
interpretation of its mandate while Chapter Three outlines the Commission’s 
endeavour to inform the public of its existence and work.
72. The detailed aspects of these foundational tasks were performed by nine thematic 
working groups. Initially, budget constraints delayed the recruitment of staff and 
the working groups were each composed of three or four Commissioners. The 
working groups were as follows: 
 Structure Working Group 
 Gender Working Group
 Stakeholder Collaboration Working Group
 Rules of Procedure Working Group
 Human Resources Working Group
 Security Working Group
 Outreach and Public Awareness Working Group
 Internal Rules and Policy Working Group
 Communications and Media Working Group
 Legal Affairs Working Group
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Internal Policies 
73. The administrative operations of the Commission were guided by, among others, 
the following internal policy and procedural documents: Staff Employment 
Policy; Staff Code of Conduct and Confidentiality Agreement; and Security Policy.
 Employment Policy: The Employment Policy was the basic policy document 
which defined the relationship between the Commission and its employees, 
including the rights and responsibilities of each party. It served as a rich source 
of information about the Commission’s working conditions, benefits and policies. 
Each staff member was expected to be acquainted with and abide by the 
Employment Policy in the conduct of their duties and in their general deportment. 
 Code of Conduct and Confidentiality Agreement: Employees of the 
Commission were required to abide by a code of conduct and take an oath of 
confidentiality. In signing the document Commission staff undertook: 
 not to reveal any information that they came across in the course of their 
work. Such information included, but was not limited, to the names of the 
victims and witnesses or adversely mentioned persons and the specific details 
of their statements, pictures, reports, and documents of the Commission. This 
restriction would apply both during the period of their employment and 
thereafter;
 to deal with witnesses with compassion and respect for their dignity;
 not to reveal or otherwise discuss with anyone outside the Commission 
information regarding the internal operations and activities of the Commission;
 to bring to the immediate attention of the Director of Finance and 
Administration or Chief Executive Officer any breach of the Code of Conduct 
that they become aware of;
 to promptly deliver to the Commission all property of the Commission 
whenever requested or in any event upon termination of employment;
 not to engage in other employment or activities that could result in a conflict 
of interest (including the reasonable perception of a conflict of interest) with 
their employment in the Commission.
 not to give press or other media interviews, on or off the record, without 
express written authority from the Director of Communications or the 
Chief Executive Officer.
 Security Policy:  This document laid out measures relating to the security of the 
Commissioners, the Commission’s staff, and witnesses who interacted with the 
Commission. 
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Management and Administration 
Organisational structure 
74. The Commission’s organisational structure was designed with the assistance of an 
independent consultant. Later, a five-member team comprising officers from the 
Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs (Ministry of Justice) 
and Ministry of State for Public Service was assigned to support the Commission 
with this task. However, as is discussed below in detail, the Commission’s 
organizational structure was not approved. 
75. The functions and objectives of the Commission were discharged by Commissioners 
who were positioned at the apex of the Commission’s organisational structure. 
According to the TJR Act, the overall task of supervising and directing the work of 
the Commission rested with the chairperson.32 It also indicated that the chairperson 
would preside over all meetings of the Commission and was its spokesperson.33 
76. The TJR Act allowed the Commission to establish such committees as it considered 
necessary for the better performance of its functions. Pursuant to this provision, 
the Commission established seven committees that fell under two broad 
categories: mandate and administrative committees. Mandate committees were 
responsible for guiding, both conceptually and practically, the Commission’s 
execution of its substantive mandate. There were four such committees:  
 Human Rights Violations Committee; 
 Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee; 
 Reconciliation Committee; and 
 Amnesty Committee. 
77. Administrative committees provided policy guidance for the daily functioning of 
the Commission. Three committees and one sub-committee were established for 
this purpose: 
 Committee on Finance and Administration and its sub-committee on 
Recruitment and Human Resources; 
 Committee on Logistics, Security and Procurement; and 
 Committee on Communications and Civic Education. 
32  TJR Act, sec 10(4)(c). 
33  TJR Act, sec 10(4)(a). 
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78. The Commission’s Secretariat was headed by the Secretary to the Commission who 
was also its Chief Executive Officer.34 The CEO was responsible for the day-to-day 
administration and management of the affairs of the Commission.35 
79. The technical operations of the Commission were carried out by eight departments, 
each headed by a Director responsible for directing, supervising and coordinating 
work within their respective departments. The eight departments were as follows: 




 Special Support Services;
 Communications;
 Finance and Administration; and
 Documentation and Information Management. 
80. Although the various units had specific terms of reference, their operations were 
harmonised to ensure coherence and efficiency in the execution of the Commission’s 
mandate. The work of each department fed into and informed the work of the other 
units. This was facilitated by periodic meetings of all Directors which allowed each 
department to learn about and contribute to the work of the other departments. 
 Civic Education and Outreach Department:  This Department was responsible 
for educating, engaging, and encouraging the public to contribute positively 
to the achievement of the objectives of the Commission. In particular, the 
Unit: (a) coordinated the dissemination of information about the Commission 
to the general public through education and public awareness campaigns 
and other forums; (b) coordinated reconciliation initiatives; and (c) developed 
and updated the Commission’s civic education and advocacy materials. 
The Department became operational in August 2010, with the hiring of the 
Director Civic Education and Outreach, together with two programme officers. 
 Research Department: The Research Department was responsible for 
three broad tasks: conducting research into all aspects of the Commission’s 
substantive mandate; servicing the research needs of other departments of the 
Commission; and coordinating the writing of the Report of the Commission. 
34  TJR Act, sec 13(1). 
35  TJR Act, sec 13(2). 
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 Investigations Department: The Investigations Department’s primary role was 
to collect, analyze and provide accurate information to enable the Commission 
to build a complete historical record and picture of gross human rights violations. 
In particular, the Department was responsible for: identifying and interviewing 
victims and witnesses; collection and recovery of evidence from victims and 
witnesses; and mapping out areas identified as scenes of gross violations of 
human rights for the Commission’s site visits.
 Legal Affairs Department: The Legal Affairs Department was responsible for 
handling all legal matters related to the Commission’s execution of its mandate. 
The Department was also responsible for organizing and coordinating the 
conduct of the Commission’s hearings. It was also involved in training of 
relevant stakeholders (e.g. lawyers) on matters pertaining to the Commission’s 
mandate. 
 Special Support Department: This Department was established pursuant to 
section 27 of the TJR Act, which provided that the Commission could put in 
place special arrangements and adopt specific mechanisms and procedures 
to address the experiences of women, children, persons with disabilities 
(PWD), and other vulnerable groups. Its primary role was to ensure that the 
situation and experiences of these vulnerable groups were consistently and 
adequately addressed in all the processes of the Commission. In this regard, 
it was responsible for coordinating the provision of counselling services to 
victims and witnesses and generally catering for their welfare, including their 
accommodation and travel needs. The Department was also responsible 
for the organisation of the women’s hearings and the thematic hearings on 
children and persons with disabilities. 
 The Communications Department: This Department was the link between 
the Commission and the media and by extension between the Commission 
and the general public. The Department managed the Commission’s media 
and public relations.
 The Finance and Administration Department: The Department of Finance 
and Administration was responsible for provision of logistical and administrative 
support to the Commission. This included the procurement of goods and 
services and the preparation and management of the Commission’s budget and 
finance.
 ICT and Documentation Department: the ICT and Documentation Department 
was responsible for the management and provision of the Commission’s 
information and communication technology needs. It was also charged with 
the custody of all records and documents and the creation and maintenance of 
the database and the Commission’s website. 
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Chart 1: Organogram 
Chart 2: Inter-departmental synergies
Recruitment of staff 
81. The Commission was permitted by its enabling legislation to appoint officers and 
other staff as considered necessary for the proper performance of its functions.36 
However, due to lack of funds, the Commission operated with neither a secretary 
nor a secretariat during its first fiscal year (2009-2010). During this period, 
Commissioners performed most of the administrative and organisational work 
with the assistance of a 17 member support staff seconded to the Commission by 
the Ministry of Justice. 
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82. The Commission commenced its recruitment process in February 2010 with 
the hiring of the Secretary/Chief Executive Officer. Most line directors and staff 
were hired in August 2010 and the various departments commenced operations 
around September 2010. At the height of its operations, the Commission had 
a total of 150 members of staff.37 This number was gradually reduced as the 
Commission approached the conclusion of its term. Thus, as at 4 November 2012, 
the initial date for its closure, the Commission had a total of 60 members of staff. 
However, upon receiving a further extension of its term, and as part of its efforts 
to finalize all pending mandate operations, the Commission in January 2013 re-
hired staff. 
  
 Victims as staff 
83. In August 2010, the Commission recruited 304 statement takers and deployed them 
across the country to take statements from victims, their families and witnesses. 
Amongst those recruited were individuals who were victims of violations that fell 
under the Commission’s mandate and scope of inquiry. Sections of civil society and 
others raised the concern that engaging victims as staff of the Commission was 
inappropriate. They argued that victims would be partial by virtue of their experience 
and their engagement as staff of the Commission would compromise the statement 
taking process. 
84. The Commission did not take these concerns lightly. The decision to engage 
victims as staff members was based on comparative experience. Many truth 
commissions across the world have involved victims. Some of the best known truth 
commissions have had victims as Commissioners and Chairpersons; for example, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu chaired the South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. Truth commissions are designed to be victim-centred, though not 
victim-dominated, processes. Engagement of victims facilitates access to victim 
communities, and promotes ownership and legitimacy of the process. The right 
to effective remedy requires that victims are involved in the processes of finding 
solutions to and redress for violations.
85. Therefore, the question before the Commission was not whether to engage victims 
but in what capacity and under what terms. Firstly, victims had to qualify for the 
position they applied for just like any other applicant and go through the interview 
process. Secondly, the Commission limited the recruitment of victims to statement 
takers and civic educators. In the area of statement taking the Commission also 
adopted the policy that any individual could request a different statement taker 
37  For the list of staff see Appendix 2. 
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than the one before them, thus ensuring that individuals who gave statements were 
provided the safest and most effective environment in which to tell their stories. 
Victims were not hired as investigators or as researchers, or in any positions which 
involved analysis of violations and identifying those responsible for such violations. 
In addition, the Commission took measures to ensure that cases of conflict of interest 
were minimised.
86. The engagement of victims by the Commission also had an important reparatory 
dimension to it. It symbolised restoration and affirmation of the dignity of victims 
and their right to access employment in formal institutions. As documented in 
the ‘Torture and Detentions’ Chapter in Volume Two of this Report, the majority 
of victims of torture and detention under President Moi’s regime remained 
unemployed, decades later. Those who were university students at the time of their 
detention and torture had their education and careers abruptly and indefinitely cut 
short. Members of the Kenya Air Force who were suspected to have been behind 
or supported the 1982 attempted coup d’état, had their careers in the armed forces 
abruptly terminated and the stigma surrounding their discharge from the Force 
made it impossible to secure employment in any formal institution. 
87. The small number of victims that the Commission engaged as statement takers and 
civic educators expressed gratitude that such an opportunity had been offered to 
them.38 
 Database Manager and Director Investigations 
88. Due to the sensitive nature of the information collected by the Commission and the 
unfortunate ethnic suspicions that have traditionally greeted public appointments 
in Kenya, the Commission decided that the positions of Database Manager and 
Director Investigations would be held by non-Kenyans. It was important for 
the Commission to take this position given that perceptions of bias could be 
heightened if Kenyan citizens were to hold these offices. In line with this policy 
decision, the Commission hired a national of India as its Database Manager and a 
national of New Zealand as its Director of Investigations. 
89. The remaining professional positions within the Commission were filled by 
Kenyans. It is noteworthy that at no point did the Commission have reason to be 
concerned about the actual bias of any staff member, whether Kenyan or foreign. 
38 See e.g. TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/28 Feb 2012/p. 52. 
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 Staffing and gender balance 
90. In line with the TJR Act,39 and its Gender Policy, the Commission ensured that all 
its appointments were made with regard to the principle of gender equality. The 
Commission maintained a gender balance in its staff composition, not simply in keeping 
with a statutory requirement, but more importantly because it wished to ensure 
that women accessed its processes with relative ease. Studies and the experience 
of truth commissions have shown that having more women on staff may make a 
commission less alienating for female victims.40 In this regard, gender as a factor in the 
Commission’s recruitment process, was particularly important for positions involving 
certain responsibilities such as statement taking, investigations, victim support, and 
leading evidence.
91. To ensure that it lived up both to its own expectations and those of the TJR Act, 
the Commission periodically assessed its staff composition in terms of gender. 
Throughout the life of the Commission, the representation of women in its staff body 
was consistently above 40 percent. At the decision making level, the Commission 
was led by a female Chief Executive Officer from February 2010 to September 2012, 
and the ratio of female decision-makers  (directorate level), stood at 50 percent 
during the same period. 
National and regional offices 
92. The TJR Act designated Nairobi as the Commission’s headquarters. Between 
2009 and 2010 the Commission had its offices at Delta House, Westlands. The 
office space at Delta House was found to be inadequate accommodation for the 
Commission’s staffing and other needs. In January 2011, the Commission moved to 
NHIF Building, where it was housed for the remainder of its tenure. 
93. In order to decentralise its presence and reach out to as many Kenyans as possible, the 
Commission established regional offices in Eldoret, Garissa, Kisumu and Mombasa. 
Each regional office had a regional coordinator and an assistant regional coordinator 
of the opposite gender. The regional offices were responsible for facilitating all 
administrative support services of the Commission within the respective regions. 
They took the lead in mobilising individuals to attend the Commission’s processes. 
They also served as central collection points for statements and memoranda within 
the regions. 
39 TJR Act, sec 30(2). 
40 V Nesiah et al (ed) Truth commissions and gender: Principles, policies and procedure (2006) 10. 
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94. The Eldoret and Mombasa offices served Rift Valley and Coast Provinces respectively. 
The Kisumu office served Western and Nyanza Provinces, while the Garissa office served 
North Eastern Province and the upper region of Eastern Province. The Commission’s 
headquarters in Nairobi was host to the regional office for Central Province, Nairobi 
Province (including Kajiado County) and the lower region of Eastern Province. 
Finance
95. Sections 43 to 47 of the TJR Act provided for the establishment and management 
of the Commission’s funds, which consisted mainly of monies appropriated from 
the Consolidated Fund. The Commission’s funds were managed by the Ministry of 
Justice during the first fiscal year of establishment and by its Secretary during the 
remainder of its tenure. The Accounts Unit, comprising an Assistant Director, an 
accountant and two assistants, was responsible for running the day-to-day financial 
operations of the Commission. At the level of the Commissioners’ the Finance and 
Administration Committee was responsible for formulating financial policies and 
exercised an oversight role in relation to all matters of finance and administration. 
96. In accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, as read with the 
TJR Act and the Government Financial Management Act, the Commission prepared 
financial statements for each fiscal year of its existence with the exception of 
fiscal year 2009-2010 during which - as earlier mentioned- the Ministry of Justice 
managed the Commission’s funds. These financial statements were submitted for 
audit to the Kenya National Audit Office (Auditor-General), in compliance with the 
provisions of section 20 of the Public Audit Act.41 
 Year 2010-2011: the Auditor General was of the opinion that the financial 
statements as submitted to the National Audit Office were a fair representation, 
in all material respects, of the financial position of the Commission as at the 
close of that year. However, the opinion was qualified as the Auditor-General 
raised concerns in relation to specific issues which were subsequently 
addressed by the Commission. 
 Year 2011-2012: As at the time of submission of this Report, the Office of 
the Auditor General had not issued its report concerning the Commission’s 
financial position for the year 2011-2012. 
Allegations of corruption and financial improprieties 
97. In July 2011, the Commission was accused of corruption and other financial 
improprieties. Reports surfaced in the media alleging corruption within the 
Commission. The media reports appeared to reference internal documentation 
41  See Appendix 3 for the Audited Statement of Financial Position for the Years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. 
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of the Commission although sourced through other organisations. This prompted 
the Commission to undertake urgent internal investigations. It was found that 
the media reports were unfounded. The investigations were undertaken with the 
generous cooperation of an organisation in which the individual who released 
the false information worked. The Commission was dismayed to learn that the 
information was based on selective release of misleading information from within 
the Commission by individuals linked to Ambassador Kiplagat.
98. Near the end of 2011 and into early 2012, new stories of financial mismanagement at 
the Commission surfaced in the press again. These stories were based on a confidential 
management letter that had been sent to the Commission by its external auditor. 
The letter from the auditors was a typical management letter – written after an initial 
review of the Commission’s accounts and requesting clarification on a number of 
matters.  As part of the auditing process, and not the end of it, management letters 
do not provide a reliable indication of the state of an organisation’s financial affairs.
99. Unfortunately copies of the management letter were leaked from inside the 
Commission to numerous media houses. Established media houses contacted 
the Commission and when the nature of the document they had been given was 
explained to them, they declined to publish the story. Some papers, however, 
did publish a series of stories alleging that the Commission’s auditors had found 
massive fraud and corruption within the Commission.  In fact, the Commission had 
already responded to the management letter answering each of the queries raised 
by the auditors, which eventually resulted in an audit report that raised absolutely 
no concerns relating to financial mismanagement or improprieties, much less 
corruption. The Commission immediately posted the audit report on its website.
100. Even after the audit report was published on the Commission’s website, the Nairobi 
Law Monthly printed a story based on the misinformed media reports appearing 
several months earlier in segments of the alternative media commonly known as the 
gutter press. Even more disappointing was the fact that Nairobi Law Monthly did not 
contact the Commission for a comment, or try to verify its story. This was particularly 
unfortunate as the Nairobi Law Monthly went on to name specific Commissioners 
and staff members as having stolen money from the Commission. The ironic reality 
is that the Commissioners had in fact lent money to the Commission at a time when 
it had not received quarterly funding from the Treasury to enable the Commission 
to perform its core functions. Those who reported on the matter misread the 
financial documents given to them – or were relying upon the interpretation of 
those documents given by individuals who wanted to harm the reputation of the 
Commission. Thus, those Commissioners who were the most generous were the 
ones most unjustly vilified in publications such as the Nairobi Law Monthly.  
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Operational Period
101. In line with the TJRC Agreement, the TJR Act required the Commission to operate for 
a period of two years,42 preceded by a three-month establishment phase.43 
102. The two-year operational period granted to the Commission was ambitious even 
in the best of circumstances, considering the breadth and complexity of the 
Commission’s mandate. The Commission’s material mandate was by far the broadest 
of any truth commission ever established, encompassing inquiry into violations of 
civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights. Its temporal mandate was 
similarly wide, spanning 12 December 1963 to 28 February 2008, a period of just less 
than 45 years. 
103. Beyond the magnitude of the task the Commission faced several challenges and 
difficulties that had the effect of hampering its work and slowing implementation 
of its mandate. In particular, the Commission lost considerable time and 
credibility at the beginning of its term due to the controversy that surrounded the 
suitability of its Chairperson which lasted fifteen months from the appointment 
of the Commissioners in August 2009, to the stepping aside of the Chairperson in 
November 2010. The Commission also suffered financial and resource constraints 
that stalled its operations for the better part of its first year of operations. As a result, 
the Commission was not able to begin operating substantively and effectively until 
September 2010, a full year after its establishment.
The first extension (November 2011 to May 2012)
104. As the end of the operational period approached, the Commission assessed the 
progress it had made in executing its mandate and the outstanding workload viz 
à vis its capacity. The Commission concluded that it would be unable to finalise 
its work within the two years statutory limit. By June 2011 the Commission had 
conducted hearings in North Eastern Province and partially in Western Province. 
With six (6) provinces to go and a series of other mandate operations that had not 
been executed, the Commission reached the considered opinion that it would not 
finalise its work within the remaining three months. 
105. Thus, on 24 June 2011, pursuant to section 20(3) of the TJR Act, the Commission 
requested the National Assembly to extend its tenure for a period of six months 
as expressly provided for by the Act. The National Assembly did not consider this 
request until two months later, on 18 August 2011, whereupon it voted to extend the 
Commission’s term as requested. 
42 TJR Act, sec 20(1). 
43 TJR Act, sec 20(2). 
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The second extension (May to August 2012)
106. Despite the fact that the Commission had been granted an extension, the outstanding 
workload remained enormous and demanding. Although it adhered to a compact 
timetable, the Commission concluded hearings in April 2012 having conducted 
220 well attended hearing sessions during which more than 680 individuals 
testified before the Commission. In March 2012 when the Commission concluded 
its individual hearings, it had less than a month to finalise and submit its report. 
This proved to be an impossible task. The one month period was only sufficient to 
process transcripts of hearings that the Commission had conducted in January and 
February 2012, leaving the key task of report writing undone.
107. Faced with this challenge, the Commission requested that the three-month 
statutory winding up period provided to the Commission (3 May to 3 August 2012) 
be reallocated to its operational period to give the Commission an additional 
three months to work on the report. Under the circumstances obtaining then, this 
was the best request that the Commission could make. To effect the request an 
amendment to the TJR Act had to be made.
 
108. While the Commission expressed its request towards the end of April, it was only on 
7 August 2012 that Parliament considered and approved the request. By that time, 
the relevant period over which an extension had been sought had already lapsed. 
109. In essence, the Commission operated in legal limbo for three months as it waited 
for Parliament to consider its request. Although the Commission continued to 
write its report during this period, the uncertainty over its legal status impacted 
negatively on its operations. Firstly, the Commission could neither conduct certain 
mandate operations (such as notifying adversely mentioned persons of their right 
to respond to allegations levelled against them) nor incur expenditures on mandate 
related operations. Secondly, the Commission suffered high turn-over of staff during 
this period. As a result, its capacity to operate at an optimal level was significantly 
reduced, especially as it had a lean staff complement to begin with.
The third extension (August 2012 to May 2013)
110. With a second extension, the Commission was expected to deliver its report on 3 
August 2012. However, as it has been indicated above, Parliament did not consider 
the Commission’s request for an extension until 7 August 2012. This was mainly due 
to the fact that the Commission was compelled to review its position on passing on 
various aspects of its mandate to the implementation mechanism to be established 
at the end of the life of the Commission. 
111. For the above reason, the Commission once again requested an extension of 
tenure to enable it finalise its report. On 27 November 2012, the National Assembly 
unanimously voted to extend the Commission’s operational period to 3 May 2013. 
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1. This Chapter presents the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission’s (the 
Commission) understanding of its overriding objectives and interpretation of its 
mandate, both material and temporal. The Commission adopted a purposive and 
liberal interpretation of its objectives and functions; an approach that accorded 
with established principles and rules of international human rights law and best 
practices in the field of transitional justice. 
2. In interpreting its mandate, the Commission took into account relevant official 
documents that preceded and informed its establishment. These documents include:
 Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission, 2003; 
 General Principles and Parameters for the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC Agreement);
 Memorandum of Objects and Reasons (attached to the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Bill, 2008);
 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act No. 6 of 2008 (TJR Act); and 
 Parliamentary Hansard reports relating to the enactment of the TJR Act.
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3. The Commission also benefitted immensely from the experiences of other 
truth commissions and the writings of scholars and practitioners. Moreover, the 
Commission drew inspiration from United Nations’ work in transitional justice. In 
particular, the Commission used the following UN documents as interpretative 
guides: Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies;1 Set of Principles for the Protection 
and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity;2 Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law;3 and the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees on Non-Recurrence.4
4. This Chapter is structured as follows: The second section after this introduction 
explains how the Commission understood the core concepts that were central to 
its mandate and operations. These concepts are truth, justice and reconciliation. 
The third section explores the scope of the Commission’s objectives and functions. 
The fourth and fifth sections deal respectively with the Commission’s temporal and 
subject matter mandate. The final three sections address the following themes: 
breadth and complexity of the mandate; responsibility for violations and injustices; 
and other relevant aspects of the Commission’s mandate. 
1 S/2004/616, 23 August 2004. 
2 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sixty-first session, Item 17 of the provisional agenda, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 Feb 
2005. 
3 Adopted by the UN General Assembly, 21 March 2006, A/RES/60/147. 
4 UN Human Rights Council, Twenty-first session, Agenda item 3, A/HRC/21/46, 9 Aug 2012. 
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5. The right to truth is now an established right in international human rights law. 
Indeed, there is a burgeoning jurisprudence and literature recognising and 
affirming the right of victims of gross violations of human rights to know and be 
informed of the truth. However, what constitutes the truth in a particular context 
and society is often subject to contestations and multiple conflicting narratives. 
Thus, the role of a truth commission in this regard is to ‘set the record straight’. 
That it was envisaged that the Commission would play such a role is evident from 
its title. 
6. However, apart from its title, the TJR Act does not make reference to the term ‘truth’. 
As such, the mandate of the Commission in relation to establishing the truth is 
drawn from the spirit and totality of the Act and in particular, from the provisions 
of sections 5(a) and (b) of the Act. 
7. Although section 5(a) and (b) does not make reference to the term ‘truth’, it was 
understood that the provisions thereof conferred on the Commission the obligation 
to establish the truth relating to gross violations of human rights and historical 
injustices in Kenya. Section 5(a) provides that the Commission’s mandate includes 
‘establishing an accurate, complete and historical record of violations and abuses 
of human rights and economic rights during the mandate period. Section 5(b), on 
the other hand, states that the mandate of the Commission includes ‘establishing 
as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross 
violations of human rights and economic rights. 
8. By requiring the Commission to establish a complete historical record of violations 
and abuses committed within a 45-year period, section 5(a) imposed on the 
Commission an ambitious and almost insurmountable task. Section 5(b) took a 
more permissive language as it required the Commission to establish ‘as complete 
a picture as possible’. In essence, section 5(b) implicitly recognised that establishing 
a complete picture of the causes, nature and extent of violations could not be 
practically achieved. On the whole, however, given the fact that the Commission 
was a temporary body with limited resources, the contents of this Report are not 
exhaustive in terms of establishing a complete record of gross violations of human 
rights or painting a complete picture of the causes, nature and extent of these 
violations. 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Volume I    Chapter T WO  
42
9. In addition to its institutional limitations, there are myriad other factors that 
worked against the Commission’s efforts to come close to satisfying the demands 
of section 5(a) and (b). Some of the events that the Commission was required to 
investigate or constituted antecedents to those events, happened many decades 
ago. As such, victims had already died and relevant evidence was no longer available 
or accessible. Even where some victims were still alive, their memory was hazy. 
Although the Commission received more than 40 000 statements and memoranda 
from individual victims and communities, it could not feasibly investigate each and 
every of these cases. As such, it relied on windows cases and statistical patterns 
to reach its conclusions on the extent of violations during the mandate period.5 
Moreover, like any other truth commission, the Commission relied on the self will 
of individuals to present their cases to it. As indicated below, the Commission is 
aware that many victims of violations and injustices did not present their cases to 
the Commission. 
10. The challenge the Commission faced in establishing a complete record and picture 
of gross violations committed in Kenya from 1963 to 2008 is not unique. Many 
truth commissions have had to contend with the fact that they cannot practically 
establish complete records of human rights violations that have occurred within 
their respective societies. For instance, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission observed as follows in relation to its mandate:
Given the resources available to the Commission, in terms of professional researchers 
and investigators, not to mention its very short lifespan, Parliament was surely ambitious 
in thinking that the Commission could create anything resembling a comprehensive 
historical record of the conflict in Sierra Leone.6
11. That truth commissions are practically unable to and should not be expected to 
produce a complete document of violations and abuses is also acknowledged 
by scholars. According to Hayner, a leading transitional justice scholar, ‘[it] is 
impossible for any short-term commission to fully detail the extent and effect of 
widespread abuses that took place over many years, or, for most, to investigate 
every single case brought to it’.7
12. Against this backdrop, what this report contains is the truth as it was presented 
to the Commission through the various ways discussed in the next chapter. By 
using the stories that it received and through its research and investigations, the 
Commission has been able to irrefutably establish that certain events that resulted 
5 See Chapter Three of this Volume. 
6 Report of the Sierra Leone Truth Commission, volume one (2004) 32. 
7 P Hayner Unspeakable truths: Transitional justice and the challenge of truth commissions (2011) 84. 
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in gross violations of human rights and injustices to individuals and communities 
did in fact take place. Therefore, the reality and occurrence of these events cannot 
and should not be denied any more, at least in official circles and by the state.   
13. In finding the truth, the Commission was not just interested in what happened. Many 
(though not all) of the violations within its mandate had already been documented 
quite extensively by other institutions and individuals. Rather the Commission was 
particularly interested in why things happened the way they did, what was their 
impact and who was responsible. The Commission also wanted to contribute to the 
narrative truth of these violations, providing an opportunity for Kenyans to share 
and hear their individual and collective experiences of such violations.  
14. In the debates that preceded the creation of the Commission and indeed for 
the larger part of its tenure, critics argued that everyone knows the truth about 
historical injustices and violations. Some wondered whether it was at all important 
to invest both time and resources in establishing what they considered to be 
matters of public knowledge. While the Commission can see that there is some 
basis for this position, ultimately the value of the Commission and its work goes 
far beyond what is currently in the public record. In the first place there is much of 
Kenya’s past that is not a matter of public knowledge. The Commission was tasked 
with investigating matters buried deep in Kenya’s history and providing answers 
to numerous questions. Secondly, some of what was considered public knowledge 
was often based on rumour, innuendo and bias. It was an important mission of the 
Commission to separate fact from fiction and to debunk myths.  
15. In so doing, the Commission hoped to contribute to building a new social truth and 
shared understanding of the past for all Kenyans. A truth that not only a narrated 
key events of Kenya’s past,  but a truth that identified the underlying fault lines that 
serve to explain why it has been that Kenyans have turned on Kenyans repeatedly 
in the past, most recently and significantly after the 2007 General Election. It is 
the Commission’s fervent hope that the truth established herein will assist in the 
establishment of a re-energised and united Kenya in which the violations and 
injustices relayed in the chapters of this report will never happen again.
16. The stories related in this Report are largely the stories of ordinary Kenyans. Over 40 
000 Kenyans shared their stories of violations and injustices with the Commission. Like 
most truth commissions, however, the Commission did not receive many statements 
or much cooperation from high ranking public officers, politicians and government 
officials. The Commission approached a number of such high-profile individuals who 
have held numerous positions of responsibility in the past (and many of whom still 
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hold positions of responsibility). With a few notable exceptions, most declined to file 
statements with or otherwise provide information to the Commission.  
17. Moreover, many ordinary citizens did not file statements with the Commission. 
Thus, the Commission is acutely aware that for every statement it received and 
every story it heard, many more statements and stories, in their thousands, remain 
unwritten and unheard. The Commission tried to reach out to victims and witnesses 
in all parts of Kenya. Their stories are reflective of the array of experiences and the 
suffering of victims across the land. 
Justice 
18. The concept of justice in the context of transitional justice has been defined as:
[…] an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights 
and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the rights of 
the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well-being of society at large. It 
is a concept rooted in all national cultures and traditions and, while its administration 
usually implies formal judicial mechanisms, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms 
are equally relevant.8
19. ‘Formal judicial mechanisms’ usually refers to a criminal justice system that results in 
the punishment of those found responsible for offences. Such systems of retributive 
justice focus on individual criminal responsibility and on forms of punishment that 
are proportional to the wrongs committed. 
20. Truth commissions have traditionally been viewed as providing an alternative to 
the more traditional retribution-based view of justice. They are one of a number of 
institutional innovations that further restorative rather than retributive justice. The 
Commission followed in the footsteps of many of its international predecessors 
in emphasizing an approach to justice that weighs more towards restorative than 
retributive justice. Some of these previous truth commissions have been criticised 
as for foregoing completely foregoing any element of retributive justice. While such 
commissions furthered restorative justice, the absence of any retributive elements 
often led individuals within the countries within which  such commissions operated 
to complain that ‘justice’ had not been. While the Commission adopted a notion of 
justice that encompasses more than its retributive elements such as punishment, 
it also recognises the important role that retributive criminal justice systems can 
have in furthering not only justice, but also truth and reconciliation.
8 The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, Report of the Secretary-General, United 
Nations, 23 August 2004, page 4.
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21. The drafters of the TJR Act were sensitive to the criticisms aimed at previous 
truth commissions concerning their perceived lack of focus on justice and thus 
made sure to both include the word ‘justice’ in the title of the Commission as well 
as to empower the Commission to further justice by engaging with the more 
traditionally retributive criminal justice system. Most importantly, the Commission 
was empowered by the Act to ‘identify any persons who should be prosecuted for 
being responsible or involved in human rights and economic rights violations and 
abuses’.9 
22. One of the most important contributions the Commission hopes to make towards 
justice in Kenya is the establishment of an authoritative record of past abuses. 
Justice will be furthered in this Report through the identification of individuals 
and institutions found to be responsible for human rights violations and historical 
injustices. Even where there is no prospect of criminal justice the conduct of rights 
violators will be held up for close scrutiny. They will be held to public account and 
their roles forever recorded in history. 
23. History will be guided by this Report in judging and assessing the conduct of 
perpetrators. In publicly identifying those it found to be responsible for human 
rights violations and historical injustices, the Commission invites Kenyans and the 
world to hold these individuals to account for their actions.   
24. In addition to embracing its mandate relating to justice in the traditional sense, 
the Commission also adopted restorative and social elements of justice in its 
work and in this Report. Retributive justice mechanisms, because of their focus 
on perpetrators and punishment, are often ill-equipped to cater to the needs 
of victims. While restorative justice does not preclude accountability and even 
punishment for perpetrators, it is equally focused on repairing the harm done to 
victims and the greater community. Recognising and acknowledging the suffering 
and experiences of victims and searching for ways to move forward as a nation, are 
crucial to restorative justice. Social justice, on the other hand, is linked to equality 
and respect for human rights. Social justice 
generally refers to the idea of creating a society or institution that is based on the 
principles of equality and solidarity, that understands and values human rights, and that 
recognises the dignity of every human being […] Social justice is based on the idea of a 
society which gives individuals and groups fair treatment and a just share of the benefits 
of society.10 
9 TJR Act, sec 6(f). 
10 MoJNCCA & NCIC National Cohesion and Integration Training Manual (2011)141.
To tell you 
the truth, I do 
not have any 
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Talking about 
it, praise to 
God, is
good enough. I 
never thought 
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25. Some aspects of the Commission’s mandate inevitably required the Commission to 
adopt restorative and social conceptions of justice. In particular, the TJR Act required 
the Commission to determine ways and means of redress for victims of gross 
violations of human rights.11 More specifically, section 42 of the TJR Act provided 
for the procedure for recommending reparation and rehabilitation of victims of 
gross violations of human rights. Moreover, in assessing and recommending ways 
of redressing violations of socio-economic rights and the legacy of economic 
marginalisation in respect to certain regions or communities, the Commission 
adopted a restorative and social conception of justice. 
Reconciliation 
26. Reconciliation is a complex concept. As the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission learnt in its work, reconciliation is not only a highly contested concept, 
but it also has no simple definition.12 As such, it was satisfied, justifiably so, with 
outlining the essential elements of reconciliation rather than defining the term. 
The elements it identified include that: reconciliation is both a goal and a process; 
it is experienced at different levels (intra-personal, inter-personal, community and 
national); and that reconciliation has linkages to redistribution in terms of material 
reconstruction and the restoration of dignity. Similarly, the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission conducted its reconciliation work on the premise that 
‘there is no universal model of reconciliation that can apply to all countries’.13
27. The Commission took a similar approach which it spelt out in its Reconciliation 
Policy and which is discussed in detail in the chapter on National Unity, Healing 
and Reconciliation in this Report.
28. In essence, the Commission understood reconciliation to be a process rather than 
an event. It is a process undertaken by individuals who have committed or suffered 
violations and as such can be intensely private and personal. It is also a process 
that can be encouraged and even undertaken at the community and national 
level. Thus, the Commission saw its role in relation to reconciliation as that of 
laying the foundation for a long-term process. This approach finds validity when 
one considers the products of the KNDR negotiations. 
29. The KNDR team wisely laid the foundation for the creation of two institutions to 
further reconciliation: this temporary Commission and the permanent National 
Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC). Entrusting reconciliation in a 
11 TJR Act, sec 5(e). 
12 Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, volume one (1998) 106. 
13 Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, volume 3B (2004) 433. 
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permanent commission dedicated to national cohesion acknowledges that 
reconciliation is not only a process, but a continuous process. Reconciliation, like 
freedom, democracy, national unity and many other fundamental values to which 
modern Kenya aspires, must always be nurtured and cared for. This Commission, 
therefore, does not claim to have achieved reconciliation for the nation. Rather, 
the hope of the Commission is that by uncovering the truth, providing a forum for 
individuals to share their experiences and by providing some accountability, the 
Commission will have placed the nation on a path to further reconciliation and 
national cohesion and unity. 
30. While the Commission could not in its short lifespan reconcile the nation, its hearings 
provided the opportunity for many to commence a healing process. Many victims 
appreciated the opportunity to relate their stories to an official body that would 
record and acknowledge their experiences and suffering. Many victims expressed 
relief after publicly sharing their stories and experiences. For such witnesses, public 
testimony was part of their own personal healing process and provided some 
assistance as they attempt to bring closure to the bitterness of the past.   
31. For the vast majority of witnesses whose rights had been violated, the oral 
testimony they gave before the Commission marked the first time they had spoken 
publicly about their pain and suffering. Many individuals said the Commission was 
the first public agency to show concern for their situation. In this regard, a witness 
of the Malka Mari Massacre said:
I never thought this Commission or anybody would ask about what happened to me. If I 
knew anybody would want to know the truth, I would have come forward [much earlier].14
32. A survivor of the security operation that became the Wagalla Massacre had similar 
sentiments:
If you [the Commission] are taking statements, I have written ten statements before but 
nobody did anything for me. This is the first time I have been told to talk openly about it 
and I thank you very much for that.15 
33. Another witness observed as follows when he was asked about his expectations 
following his testimony before the Commission: 
To tell you the truth, I do not have any expectations. Talking about it, praise to God, is 
good enough. I never thought I would see a Commission looking for the truth.16
14 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Mandera/25 April 2011/p. 42. 
15 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Wajir/19 April 2011/p. 4. 
16 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Mandera/26 April 2011/p. 44. 
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34. For others, the platform the Commission provided for a public narration of violations 
they had suffered contributed to lessening the social stigma associated with their 
violations. As an example, Omar Qutara, whose story is told in detail elsewhere in this 
report, was arrested in 1982, detained, tortured and later sentenced to three years 
imprisonment for allegedly participating in the 1982 attempted coup. For close to 
30 years following his release from prison, he lived with the shame of being referred 
to as a ‘rebel’ or ‘fugitive’. His children also suffered stigma. His eloquent and detailed 
testimony before the Commission was the first time that he had publicly spoken 
about his experience and in conclusion, he was grateful for that opportunity. He said:
I can sleep today. I am a little relieved. That was the major problem. I wanted many 
people to come here because many of them call us fugitives or rebels here in town. I am 
sure they have heard it today with their own ears.17 
35. While the hearings had a therapeutic effect for individuals like Omar Qutara, it 
was not so for some who testified before the Commission. Even as it conducted 
its hearings, the Commission sufficiently warned itself of the potential of hearings 
or truth-telling to re-traumatise victims. Such was the experience of a victim who 
testified before the Commission in Kapenguria:
When I think about those issues, I feel so bad. I do not see the reason why we should talk 
over such issues, because it will not help me. I do not have any children; one of my ears 
cannot hear; I do not have any property; my son, who was a man, died because there 
was nobody who could take care of him when he was sick. I failed to get another person, 
a man, who will inherit my wealth. Even if I talk from here, I do not know whether the 
government can really help somebody. What is the importance of all these discussions as 
we sit here?18 
36. To mitigate the effects of re-traumatisation, the Commission instituted a number 
of support mechanisms for victims and other witnesses who testified before it.  
 
Inter-relationships between truth, justice and reconciliation 
37. Truth, justice and reconciliation – the three pillars of the Commission – share a complex 
relationship. Depending on how they are pursued, they can both complement 
and reinforce each other, or be in tension with and even conflict with each other. 
Truth is necessary for furthering justice and reconciliation; justice is necessary for 
reconciliation; and reconciliation may be necessary for truth and for justice. 
38. From inception, the Commission proceeded from the premise that the three values 
of truth, justice and reconciliation are mutually inclusive and that they complement 
17 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Marsabit/4 May 2011/p. 38. 
18  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kapenguria/14 October 2011/p. 17. 
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each other. None of the values should be seen or pursued in isolation. This is an 
approach that has been recently advocated by the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-recurrence. In 
his first report to the UN Human Rights Council, in which he made a case for a 
comprehensive approach to the constituent elements of his mandate he noted:
The Special Rapporteur takes the four components of the mandate, truth, justice, 
reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence as a set of measures that are related to, 
and can reinforce, one another, when implemented to redress the legacies of massive 
human rights violations and abuses. Redressing the legacies of abuse means primarily 
giving force to those human rights norms that were systematically or grossly violated 
[…] While arguably, they all serve the ultimate end of pursuing justice, a less abstract 
functional analysis that distinguishes between the immediate, mediate and final ends of 
the measures would say that the four measures can be conceptualized as assisting in the 
pursuit of two mediate goals, i.e., providing recognition to victims and fostering trust, and 
two final goals, i.e. contributing to reconciliation and strengthening the rule of law.19 
39. In the paragraphs that follow, the Commission explains how it conceptualised the 
linkages and inter-relationships between truth, justice and reconciliation. 
Truth and justice
40. Former UN Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet refers to the ‘inalienable right to truth’, 
which he defines as a ‘collective right, drawing upon history, to prevent violations 
from recurring’.20 Justice thus looks to the past to facilitate a better future by holding 
individuals to account for the wrongs they committed; by providing reparations to 
those who suffered violations; and, through an acknowledgment of such violations 
and an understanding of their causes, providing guidance to the present generation 
to prevent the commission of such violations upon future generations. 
41. In essence, truth telling is necessary for justice. By identifying those individuals and 
institutions responsible for historical violations, truth telling contributes to holding 
those responsible to account through public naming and shaming and provides 
evidence to support the Commission’s obligation to recommend to the government 
those individuals who should be investigated and, if sufficient evidence exists, 
prosecuted. Such truth telling also provides a basis for other recommendations, 
including those relating to individuals or institutions that should contribute to 
reparation initiatives and those individuals who should be barred from public office 
or other positions of responsibility and trust.  
19 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de 
Greiff, Human Rights Council, 9 Aug 2012, A/HRC/21/46. 
20 Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations, UN Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion 
of Human Rights, June 1997.
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Truth and reconciliation
42. The relationship between truth and reconciliation is twofold. First, public truth-
telling offers a forum for the victims to recount publicly their experiences and to 
have such experiences acknowledged. Such acknowledgement can contribute to 
individual healing and thus strengthen the courage of victims and perpetrators to 
work in furtherance of reconciliation and national unity. As expressed by the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, reconciliation must be based on an 
understanding of the past ‘which allows both victims and perpetrators to find the 
space to live side by side in a spirit of tolerance and respect’.21 This concept is also 
expressed in the mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, ‘[t]
he truth of our common experiences will help set our spirits free and pave the way to 
reconciliation’.22
43. Second, truth-telling offers an opportunity to uncover historical truths and 
interrogate the past. Periods of transition offer a unique opportunity to redraft 
social understandings of a country’s history and rectify past narratives imposed 
by the state in furtherance of the interests of a powerful few or an intolerant 
majority. A member of the Chile Truth and Reconciliation Commission expressed 
the relationship between truth telling and reconciliation thus:
Society cannot simply block out a chapter of its history; it cannot deny the facts of its 
past, however differently these may be interpreted. Inevitably the void would be filled 
with lies or with conflicting, confusing versions of the past. A nation’s unity depends on 
a shared identity, which in turn depends largely on a shared memory.23
44. This is not to say that all Kenyans need to agree on a new historical account; rather, 
the Commission aims to generate constructive debate and discussion by bringing 
to light information and facts that were previously unknown or little known to 
Kenyans. Reconciliation, like history, is the result of a process of engagement with 
the past by the present in order to secure a more just and peaceful future.
Justice and reconciliation
45. There can be little doubt that effective and prompt justice will promote meaningful 
reconciliation.  Justice initiatives have the potential to foster reconciliation. In particular, 
the following could promote reconciliation: providing adequate reparations to victims, 
whether individual or communal; acknowledging those who suffered wrongs and 
those individuals and institutions responsible; investigating and, where appropriate, 
21 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone, volume one (2004) 85.
22 Schedule N of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, preamble.
23 J Zalaquett ‘Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past 
Human Rights Violations’   (1992) 43 Hastings Law .Journal 1425, 1433.
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prosecuting those responsible; reforming institutions to prevent future violations 
and to provide equal opportunity and support to all Kenyans, including those from 
historically marginalized communities.
46. The justice furthered by the Commission is restorative in focus and thus joins easily 
with efforts to further reconciliation. While restorative justice does not preclude 
retributive justice, it would be a mistake to focus on the retributive contributions 
or omissions of the Commission and its work in evaluating its contribution to 
reconciliation. For, while retributive justice can and has contributed to reconciliation, 
it may also undercut reconciliation.  
47. In developing its recommendations for further investigations, prosecutions and 
other forms of retributive justice, the Commission was sensitive to the needs of 
reconciliation and national unity. There is no doubt that some will question the 
choices made by the Commission in this regard, arguing that some who have been 
recommended for prosecution should not have been so recommended, or that 
others should be enjoined together with those who have been recommended 
for prosecution. This does not mean however that there can be no meaningful 
reconciliation at the individual, community and national levels. There is much that 
can be done to foster reconciliation between individuals and groups. These important 
tasks should not simply be left in the hands of investigators, lawyers, prosecutors 
and technocrats. It is the responsibility of all Kenyans to pursue reconciliation.
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Objectives and Functions of the Commission 
48. The objectives and functions of the Commission were respectively spelt out in 
sections 5 and 6 of the TJR Act. Although these objectives and functions were 
outlined in two separate sections of the Act, the Commission proceeded with its 
work with the understanding that both sections essentially related to its mandate 
and there were no strict distinctions between its objectives, on the one hand and 
its functions, on the other.
49. Section 5 of the TJR Act provides that ‘the objectives of the Commission shall be to 
promote peace, justice, national unity, healing and reconciliation among the people 
of Kenya’. These objectives must be understood from a historical perspective, and 
particularly, in relation to both historical and immediate reasons leading to the 
formation of the Commission. Chapter one of this Report recounted that history, 
but it must be emphasised here that central to establishing the Commission was 
the stark and painful realisation that Kenya’s past and history could no longer be 
ignored or ‘swept under the carpet’. The past had to be confronted. 
50. Thus, when the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Bill, 2008 (TJR Bill) was introduced 
in Parliament for debate, the Minister for Justice stated in her ‘Memorandum of 
Objects and Reasons’ that:
[…] The Bill is borne of the realisation that lasting peace and co-existence cannot prevail 
in Kenya unless historical injustices and violation and abuse of human rights have been 
addressed.
51. The Minister further explained that: 
The Bill emanates from the deliberations of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
Committee which was formed after a political crisis ensued following a dispute on the 
outcome of the Presidential Election held on 27th December, 2007. The political crisis 
brought to the surface deep-seated and long-standing divisions within the Kenyan 
society and to heal those divisions, a raft of constitutional, legal and political measures 
to defuse the crisis were proposed, among them being the formation of a Commission 
to deal with historical injustices and violation of human rights. The establishment of the 
Commission was conceived with a view to addressing historical problems and injustices 
which, if left unaddressed, threatened the very existence of Kenya as a modern society.
52. The fact that the past had to be confronted was eminently clear to the National 
Assembly when it sat to debate the TJR Bill. In seconding that the Bill be read a 
second time, a member of the KNDR team indicated that: 
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[…] the events of the last General Election taught this country a lot of painful lessons. It 
has given us a chance to reflect on our past. It has become absolutely necessary to bring 
our past to some closure so that we can move ahead as a country. The Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission is the avenue through which Kenyans from all walks of life, 
and with truth, justice and reconciliation being their mission, come together to express 
themselves in this exercise so that they can bring their past to a closure and open a new 
chapter for us to move ahead as a country. It became clear that among the things that 
informed the near destruction of our country in the last General Election were issues 
that have been pending for a long time. There were historical injustices and prejudices 
that were informed by past events, deeds and actions by individuals, organisations and 
governments. It is necessary for us to bring that to a closure so that Kenya can exit from 
these prejudices and perceived or real injustices that were meted to the people of Kenya, 
thereby causing the mistrust that exists between our citizenry. The Bible says ‘if you know 
the truth, the truth will set you free’. It is important for us to get to know the truth so that, as 
a country, we become free. It is important for the things that have been said about people 
and communities be known. The truth about government bodies, individuals and public 
officers must be known. The truth must be known so that we can set our country free. It is 
said that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. It is, therefore, important for 
us, as a country, to deal with injustices that have been meted upon citizens of our country, 
whether they are perceived or real so that again we can live in a just society.24
53. In addition to stating the objectives of the Commission, section 5 also indicated 10 
ways by which those objectives should be achieved. When these modes of achieving 
its objectives were read together with section 6 of the Act, the Commission found 
it necessary to conceptually cluster its functions into four broad categories, that 
is, functions relating to: creating a historical record; victims, perpetrators; and the 
report.  
On a historical record 
54. Although the TJR Act does not create a hierarchy in relation to the functions of 
the Commission, it is noteworthy that the first two ways in which it envisaged 
that the Commission would execute its objectives is through the compiling of a 
historical record. In this regard, section 5(a) mandated the Commission to establish 
an accurate, complete and historical record of gross violations of human rights 
committed in Kenya by various state actors between 12 December 1963 and 28 
February 2008. Section 5(b) mandated the Commission to establish as complete a 
picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of violations of human rights. In 
this regard, the catalogue of specific violations that the Commission investigated is 
provided and discussed in detail further below. 
24 Kenya National Assembly, Official Report, 24 July 2008, p. 2217. 
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On victims 
55. Victims are at the heart of a truth-telling process and the operations of a truth 
commission. The process ought to give agency and recognition to victims. 
Ultimately, it should provide redress to victims. The process itself should be 
sensitive and humane. 
56. According to the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims, ‘victims should be treated with humanity and respect 
for their dignity and human rights and appropriate measures should be taken to 
ensure their safety, physical and psychological well-being and privacy, as well as 
those of their families’.25 In this light and in keeping with international standards, 
sections 5 and 6 of the TJR Act mandated the Commission to carry out the following 
functions with respect to victims: 
 Identify and specify victims of violations;26 
 Determine ways and means of redressing the suffering of victims;27
 Provide victims with a platform for non-retributive truth telling;28
 Provide victims with a forum to be heard and restore their dignity;29 
25 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims, para 10. 
26 TJR Act, sec 6(c).
27 TJR Act, sec 5(e). 
28 TJR Act, sec 5(g). 
29 TJR Act, sec 5(h). 
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 Investigate into the whereabouts of victims and restore their dignity;30 and 
 Recommend reparation measures in respect of victims.31 
57. The Commissions faithfully performed these functions. On identifying and 
specifying victims of violations, the Commission has compiled and published in this 
Report a list of victims of various violations committed during its mandate period. 
The list contains the names of victims who submitted their cases to the Commission 
and as such, it is not a complete list of all people who suffered violations during 
the mandate period. In relation to determining ways and means of redressing the 
suffering of victims, this report contains a catalogue of recommendations aimed 
at repairing the harm suffered by victims. The Commission’s measures intended to 
ensure that victims have a platform for non-retributive truth-telling are discussed 
in detail in the next chapter. 
58. In a nutshell, the Commission held various forms of hearings which provided 
victims with the opportunity to narrate their stories and in the process restore their 
dignity and commence a healing process. 
On perpetrators 
59. While victims are at the heart of a truth-telling process, the involvement of alleged 
or actual perpetrators is equally important for optimum success of the process. 
Firstly, for a complete and accurate story of violations, the perspectives of both 
victims and perpetrators are a requisite. For this reason, section 5(a) of the TJR 
Act required the Commission to record the ‘motives and perspectives of the 
persons responsible for commission of the violations’. Secondly, inter-personal 
reconciliation between a victim and a perpetrator is by necessity dependent on the 
participation of both parties. Of course, a victim may reconcile with his situation 
and even forgive the perpetrator without the two ever meeting, but the benefits of 
a healing and reconciliation process are maximised when both parties have a joint 
forum for constructive engagement. 
60. For these reasons, the TJR Act mandated the Commission to provide perpetrators 
with a platform for non-retributive truth telling and a forum to confess their actions 
as a way of bringing reconciliation.32 However, knowing that a careful balance 
must be struck between reconciliation and justice, the drafters of the TJR Act also 
recommended that the Commission should determine perpetrators of violations 
and where appropriate recommend their prosecution.33 The Act also mandated the 
30 TJR Act, sec 6(t). 
31 TJR Act, sec 6(k) & 42. 
32 TJR Act, sec 5(g) & (i). 
33 TJR Act, sec 5(c) &(d); sec 6(f) & k(ii). 
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Commission to facilitate the granting of conditional amnesty to perpetrators who 
make full disclosure of their involvement in violations. The Commission’s approach 
in relation to this specific mandate relating to amnesty is discussed in detail later 
in this chapter.  
61. In respect to determining perpetrators of violations, the Commission has 
published in this report names of individuals who were alleged to have 
committed gross violations of human rights during its mandate period. The 
Commission received allegations against 54,000 individuals. However, the list of 
alleged perpetrators contained in this report is only limited to those who were 
afforded an opportunity to respond to allegations levelled against them. Due 
to limited resources and time constraints, the Commission could not notify all 
alleged perpetrators of the nature of allegations raised against them. As such, 
the Commission had to prioritise its work in relation to sending out notifications 
to alleged perpetrators. The criteria used included looking at the gravity of the 
violations and the frequency of an individual’s appearance in the Commission’s 
database as a perpetrator. 
On the report
62. The functions of the Commission in relation to preparing this Report were outlined 
under sections 5(j) and 48(2) of the TJR Act. In essence, the law expressly required 
the Commission to do two main things in this report: document its findings and 
make recommendations flowing from those findings. The Act stipulated that the 
recommendations of the Commission should include the following:
 Recommendations for prosecution
 Recommendations for reparation for victims 
 Recommendations on specific actions to be taken in furtherance of the 
Commission’s findings 
 Recommendations on legal and administrative measures to be taken to 
address specific concerns identified by the Commission
 Recommendations relating to the mechanism and framework for the 
implementation of its recommendations and an institutional arrangement. 
63. Due to the numerous yet interrelated issues that it was called upon to document, 
the Commission grappled with how best to structure this Report. Several options 
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Temporal Mandate 
64. The Commission’s temporal mandate was one of the least understood aspects 
of its mandate despite efforts by the Commission to educate the public on this 
subject. This situation arose because up until its formation, disagreements were 
still rife as to which period the Commission should cover in its inquiry. Before the 
Task Force on the Establishment of a TJRC, a considerable number of people were 
of the opinion that a Kenyan truth commission should have a temporal mandate 
dating back to 1895 when the boundaries of what is now Kenya were demarcated. 
In essence, there are those who wanted the envisaged commission to address 
violations and atrocities committed during the colonial period. The Task Force, 
while agreeing that the colonial period was marked by unspeakable atrocities, 
rejected the idea that a truth commission should inquire into issues dating as far 
back as 1895. The Task Force explained its position thus: 
First, that period (1895-1963) is too remote in time, and the questions that it raises are too 
complex for a transitional justice instrument like a truth commission. Evidence would be 
scant; many of the perpetrators are long dead or are in the United Kingdom. Secondly, 
the answerable power is not Kenya, but the United Kingdom, and truth commissions are 
not generally established to investigate a remote, departed power. Finally, extending the 
truth commission to the colonial period would be an impossibly expensive, laboriously 
prohibitive, and practically unmanageable exercise. For these reasons, the Task Force 
rejects 1895 as an impracticable time-line, and instead recommends that the Kenya 
government sets up a less ambitious vehicle, such as a committee of eminent Kenyans 
to examine a limited set of issues relating to the colonial period.34
65. For the colonial period, the Task Force recommended that ‘a less ambitious 
vehicle, such as a committee of eminent Kenyans’ be constituted for purposes 
of examining ‘a limited set of issues relating to the colonial period’. For the truth 
commission, the Task Force recommended that its temporal mandate be limited to 
the independence period. It offered four reasons for this position: 
The Task Force therefore is of the view that a truth commission ought to cover the period 
from 1963 to 2002, the post-colonial era and the period KANU ruled the country […] 
the reasons for this choice, which the Task Force endorses, are rational, compelling, and 
unassailable. First, the period combines the first and the second regimes under KANU, 
and as such cannot be said to be selective or directed at any particular community. This 
is important because a truth commission cannot be legitimate if it appears to be an 
instrument to settle scores against a particular former regime, community or individuals. 
Secondly, the post-colonial period is very present, and not remote. Many of those who 
34 Government of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
(2003) 37 [Hereinafter Makau Mutua Report].
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served in the independence government are still alive. Thirdly, it stands to reason that 
Kenyans ought to rightly audit their own state, not the colonial British state. Fourth, the 
human rights violations and gross economic crimes that the majority of Kenyans want 
investigated were committed over the last forty years. Lastly, the investigation span of 
the last forty years is financially feasible and defensible, practical, and could be carried 
out within a two-year period. It is for these reasons that the Task Force recommends that 
a truth commission cover the period from December 12, 1963 to December 31, 2002.35
66. As described in the previous Chapter, the recommendations of the Task Force 
were never followed through. However, when the question of establishing a 
truth commission returned to the table under the KNDR process, the issue on the 
temporal mandate of the commission returned with it too. Perhaps, acknowledging 
that there were still some agitating for the colonial period to be the subject of 
inquiry, parties to the TJRC Agreement decided to limit the commission’s mandate 
to the independence period but they also agreed to give it room to look into events 
prior to this period. According to the Agreement:  
The Commission will inquire into such events which took place between December 
12, 1963 and February 28, 2008. However, it will as necessary look at antecedents to 
this date in order to understand the nature, root causes, or context that led to such 
violations, violence or crimes. 
67. In terms of the TJRC Agreement, the TJR Bill delineated the Commission temporal 
mandate to focus on the post-independence period, from 12 December 1963 when 
Kenya got its independence to 28 February 2008 when the National Accord was 
signed. But it also clearly indicated that the Commission would be empowered to 
look into the colonial period in as far as this period was relevant for understanding 
‘antecedents, circumstances and context’ of violations committed after independence. 
When the Bill was introduced in Parliament, the Minister for Justice explained the 
proposed temporal mandate of the Commission in the following words: 
Clause 5 gives the objectives of the Commission as to promote peace, justice and 
national unity, healing and reconciliation among the people of Kenya. The Commission 
will, therefore, be establishing an accurate, complete and historical record of violation 
and abuses of human rights and economic rights inflicted on Kenyans by the state, 
public institutions and holders of public office, both serving and retired, between 12th 
December, 1963 and 28th February, 2008.
These two dates are significant. 12th December 1963 is when we attained Independence 
while 28th February 2008 is the date when the National Accord was signed. So, we want 
to examine how we have dealt with each other as an independent state. However, 
Clause 5A (i) recognises that we may need to go beyond 12th December 1963 to the 
35 Makau Mutua Report (n 33 above) 37. 
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antecedents, circumstances and factors so as to contextualize such violations. If we 
need to go beyond 12th December 1963 to discover the genesis of the problem, the 
proposed Clause 5B does indicate that we can go as far back as possible in order to 
establish a complete picture of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violation of 
human and economic rights committed between the period I have stated and including 
antecedents and circumstances.36
68. Despite the above clear explanation, some members of Parliament still proceeded 
to lament that the proposed temporal mandate was too limiting to the extent that 
the colonial period was not covered. The words of Njeru Githae, then an Assistant 
Minister of Local government, are instructive in this regard: 
It is unfortunate that we have come up with the date of 12th December1963 when 
Kenya attained Independence. If I would have been asked, I would have said we need 
to go backwards to when Kenya as a nation we know today, first existed. I would have 
gone back to 1895. This is the time that some of the so-called historical injustices 
started. I have talked of the year 1895 because before then, Kenya, whether a colony or a 
protectorate did not exist. This then would have given Kenyans an opportunity to go as 
far back as memory can remember. This would give the basis for the so-called historical 
injustices. Some of the so-called historical injustices are actually a result of colonialism.37
69. After clarifications, those who harboured fears such as is quoted above came to 
understand that the envisaged commission could inquire into the colonial period. 
No changes were, therefore, made to the clauses in the TJR Bill relating to the 
temporal mandate of the Commission. Thus, in the TJR Act, the first part of the 
relevant sections mandates the Commission to investigate violations of human 
rights that occurred in Kenya between 12 December 1963 and 28 February 2008.38 
The second part mandates it to look into ‘antecedents, circumstances, factors 
and context’.39 
70. Notwithstanding the clear authority, even obligation, in the Act to examine the 
pre-independence period for the root causes of the violations committed since 
independence, many Kenyans remained under the impression that the temporal 
mandate of the Commission strictly covered the period between 12 December 1963 
and 28 February 2008. For instance, in a letter to the Chairman of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs, the Release Political 
Prisoners Trust sought the review of the TJR Act because they claimed, amongst 
other reasons, that:
36  Kenya National Assembly, Official Report, 24 July 2008, p. 2111-2112. 
37  Kenya National Assembly, Official Report, 24 July 2008, p. 2119. 
38 TJR Act, sec 5(a) & (b).
39 TJR Act, sec 5(a) (i) & (b) (i). 
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It ignores a crucial and critical part of the Kenyan history. It starts from 1963, yet some 
of the root causes of the issues that date back to the colonial era are not covered in the 
Act. Kenyans need to know why the period before independence is being left out of the 
TJRC and why some Kenyans have been left out of the process, yet they have the living 
testimonies and memories of the history and real life experiences; not allegations. To us, 
the scope on the search for justice through TJRC should cover the history of our country 
as a whole.
71. The Kenya National Liberation War Veterans Association expressed similar 
sentiments. In a submission to the Commission, the association lamented that:
The TJRC Act of 2008 excludes the colonial period. Hence our members ranging from 
3,500 are being left out in the truth-telling process of our country; being left out of this 
process leads to suffocation of Kenyan history and what haunt[s] us as a nation up to date. 
72. Indeed, similar concerns became one of the grounds of a suit seeking the 
dissolution of the Commission. As discussed in detail in Chapter Four of this 
Volume, the applicants in the case of Augustine Njeru Kathangu & 9 Others v TJRC 
and Bethuel Kiplagat40 challenged the statutory mandate of the Commission, 
arguing that the TJR Act was defective and unconstitutional to the extent that 
it excluded the periods before 12 December 1963 and after 28 February 2008 
from the Commission’s temporal mandate. The court dismissed the contention 
on a technical ground, though in doing so it incorrectly accepted the underlying 
assertion that the Commission was precluded from looking at events before or 
after the prescribed temporal mandate:
We note that the ex parte applicants are concerned with human rights violations 
which occurred prior to 12th December 1963 and after 28th February 2008, which are 
not covered under the TJRC Act. It is arguable as to whether the legislature was right 
in excluding those violations. This issue and other equally pertinent issues which 
have been raised can only be determined in a properly pleaded case, preferably in a 
constitutional reference. 
73. In addition to raising concerns about the perceived legal inability for the 
Commission to inquire into events that occurred during the colonial period, some 
people went further to assert that the Commission’s mandate should have been 
extrapolated to cover the period after 28 February 2008. For instance, in its letter 
already alluded to above, the Release Political Prisoners Trust argued that: 
The [TJR] Act also ignores the period after February 2008, when other human rights 
violations took place, especially the killing of human rights defenders GPO and Oscar 
40 High Court (Nairobi) Misc App. 470 of 2009 (unreported). 
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King’ara of Oscar Foundation on March 5 2009 and the recent Mathira killings among 
other happenings that leave questionable marks on their intentions and purposes, 
alienating sections of Kenyans who keep on crying for justice. 
74. This was an erroneous assumption. But first, it must be emphasised that being a 
temporary body, a truth commission must have a time-bound mandate. Its focus 
should be on past violations, as has been the case with all truth commissions across 
the world. The role of investigating ‘new’ and ‘current’ violations traditionally rests 
with permanent bodies such as the police department or national human rights 
institutions. Occasionally, commissions of inquiry are constituted to investigate 
particular current events or violations. 
75. With these caveats in mind, the Commission nevertheless proceeded with its work 
with the understanding that it could, in certain circumstances, inquire into events 
that occurred after 28 February 2008. Firstly, borrowing mutatis mutandis from 
the ‘continuing violations’ doctrine developed by human rights treaty bodies, the 
Commission could extrapolate its mandate beyond 28 February 2008 if a violation 
under its inquiry was a continuing violation. That is, the violation commenced 
during the mandate period but continued after that period. For example, some of 
the people displaced during the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence remain in camps 
and have not been compensated for their losses. As such, the Commission required 
all individuals filling out a Statement Form to indicate whether the violation they 
were recording was a continuing violation.41 
76. Secondly, the Commission was expressly mandated to ‘investigate any other 
matter that it considers requires investigations in order to promote and achieve 
national reconciliation’.42 Therefore, notwithstanding that a violation or event 
occurred after its formal mandate, the Commission could investigate it, provided 
that such an investigation was necessary for the promotion and achievement of 
national reconciliation. Moreover, from a pragmatic point of view, it was important 
for the Commission to constantly take into account current developments which 
could impact on its work. 
77. Despite the many concerns raised about its temporal mandate, when the Commission 
undertook its civic education campaigns and explained its mandate, many came to 
understand that the temporal mandate of the Commission was flexible and that 
its inquiry was a contextual one that required all events to be taken into account 
including those that had occurred prior to and after its formal mandate period.
41  See Appendix 4 for the Statement Form. 





look into the 
colonial period 
in as far as 










REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Volume I    Chapter T WO  
62
Subject Matter Mandate 
78. Unlike most previous truth commissions, whose mandate focused on human rights 
violations during a particular event (such as an armed conflict), the Commission’s 
mandate covered a 45-year period of relative peace, albeit with occasional 
eruptions of violence that were often limited to specific geographical areas or to 
political transitions. In other words, the country as a whole has never experienced 
an intense and long period of violence. However, the entire mandate period was 
characterized by various forms of state violence and episodes of systematic and 
widespread violations of human rights. The mandate period was also characterised 
by state plunder, corruption and impunity.  
79. Against this background, it was important that the subject matter mandate of the 
Commission be clearly spelt out. The question of what this Commission would 
investigate was first dealt with by the Makau Mutua Task Force. According to 
the Task Force, unlike the question relating to the temporal mandate, there was 
substantively huge consensus among Kenyans on what violations and issues 
should be the subject of a truth commission’s inquiry:
One of the least contested questions in the quest for a truth commission for Kenya 
relates to its terms of reference or the matters that it must address, that is, the types 
of violations that it must investigate. Although different communities, groups, and 
individuals around the country expressed particular preferences to the Task Force, there 
is no doubt about the functions that Kenyans want a truth commission to perform. 
Kenyans want a truth commission to perform four inter-related functions. These are 
establishing the truth about past atrocities by identifying the perpetrators and the 
reasons behind their actions; recognising victims and providing justice or some form 
of redress for the harm and suffering inflicted on them by the previous governments; 
auditing the state and suggesting corrective measures to avoid a recurrence of abuses; 
and creating an enabling environment for national reconciliation and healing.43
80. The Task Force proceeded to observe that: 
But Kenyans are clear that these functions cannot be successfully performed unless 
established categories of human rights violations and economic crimes are fully 
investigated and addressed. While it is true that many horrible and unimaginable 
violations have been perpetrated by the state over the last forty years, the Task Force 
believes that a truth commission cannot investigate every human rights violation. The 
Task Force therefore recommends that a truth commission address certain categories 
of violations. The violations that ought to form the terms of reference of a truth 
commission must be those that indicate a systemic pattern or state policies, actions that 
43  Makau Mutua Report (n 33 above) 29-30. 
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were carried out as policies of the state to abrogate the rights of Kenyans. Thus a truth 
commission must have the discretion to decide which violations qualify for scrutiny. 
In any case, it is practically impossible for a truth commission to address more than 
several thousand cases. That is why the Task Force has identified individual cases and 
groups of violations that it believes ought to be the subject of inquiry. The Task Force 
has made this choice consistent with the views of Kenyans and with due regard to the 
purposes of an effective, timely, and the least burdensome truth commission. The Task 
Force recommends that a truth commission investigates six categories of human rights 
violations and economic crimes.
81. For these reasons the Task Force recommended that a Kenyan truth commission 
should limit its focus on the following six violations and/or issues:44 
 Political assassinations and killings 
 Massacres and possible genocides
 Political violence and killings of democracy advocates 
 Torture, detention, exile, disappearances, rape, and persecution of opponents 
 Politically instigated ethnic clashes 
 Violations of economic, social and cultural rights 
82. During the KNDR negotiations, this list was expanded to include numerous other 
issues and particularly, a category of issues falling under the rubric of historical 
injustices. In this regard, the TJRC Agreement states: 
The Commission will inquire into human rights violations, including those committed by 
the state, groups, or individuals.  This includes but is not limited to politically motivated 
violence, assassinations, community displacements, settlements and evictions. The 
Commission will also inquire into major economic crimes, in particular grand corruption, 
historical land injustices, and the illegal and irregular acquisition of land, especially as 
these relate to conflict or violence. Other historical injustices shall be investigated.
83. The TJR Act was enacted with the recommendations of the Makau Mutua Task Force 
and the provisions of the TJRC Agreement in mind. However, sections 5 and 6 of the 
Act, under which the mandate of the Commission is spelt out, is at best ambiguous 
and confusing. For instance, it makes several incongruent references to the nature 
of rights to be investigated: ‘violations and abuses of human rights and economic 
rights’; ‘gross violations of human rights and economic rights’; and ‘gross human 
rights violations and violations of international human rights law and abuses’. In 
essence, it is not clear whether the drafters intended that the Commission focus on 
44 Makau Mutua Report (n 33 above) 30-33. 
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‘ordinary’ violations of human rights or on gross violations of human rights. Similarly, 
multiple sections of the Act offer different prescriptions on the same topics. For 
instance, on the subject of sexual violations, section 5(c) refers to ‘sexual violations’ 
but section 6(h) refers to ‘crime of a sexual nature against female victims’. Moreover, 
while some key terms within the Commission’s mandate are defined, some are not 
(such as ‘economic crime’). In addition, some definitions offered in the Act create 
uncertainty and ambiguity concerning the intention of the drafters. 
84. Faced with these uncertainties and mindful of the high expectations many 
placed on the Commission’s work, the Commission adopted a liberal approach to 
interpreting its mandate. After a careful analysis of the provisions of the TJR Act, it 
categorised its subject matter mandate into three broad areas: gross violations of 
human rights; historical injustices; and other mandate areas. 
85. Before these mandate areas are discussed in detail, it is important to dispense 
with two preliminary issues. Firstly, the TJR Act appears to create a distinction 
between ‘human rights violations’ (presumably under national law) and ‘violations 
of international human rights law’. The Commission considered this distinction to 
be inconsequential. It is assumed and rightly so, that in referring to both ‘human 
rights violations’ and ‘violations of international human rights law’, the lawmaker 
wanted to be exhaustive and not to miss anything. However, the lawmaker was 
clearly mistaken as to the possible difference in violations of human rights under 
national and international law. What differs – and this was irrelevant to the work 
of the Commission – is the forum at which victims may seek recourse. Sometimes 
the remedies available and the protections afforded may be more extensive under 
international law than at national law. 
86. Given that Kenya was already a party to the main international human rights 
instruments for a good number of years during the mandate period,45 the 
Commission looked seamlessly at both national law (Constitution and Statute) and 
relevant international law in determining which rights were violated during the 
mandate period. In any case, the Act sourced definitions of various concepts from 
international law.
87. Secondly, the Act appears to make a distinction between civil and political 
rights, on the one hand and socio-economic rights, on the other. This is apparent 
from section 5(a) and (b) which refer to ‘violations and abuses of human rights 
and economic rights’ and ‘gross violations of human rights and economic rights’ 
45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; etc. 
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respectively. The use of the disjunctive ‘and’ may appear to suggest that there is 
a difference between ‘human rights’, on the one hand, and ‘economic rights’, on 
the other. Again, this distinction is inconsequential. It is now established in human 
rights law and practice that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated.46 As such, the traditional dichotomy drawn between civil and political 
rights and socio-economic rights has since been rejected.47 
88. Apart from the conceptual linkages between civil and political rights and socio-
economic rights, historical patterns of human rights violations in Kenya shows that 
violations of these two categories of rights work hand in hand. This was a point 
that the Makau Mutua Task Force considered when it recommended that a Kenyan 
truth commission should inquire into violations of both civil and political rights 
and socio-economic rights. According to the Task Force: 
It is a well-established fact in human rights law that all human rights – including 
economic, social and cultural rights – are indivisible, inter-dependent, and inter-related. 
Thus human rights law does not only refer to civil and political rights. The Republic of 
Kenya has an internationally binding obligation to protect all human rights, that is, civil 
and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights, because it is a signatory 
to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. That is why a truth commission 
should investigate the violations of civil and political rights as well as those of economic, 
social and cultural rights.48
89. Indeed, several chapters of this Report demonstrate the inherent linkages between 
civil and political rights and socio-economic rights. 
90. The sub-sections that follow now focus on the three broad areas of the Commission’s 
subject matter mandate. 
Gross violations of human rights 
91. Although, as indicated above, it is not evidently clear whether the intention 
of Parliament was for the Commission to focus on ‘ordinary violations’ or ‘gross 
violations of human rights’, the Commission made a decision to focus on the latter. 
After a careful scrutiny of the TJR Act, the Commission concluded that there was a 
strong textual indication all over the Act to suggest that Parliament intended gross 
violations of human rights should be the focus of the Commission’s inquiry. In 
46 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para 5.  
47 See J Biegon ‘The inclusion of socio-economic rights in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya’ in J Biegon & G Musila (eds) Judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights under the new Constitution: Challenges and opportunities for Kenya (2011) 13. 
48 Makau Mutua Report (n 33 above) 33. 
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section 5 and 6, the Act refers to ‘gross violations of human rights’ or ‘gross human 
rights violations’ seven times. 
92. There are at least two additional reasons why the Commission believes its focus 
on gross violations of human rights is accurate and valid. First, comparative 
experience shows that gross violations of human rights have been the focus 
of inquiries by truth commissions elsewhere.49 Despite contextual differences 
between Kenya’s and other countries, there was no need for the Commission to 
reinvent the wheel on this specific issue. The second reason was a matter of policy 
and practical considerations. The Commission could not, even if it chose to do so, 
inquire into all human rights violations, however petty, within a 45-year period. It 
was not practical, in view of time and resource constraints.
93. Having made the decision that it would focus on gross violations of human rights, 
the Commission had to then define what this entailed. Of course, the starting 
point was the TJR Act which defines ‘gross human rights violations’ to include the 
following: 
(a) violations of fundamental human rights, including but not limited to 
acts of torture, killing, abduction and severe ill-treatment of any person;
(b) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical property;
(c) rape or any other form of sexual violence;
(d) enforced disappearance of persons;
(e) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender or other grounds 
universally recognised as impermissible under international law;
(f ) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command, procurement 
to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a) and (c), which was committed 
during the period between 12 December 1963 and 28 February 2008 and 
the commission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded or 
ordered, by any person acting with a political motive; or 
(g) crimes against humanity. 
94. In terms of this definition, the Commission prioritised the following categories of 
violations in its work and has dedicated a chapter to each in this report: 
49  See for instance South African TRC; Sierra Leone TRC; and Liberian TRC.
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 Unlawful killings and enforced disappearances (including political 
assassinations, extra-judicial killings and massacres);
 Unlawful detention, torture and ill-treatment; and 
 Sexual violence. 
95. Further, owing to its wide temporal mandate and for pragmatic reasons, the 
Commission had to be selective of the events it would concentrate on in terms of 
research and investigations. In this regard, the Commission prioritised violations 
committed in the following contexts:
 Shifta War (1965-1967);
 Security operations in North Eastern, Upper Eastern and North Rift (1963-2008);
 Attempted coup (1982);
 Crackdown on multi-party and pro-democracy activists (1986-1991);
 Ethnic and politically instigated clashes (1991/1992 and 1997);
 Activities of and crackdown on militia groups (2006-2007); and 
 Post-election violence (2007-2008).
96. While in its research and investigations the Commission prioritised violations 
committed in the above contexts, it has captured and narrated in this Report many 
more violations that were committed in contexts beyond those listed above. 
97. The three categories of violations listed above relate to violations of bodily 
integrity or more generally of civil and political rights. In addition to these and in 
accordance with the TJR Act, the Commission also focused on violations of socio-
economic rights.  This report has considered the subject in three different ways. 
98. Firstly, the Commission considered the socio-economic impact of violations that 
targeted individual’s bodily integrity or their civil and political rights. As indicated 
earlier, violations of civil and political rights always go hand in hand with violations 
of socio-economic rights.
 
99. One of the findings of the Commission in this regard, for instance, is that most 
security operations in the country in which killings, torture and sexual crimes were 
committed, were also characterized by the burning of houses, theft or killing of 
cattle, looting of property and destruction of crops. The impact of these violations 
was particularly borne by the most vulnerable in society such as women, children, 
persons with disabilities and the elderly. 
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100. Secondly, the Commission considered socio-economic rights within its mandate 
to inquire into and establish the reality or otherwise of perceived economic 
marginalisation of communities. In this respect, the Commission considered 
violations of socio-economic rights as independent violations.
 
101. Finally, the Commission considered socio-economic violations within its mandate to 
investigate economic crimes and grand corruption. As the Makau Mutua Task Force 
report noted, ‘economic crimes lead to the violations of the entire gamut of human 
rights and in particular of economic, social and cultural rights’.50
Historical injustices 
102. Although the term ‘historical injustices’ is not used in the TJR Act, the notion of 
‘historical injustices’ pervades the debate on transitional justice in Kenya and has 
since become a rallying cry for those seeking justice for past violations. There is 
nevertheless ample proof that it was intended that the Commission would inquire 
into what are regarded as ‘historical injustices’. 
103. This was clearly spelt out in the TJRC Agreement and the Memorandum of Objects 
and Reasons attached to the TJR Bill. As already quoted above, the latter document 
stated that: 
The establishment of the Commission was conceived with a view to addressing historical 
problems and injustices which, if left unaddressed, threatened the very existence of 
Kenya as a modern society.
104. However, ‘historical injustices’ is not a term of art. It entered Kenyan lexicon in the 
context of activism and agitation for constitutional reform and establishment 
of transitional justice mechanisms aimed at addressing past human rights 
violations. In public discourse, the term refers to at least two things: Firstly, it refers 
to exclusion and marginalisation (in terms of economic development) of certain 
groups or regions and a range of violations supportive of this phenomenon. 
105. Secondly, it refers to dispossession and inequalities in the allocation of land in 
a variety of ways by successive governments (or those associated with them) 
in pre-independence and post-independence Kenya. For instance, during the 
parliamentary debate that preceded the enactment of the TJR Act, a member of 
Parliament observed that: 
50 Makau Mutua Report (n 33 above) 33. 
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One of the functions of this Commission is to find the so-called historical injustices. I am 
one of the people who have been unable to understand what this so-called historical 
injustice is. I am saying this because it is more related to land, and more particularly, land 
in the Rift Valley.51
106. In other words, the term historical injustice has been used to describe issues of 
marginalisation and dispossession that resulted in disparities of income, wealth 
and opportunity that lie at the heart of many of the current conflicts in Kenya. 
In its report, the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence, for instance, 
makes reference to ‘historical marginalisation, arising from perceived inequities 
concerning the allocation of land and other national resources as well as access to 
public goods and services’ as one of the main causes of inter-ethnic tensions and 
conflict.52
107. Thus, although the TJR Act does not expressly refer to historical injustices, it mandates 
the Commission to inquire into issues that fall under this term. First, section 6(p) 
mandates the Commission to ‘inquire into and establish the reality or otherwise of 
perceived economic marginalisation of communities and make recommendations 
on how to address the marginalisation’. Second, section 6(o) mandates the 
Commission to ‘inquire into the irregular and illegal acquisition of public land and 
make recommendations on the repossession of such land or the determination of 
cases relating thereto’. 
Other mandate areas 
108. In addition to gross violations of human rights and historical injustices, the 
Commission was mandated to investigate and/or carry out the following three 
functions: 
 consider the reports of the relevant commissions of inquiry and make 
recommendations on the implementation of such reports;
 inquire into the misuse of public institutions for political objectives; and 
 inquire into the causes of ethnic tensions and make recommendations on 
the promotion of healing, reconciliation and co-existence among ethnic 
communities. 
51 Kenya National Assembly, Official Report, 24 July 2008, p. 2120. 
52 Government of Kenya Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (2008) 23.
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Breadth and Complexity of Mandate 
109. As can be gleaned from the foregoing discussion, the Commission’s mandate was 
both materially vast and complex. Truth commissions are ordinarily mandated to 
focus only on gross violations of human rights. In addition to being mandated to 
investigate gross violations of human rights, the Commission was also mandated 
to investigate historical injustices and other issues that are rarely the focus of a 
truth commission. The enormity of the task handed to the Commission is well 
illustrated by the testimony of a witness who, speaking of only a single event, the 
Wagalla Massacre, observed that:
If all the water is turned into ink with which to write, all the trees are turned into pens 
with which to write, and all the land is turned into paper on which to write, the history 
of Wagalla cannot be covered.53
110. The breadth and complexity of its mandate, as measured against its resources and 
life span, imposed on the Commission intense pressure. It also partly contributed 
to the Commission’s inability to present its Report as it had been initially scheduled. 
Responsibility for Violations and Injustices 
111. The question of responsibility for violations and injustices committed during the 
Commission’s mandate period was dealt with under section 5(a) and 6(b) of the TJR 
Act. Section 5(a) restricted responsibility to the state, its organs and agents or former 
agents. It required the Commission to establish a record of violations committed by 
‘the state, public institutions and holders of public office, both serving and retired’. 
Thus, in ascribing responsibility to the state, the Commission adopted an approach 
that was informed by the express language of the TJR Act and by international legal 
principles concerning state responsibility. In particular, the Commission considered 
that an act or omission of the following entities was attributable to the state: 
 state organs; 
 a person or entity who acts under the legal authority of the state to perform 
governmental functions (and it does not matter whether the organ or entity 
exercising governmental authority exceeds its authority or contravenes 
instructions); 
 a person or group of persons acting on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of, the state in carrying out the conduct; and 
53  TJRC/Hansard/Public hearing/Wajir/18 April 2011/ p. 20. 
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 private entities, the activity of which is acknowledged and adopted as its own 
by the state.54
112. Section 6(b), on the other hand, expanded the list of those who could be held 
responsible for violations and injustices beyond the state. In addition to public 
institutions, public office holders, the state, state actors and persons purporting to 
have acted on behalf of a public body, it also lists the following: individuals, bodies 
and organisations. The Commission interpreted the reference to individuals, 
bodies and organisations to include persons other than state agents or persons 
purporting to act under the authority of the state. 
113. As such, while the Commission primarily focused on violations perpetrated by 
the state and its agents, in certain respects it considered the actions of non-state 
actors, especially militia groups such as Mungiki, Chinkororo and the Sabaot 
Land Defence Force (SLDF). The Commission’s inclusion of non-state actors in its 
definition of perpetrators was fortified by the fact that this inclusion was necessary 
for the establishment of an accurate, complete and historical record of historical 
injustices and gross violations of human rights. 
Amnesty 
114. One of the most controversial provisions in the TJR Act concerns the Commission’s 
powers with respect to amnesty. Amnesties have been a much used, if controversial, 
mechanism in most transitions. While historically amnesties have been used and 
upheld even when they have applied to international crimes and other gross 
violations of human rights, there is now an established principle  that amnesties 
for international crimes are prohibited under international law.  
115. The TJR Bill included provisions granting the Commission power to recommend 
amnesty for a broad range of violations. Those powers were changed, in part, 
because of the successful lobbying of both domestic and international human 
rights organisations, who argued that international law prohibits the granting of 
amnesty for international crimes.  
116. Thus, the first version of the TJR Act significantly restricted the range of violations 
for which amnesty could be granted. In particular, it provided that amnesty could 
not be granted for  ‘gross violation[s] of human rights or an act, omission or offence 
54 Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001, arts 4-12. For reference, see 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two.
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constituting a gross violation of human right[s] including extra-judicial execution, 
enforced disappearance, sexual assault, rape and torture’. It also clearly indicated that 
the Commission had powers to recommend but not to grant amnesty. However, the 
Act still had several shortcomings in respect of the Commission’s amnesty powers. 
117. For example, the explanatory note in the margins of Part III of the Act relating to 
amnesty stated ‘No amnesty for crimes against humanity’. This suggested that 
amnesty could be granted for other international crimes, such as war crimes, 
genocide, or torture. It also stated that the Commission could recommend amnesty 
for a violation of ‘any international treaty to which Kenya is a party’. 
118. As such, there were some who feared that the specific reference to crimes against 
humanity but not to genocide or war crimes might have suggested that the 
Commission could recommend amnesty for genocide or war crimes.55  While the 
Commission concedes that the language as originally drafted was somewhat 
confusing with respect to its powers to recommend amnesty for genocide and 
war crimes, the clear provision prohibiting it from recommending amnesty for 
gross violations of human rights would clearly have prevented the Commission 
from recommending amnesty for most acts that would qualify as either 
genocide or a war crime.56  
119. In 2009, the TJR Act was amended to, amongst other reasons, make its amnesty 
provisions conform to internationally accepted norms. The marginal note that 
had read ‘No amnesty for crimes against humanity’ was amended to read ‘No 
amnesty for international law crimes’. Moreover, the reference in section 34(2) 
recommending amnesty for an act that violates ‘any international treaty to which 
Kenya is a party’ was removed. Finally, the Act was amended to make it clear that 
amnesty could not be granted for crimes against humanity or genocide.  
120. While the amendments made it clear that genocide, crimes against humanity and 
most likely other international law crimes could not be the subject of an amnesty 
recommendation, the Commission was still left to determine the acts, if any, for 
which it had the power to recommend amnesty. The Act made it clear that the 
Commission could not recommend amnesty for gross violations of human rights.  
55 This fear was buttressed by the fact that the reference to no amnesty for crimes against humanity was only found in a marginal 
note, and was not (until the 2009 Amendments) provided for in the text of the Act itself.  
56 It is possible to argue that some minor acts that do not include violence against persons but might still qualify as genocide or 
a war crime would not constitute a gross violation of human rights of the nature provided in the Act (which lists violations of 
bodily integrity rights such as extrajudicial execution, enforced disappearance, sexual assault, rape, or torture). Thus some 
might argue that cruel inhuman or degrading treatment that does not rise to the level of torture but is part of an armed conflict 
or committed as part of a broader campaign of genocide might not fit within the prohibited acts for which the Commission could 
not recommend amnesty. Given the 2009 amendments to the Act, the Commission did not have to address whether such acts 
would or would not qualify as a gross violation of human rights.  
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121. While the amnesty provisions only made reference to acts of violence (extra-
judicial execution, enforced disappearance, sexual assault, rape and torture), 
the Act defined gross human rights violations more broadly than this to include 
‘violations of fundamental human rights’.57  
122. Given these restrictions on its powers, the Commission undertook a number of 
consultations with various stakeholders to better understand the limitations on 
its amnesty powers and to discuss the opportunities, if any, its amnesty powers 
provided with respect to furthering its mandate with respect to truth, justice and 
reconciliation.
123. After internal deliberation and consultations with stakeholders, the Commission 
decided to forego exercising the powers granted to it to recommend amnesty. 
There are several reasons for this. First, given the broad definition of gross 
violations of human rights in the Act, the type of acts for which the Commission 
could recommend amnesty is very limited.  The Commission generally adopted an 
expansive view of what qualified as a gross violation of human rights in order to 
provide a forum to as many witnesses as possible.  
124. Second, given the limited acts for which amnesty could be recommended and the 
fact that it could only recommend and not grant amnesty, the Commission did not 
anticipate that much additional truth would come out of the amnesty process. The 
amnesty administered by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(which was clearly the primary model for the amnesty provisions provided in 
the Act), was able to grant amnesty itself and was not clearly prohibited from 
considering amnesty for gross violations of human rights and even international 
crimes. The South African Commission did grant amnesty for, among other things, 
acts of torture, enforced disappearances, extra-judicial killings and other acts that 
are clearly outside of this Commission’s power to recommend amnesty. While 
some have criticised the South African amnesty for foregoing justice for such 
crimes, others argue that new information was revealed about some of the worst 
violations committed during the apartheid years.  
125. Regardless of whether one views the South African amnesty as having been a 
success in contributing to the truth of apartheid-era violations, there is no question 
that the limited amnesty powers provided in the TJR Act would not have provided 
a similar opportunity to the Commission.  
57 TJRC Act, sec 2. While the definitions section refers to ‘gross human rights violations’ and the amnesty section to ‘gross 
violation of human rights’ we do not think that the drafters intended to be referring to two different concepts, but instead use 
the two phrases interchangeably to refer to the same violations.  
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Other Relevant Aspects of the Commission’s 
Mandate 
Application of the Indemnity Act 
126. In 1972 the Kenyan Parliament passed the Indemnity Act,58 which restricts the ability 
of individuals to make claims arising from acts committed by the Kenya armed forces 
and others acting on behalf of the government for any act they committed during 
the so-called Shifta War (25 December  1963 – 1 December 1967). The restriction on, 
among other things, any proceeding or claim to compensation is itself restricted to 
acts committed only in a part of Kenya:  the former North Eastern Province and Lamu, 
Tana River, Marsabit and Isiolo districts. 
 
127. The Indemnity Act thus purports to institutionalise impunity for human rights 
violations committed by those acting on behalf of the government during a 
prescribed time and in a prescribed area. In other words, it attempts to create a 
separate legal regime with respect to accountability for the Shifta War.  
128. To qualify for legal protection under the Indemnity Act, an individual’s action must 
have been done in good faith and ‘done or purported to be done in the execution of 
duty in the interests of public safety or the maintenance of public order, otherwise 
in the public interest’.59
129. Since the passage of the Indemnity Act many have argued for its repeal, including 
and not surprisingly, residents of the affected areas. Parliament voted to repeal the 
Indemnity Act in 2010. The President however refused to assent to the repeal and 
thus the Indemnity Act continues to be part of the laws of Kenya.  
130. From its inception, concerns were raised about the impact of the Indemnity Act on 
the Commission’s work. Some were concerned that the Indemnity Act prevented 
the Commission from investigating, researching, discussing, or commenting on 
violations that occurred in the areas and during the times covered by the Act. Others 
argued that the Commission should devote some of its operational resources to 
pushing for repeal of the Indemnity Act. Still others refused to engage with the 
Commission unless and until the Act was repealed.  
131. Speaking of the Indemnity Act before the Commission, a witness lamented:
What a gross violation of human rights and absolute abuse of democracy that has 
been legitimized under the law! It was this period between 25th December 1963 to 1st 
December 1967 that gross human rights violations and atrocities were meted out on the 
residents of Northern Kenya. It is something so strange that section 3(b) says ‘if it is done 
58  Chapter 44, Laws of Kenya. 
59  Indemnity Act, sec 3(1) (a)-(b). 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Volume  I    Chapter T WO 
75
in good faith’. I wonder whether the killing of our people, raping of our wives, killing our 
animals were done in good faith.60  
132. Another witness expressed similar sentiments:  
I do not want to go into the details of the Act, but it puzzles me … I am yet to understand 
whether human rights can be grossly and systematically violated and abused in good 
faith and whether such violations and abuses further any known public interest.61  
133. In interpreting the scope of its mandate, the Commission obviously had to address 
the applicability and effect of the Indemnity Act on its activities. After thoroughly 
considering the issue, the Commission concluded that the Indemnity Act did not 
apply to the work of the Commission and thus could not restrict in any way the 
work of the Commission. There are two arguments that support the Commission’s 
conclusion.
134. First, the Indemnity Act makes it clear that its restrictions with respect to 
accountability do not apply to ‘the institution or prosecution of proceedings 
on behalf of the government’.62  This section makes clear that the focus of the 
legislation is on restricting the right of private individuals to bring a claim for 
compensation or other form of accountability. 
135. The Commission is an independent government commission that was created 
by and works on behalf of the government. As such the Commission clearly is 
engaged in ‘proceedings on behalf of the government’ and thus its operations are 
excluded from the provisions of the Indemnity Act.
136. Second, even if one were to argue that the Indemnity Act by its terms applies to and 
thus restricts the powers of the Commission, the passage of the TRJ Act, which, under 
this argument, conflicts with the provisions of the Indemnity Act, would prevail as it 
was passed after the Indemnity Act. It is a fundamental principle of the rule of law 
that if two pieces of legislation conflict, the one passed later in time applies unless 
the later legislation makes clear that it is subject to the previous legislation.  
137. In this case, Parliament passed the TJR Act in 2008 and decided not to make the 
Commission subject to the Indemnity Act. This argument is strengthened by the fact 
that Parliament did expressly indicate that the Commission is subject to other pieces 
of legislation that conflict with the TJR Act, such as the Protected Areas Act.63
60 TJRC/Hansard//Public Hearing/ Marsabit/4 May 2011/ p. 
61 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Marsabit/4 May 2011/p. 8. 
62 Indemnity Act, sec 4(a).
63 The Protected Areas Act, which governs access to certain sensitive government buildings and facilities, conflicts with the 
general power granted to the Commission to ‘visit any establishment or place without giving prior notice’. TJR Act sec 7(2) 
(b). Parliament made clear that notwithstanding the power to visit any establishment without prior notice, the Commission 
was still bound by the provisions of the Protected Areas Act. TJR Act sec 7(4). 
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Choice of terminologies 
138. Truth Commissions have grappled with how best to refer to individuals who 
were affected by or are responsible for gross violations of human rights. The 
Commission, like other truth commissions around the world, had a strong victim 
focus. The TJR Act directed the Commission to elicit the views and perspectives of 
victims, restore their dignity and determine ways and means of providing them 
with redress. The term ‘victim’ is also defined in the Act essentially as any person 
or group who has suffered any harm, loss or damage as a result of a human rights 
violation.64  
139. However, while the TJR Act refers to perpetrators, it does not define the term. It is 
clear, however, that the term perpetrator refers to an individual who bears some 
responsibility for a gross violation of human rights or other violation within the 
mandate of the Commission. Both terms (victim and perpetrator) thus presuppose 
a determination that, in the case of victims, an individual has suffered harm, loss or 
damage as a result of a violation, or in the case of perpetrators, are responsible for 
a violation. In other words, both require that a determination be made with respect 
to the existence of a violation and either harm or responsibility arising from that 
violation.  
140. So as not to prejudge the existence of a violation, harm, or responsibility and to 
better fulfil its obligations to provide ‘victims, perpetrators and the general public 
with a platform for non-retributive truth-telling’,65 to promote reconciliation and 
national unity and to respect the dignity and value of all Kenyans, the Commission 
decided to refer to all individuals who engaged with the Commission as witnesses, 
rather than as victims or perpetrators.  With respect to those who others named 
as being perpetrators of a particular violation, the Commission adopted the term 
‘adversely mentioned person’ again so as not to prejudge whether an individual 
indeed qualified as a perpetrator with respect to a specific violation. 
141. Depending on the evidence collected by the Commission with respect to a 
particular violation, an adversely mentioned person may be identified in this report 
as being responsible for a particular violation (and thus correctly identified as a 
perpetrator of that violation), or as an individual who some have accused, but for 
whom there is insufficient evidence for the Commission to assert with confidence 
their responsibility, or as an individual for whom the evidence suggests has no 
responsibility for a particular violation.  
64 TJR Act, sec 2.  
65 TJR Act, sec 5(g).
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142. In addition, many individuals qualify as both victims and perpetrators. In fact for 
some perpetrators it is their experience as victims which push them to become 
perpetrators, sometimes in the name of vindicating either real or perceived 
violations suffered by themselves, their families, or their community. Much of the 
violations involving ethnic tension and ethnic violence may be better understood 
by acknowledging the dual experiences of individuals and communities as having 
attributes of both victims and perpetrators.  As such, The Commission deemed it 
inappropriate to refer to a person as a victim or perpetrator as such a designation 
only reflects one part of that individual’s experience.  
143. The manner in which individuals engaged with the Commission underscored the 
problematic nature of referring to individuals as victims or perpetrators. While 
the Commission referred to individuals who engaged with the Commission as 
witnesses, individuals self-identified themselves and others using terms like victims, 
survivors and perpetrators. Some who qualified as victims under the Act referred to 
themselves as survivors, choosing to adopt a term that emphasized their present 
and future survival rather than their past victimization. For instance, David Onyango 
Oloo expressed the views of many who suffered from violations of the past:   
What a waste of time the Moi KANU regime went through, plucking university students 
from their classrooms and homes and dumping them in filthy dungeons. It did not 
stop anything. Did it? We are still here. Are we not? We survived. Did we not? Yes, we 
are survivors and not victims. We are victorious overcomers and not carcasses of state 
oppression.  They tried to bury us alive but we defiantly emerged from the graves called 
maximum security penitentiaries. We are still here standing up and fighting for peace, 
justice and democracy. You can lock people up but no oppressor has yet found a way of 
imprisoning patriotic, democratic and revolutionary ideas.66
144. Another witness, Wahinya Bore, echoed this position:
We are not victims but people who are simply victorious. We are not carcasses of state 
oppression or repression. We are people who are strong. Let it not be seen as if victims 
are begging for mercy or to be heard. No! We want the world to know that something 
happened somewhere in Kenya. The issue here is that there is a constituency of some 
people in this particular country who fought for the liberation of this particular country, 
but they have never been recognised.67 
145. Regardless of how they chose to describe themselves, this Report is a tribute to the 
thousands of individuals who suffered the various forms of violations and injustices 
recorded here and in the Commission’s database. 
66 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 Feb 2012/p. 47. 
67 TJRC/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 Feb 2012/p. 53. 
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1. The Commission adopted procedures and policies which conformed to internationally 
accepted standards for truth commissions and truth seeking initiatives. The 
Commission’s reference materials in this regard included the General Principles and 
Parameters for the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation (TJRC Agreement), Truth Justice 
and Reconciliation Act (TJR Act) and the United Nations Principles for the Protection 
and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity.
2. The TJRC Agreement provided that:
The Commission shall receive statements from victims, witnesses, communities, interest 
groups, persons directly involved in events, or any other group or individual; undertake 
investigations and research, hold hearings; and engage in activities as it determines to 
advance national or community reconciliation. The Commission may offer confidentiality 
to persons upon request in order to protect individual privacy or security, or for other 
reasons. The Commission shall solely determine whether its hearings shall be held in 
public or in camera. 
 
3. The TJR Act also gave the Commission ‘all powers necessary for the execution of 
its functions’.1 These included the power to: gather information by any means it 
1  TJR Act, sec 7. 
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deemed appropriate; visit establishments or places for the purpose of obtaining 
information; interview individuals; call upon individuals to attend its hearings; 
require statements to be given under oath; request and/or compel the production 
of information; and issue summons as it deemed necessary. 
4. The Commission structured its operational work under four mutual and overlapping 
phases: 
 statement-taking;
 research and investigations; 
 hearings; and 
 report writing. 
5. The public was educated about these processes through the Commission’s civic 
education and outreach programmes and activities. Where appropriate, the 
Commission opened up its procedures to external review and used the reports 
and recommendations of such reviews to strengthen its processes. 
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Civic Education and Outreach
Starting out 
6. The Commission’s functions, as spelt out in its founding legal instrument included 
‘educating and engaging the public and giving sufficient publicity to its work so 
as to encourage the public to contribute positively to the achievement of the 
objectives of the Commission’ and ‘informing the public of its existence and the 
purpose of its work’.2  To fulfil on this requirement, the Commission carried out 
civic education and outreach activities to allow full and active public participation 
in its work and processes. These civic education and outreach activities were also 
a means of building ownership of both the Commission’s processes and its final 
report among Kenyans. 
7. Civic education and outreach activities were initially delayed by lack of funds 
which made it impossible for the Commission to educate and engage with 
the public as mandated. This was only possible from August 2010 - a year after 
Commissioners were sworn in. The controversy over the suitability and credibility 
of the Chairperson derailed several planned activities including civic education 
and outreach. It also crippled efforts to engage with civil society and development 
partners for assistance and support.
 
8. The Commission received funds in July 2010 and immediately proceeded to 
establish its Civic Education and Outreach Department with responsibility for 
coordinating all the Commission’s civic education and outreach activities. The 
Department started by developing a Strategy and Work Plan before rolling out 
key activities in November 2010.  The roll-out followed soon after the Chairperson 
took the decision to step aside and allow inquiry into his suitability to hold office. 
9. Recognising the financial and time constraints faced by the Commission,3 the 
Department established partnerships with organisations including Kituo cha 
Sheria, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), Action Aid, and others to facilitate 
some of its operations and activities. Kituo cha Sheria disseminated information 
about the Commission’s mandate and work in its outreach programmes in the 
provinces of Nairobi, Nyanza and Rift Valley.  The IOM incorporated aspects of the 
Commission’s mandate and processes in its inter community dialogue and peace 
meetings among pastoralists communities in Northern Kenya, particularly in 
2 TJR Act, sec 20(5)(a). 
3 See Chapter Four in this Volume. 
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Kakuma, Pokot, Kapenguria, Dadaab and Garissa. The structured assistance of civil 
society partners enabled the Civic Education and Outreach Department to expand 
its reach and work. 
Specific activities
10. The Civic Education and Outreach Department conducted a number of activities 
including training of stakeholders, hosting workshops and meetings, and 
participation in barazas and Agricultural Society of Kenya (ASK) shows in an 
effort to reach as many people as possible from all sectors of society.
 
11. The Department’s major activity involved conducting pre-hearing civic education 
drives around the country.  These drives served a three-fold objective: informing the 
public about the Commission’s work and processes; managing public expectations; 
and creating a receptive environment for the hearings that were to follow.  The 
drives used interactive and participatory approaches that allowed participants 
to seek clarification and engage in discussions. Most of these drives were held in 
town halls but in some areas they took the form of open-air gatherings or barazas. 
Participation was open to the general public, different groups of victims, community 
leaders (including representatives of councils of elders and political leaders), as 
well as members of professional organisations and the business community. 
 
12. To ensure inclusiveness in its civic education and outreach activities, the 
Commission organised special workshops and meetings that created space and 
a conducive atmosphere for expression and discussion of the various experiences 
of specific vulnerable groups. Such forums were organised for women, youth, 
children, persons with disabilities, internally displaced persons, slum dwellers, 
squatters, evictees and survivors of particular episodes of human rights violations. 
13. The Commission designed and produced information, education and communication 
(IEC) materials that were distributed to individuals through various outlets, including 
public events and functions of the Commission. IEC materials included brochures 
summarising the Commission’s processes, posters with pictures promoting peace 
and dialogue, fliers with specific information and messages on public hearings and 
Commission branded products such as T-shirts, scarves and khangas. 
To ensure inclusiveness in its civic education and outreach activities, 
the Commission organised special workshops and meetings that 
created space and a conducive atmosphere for expression and 
discussion of the various experiences of specific vulnerable groups. 
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Statement-Taking 
14. Statement-taking is not only one of the primary sources of information for truth 
commissions but it is also a major avenue through which individuals interact with 
a truth commission. The number of statements collected provides an indication of 
the interest of individuals in a truth telling process. The Commission collected a 
total of 42,465  statements. This high level of participation confirmed the findings 
of the Makau Mutua Task Force that there was overwhelming desire for a truth-
seeking process in Kenya.  
 
15. The process sought statements from victims and witnesses of various forms 
of human rights violations. It provided victims, their families and witnesses the 
opportunity to tell their stories. The process gave voice to a multitude of stories 
and perspectives about violations that had occurred in Kenya’s history.  
 
16. The Commission was fully aware that the process of sharing experiences of 
gross human rights violations could be traumatic for victims. As such, Statement 
Takers were trained on how to assist victims deal with trauma. Moreover, aware 
of the importance of the need for inclusion and participation in a truth seeking 
process, the Commission ensured that the statement taking process was inclusive, 
accessible and safe.  In particular:
 the Commission recruited Statement Takers from all regions of the country to 
ensure broad geographical reach for the statement-taking process;
 individuals were free to give statements in the language of their choice, 
although the statement taking forms were filled out in English;
 individuals could request a different statement taker to record their statement if 
they were uncomfortable giving their statement to the person before them (for 
example, an elderly person could choose not to give a statement to someone 
much younger than them);
 the Commission learned from the experience of other truth commissions that 
women were less likely to give their statements to male Statement Takers. For 
this reason, as far as it was possible, statements from women were taken by 
female Statement Takers; and
 the Commission made special provisions to reach out to those who could not 
normally access a statement taker. For example, the Commission deployed 16 
Statement Takers to prisons across the country. 
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Statement Form 
17. The Commission designed a Statement Form to capture information from 
witnesses.4 The Statement Form was designed to ensure the gathering of as 
much information as possible about gross violations of human rights. The Form 
was designed to capture this information from both victims and perpetrators, 
but no single perpetrator volunteered information through this avenue. This was 
so despite the fact that individuals who were adversely mentioned in Statement 
Forms or during the hearings were so notified and requested by the Commission 
to file a statement. 
 
18. Human Rights Information and Documentation Systems (HURIDOCS), an 
internationally recognised organisation in human rights data gathering and 
analysis, reviewed the Statement Form and found it met internationally accepted 
standards for tools designed to gather information about human rights violations. 
HURIDOCS described the Commission’s statement taking form as ‘one of the most 
sophisticated we have seen from a truth commission’.
 
Initial Statement-Taking Exercise 
19. The Commission undertook an initial statement taking exercise in Mt Elgon 
in May and June 2010. This was, in effect, a pilot project conducted for two 
reasons.  Firstly, the Commission used the exercise to get feedback from victims 
and other witnesses about the statement-taking methodology, including the 
Statement Form. Secondly, the exercise enabled the Commission to begin its main 
operational activities immediately, despite the fact that resources to hire staff were 
yet to be received. This inadequacy of financial and human resources through the 
first year of the Commission’s establishment hindered the start of a nation-wide 
exercise until July 2010. Rather than wait for the availability of adequate resources, 
the Commission took the opportunity of the initial exercise to strengthen the tools 
it would work with and learn from the mistakes of other truth commissions that 
had not field-tested their statement-taking form and methodology.  
20. The Commission found the initial statement-taking exercise extremely valuable 
because: 
 it allowed the Commission to interact on a one-on-one basis with victims 
and witnesses and to gain valuable insights into how to elicit the range of 
violations and experiences of statement givers;
4  See Appendix 4 for the Statement Form.  
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 it permitted Commissioners to participate first hand in the day to day activities 
of statement- taking, an experience that would enrich their ability to guide 
the national statement-taking process and to understand and process the 
information more thoroughly in connection with public hearings;
 the exercise elicited information that allowed the Commission to refine its 
statement-taking form and statement-taking methodology; and
 the statement-taking exercise provided an opportunity for the Commission to 
engage with its core mandate functions despite the challenges that up until 
that point had primarily limited the Commission’s activities to Nairobi.
 
Training of Statement Takers 
21. The Commission recruited 304 Statement Takers - 113 male and 191 female. They 
were trained between 23 August 2010 and 9 September 2010 to prepare them for 
their task. The Commission developed a curriculum with four major areas of focus: 
transitional justice, human rights, and the mandate of the Commission; gender 
perspectives in statement taking; trauma management and the statement taking-
form and process. Training workshops were held in each of the eight provincial 




22. The nation-wide statement taking exercise was officially launched on 9 September 
2010 and lasted five months. It was anticipated that some individuals would be 
unwilling or unable to record statements during the formal statement taking 
exercise and so the Commission, continued to record and receive statements and 
memoranda at its offices and during individual and thematic hearings. 
23. The Commission travelled around the country conducting civic education and 
individual hearings which increased its visibility significantly and resulted in many 
more people coming forward to record statements. The Commission re-engaged 
a limited number of Statement Takers during the pre-hearing stage to record 
statements for a period of two weeks in each specific area.
 
24. The Commission cultivated a number of important partnerships with civil society 
organisations around the statement-taking exercise. The main partners in this 
regard were Action-Aid and Kituo cha Sheria. Action-Aid partnered with the 
Commission in statement-taking in Mt. Elgon and the Coast region while Kituo 
cha Sheria focused entirely on the Coast region. Both organisations recruited 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Volume I    Chapter T H R E E  
86
Statement Takers who received training based on the curriculum developed by 
the Commission before being deployed in the field. They would then forward the 
statements to the Commission.
25. Despite the huge number of statements recorded the Commission continued to 
receive complaints that individuals had not been able to record their statements. 
This continuous expression of interest in recording statements underscored the 
depth of interest in a truth telling process as well as the increased credibility of the 
Commission as it embarked upon activities relating to its core functions.  
Review of Statement-Taking
26. In November 2010, the Commission  reviewed the statement-taking process in 
consultative meetings with CSOs based in all eight provinces. The review had 
a three-fold objective: to identify gaps and critical issues emanating from the 
statement taking process; to assess the quality of information received through 
the statement taking process; to assess the level of participation of vulnerable 
groups (such as women, persons with disabilities, etc) in the process.
27. Through these review meetings, the Commission established working arrangements 
with local organisations some of which later supported the statement-taking 
process through civic education and mobilisation of their respective constituents. 
At the end of the statement-taking session, debriefing sessions for Statement 
Takers were held in each province and included psychosocial support to help them 
cope with the stress of having to hear traumatic accounts from victims.
Statements by Children 
28. As is the case with other vulnerable groups, the TJR Act allowed the Commission to 
put in place special arrangements and adopt specific mechanisms and procedures 
to address the experiences of children. Consistent with the Kenyan law and 
international practice, the Commission defined a child as any human being under 
the age of 18 years. 
 
29. A Stakeholders’ Workshop on the Participation of Children in the Commission’s 
Process was held on 7 October 2011 in Nairobi. The purpose of the meeting was 
to consult child protection agencies and other stakeholders on best practices in 
taking statements and organising hearings involving children.
 
30. Taking statements from children requires special skills and considerations. A distinct 
training programme was therefore designed for statement takers who would engage 
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with children and record their statements. The scope of the training included aspects 
relating to: the different evolving capacities of children and processes suited to those 
capacities; the need to ensure children’s free participation without interfering with 
their other entitlements such as education or play; the need to avoid stigmatisation 
or discrimination; and the need to obtain consent from the parents, caregivers or 
guardians of a child. A total of 40 statement takers - drawn from the Commission, 
child protection agencies and individual professional counselling organisations – 
were trained under programme.
 
31. A special Children’s Statement-Taking Form was also prepared in consultation 
with child protection agencies and was pre-tested in October 2011 to assess its 
suitability and effectiveness in taking statements from children. The draft was 
subsequently revised to incorporate insights from the pre-testing exercise.5 
 
32. The 40 statement takers were then guided on the use of the Children’s Statement 
Form before they were deployed to take statements from children for a period of 
one month. A total of 996 statements were collected from children:  500 from boys 
and 496 from girls.  
 
33. On the basis of these statements, the Commission subsequently organised a 
thematic hearing for children in December 2011, details of which are discussed 
later in this Chapter. 
5  See Appendix 5 for the Children’s Statement Form. 
 Statements Distribution by region and gender
Region Male Female Unknown Total
Central 1778 1574 6 3358
Coast 2455 1079 13 3547
Eastern 3467 1775 7 5249
Nairobi 832 947 2 1781
North Eastern 2883 1307 2 4192
Nyanza 2602 1828 7 4437
Rift Valley 7211 4698 23 11932
Western 3934 2890 8 6832
Not Given 649 405 83 1137
Grand Total 25811 16503 151 42465
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Memoranda
34. Statements recorded by individual victims or witnesses provided the bulk of raw 
information for the Commission. In addition, memoranda were also collected 
by the Commission. Generally, memoranda were submitted by representatives 
of affected communities or groups, but in some instances also by individuals. 
Memoranda provided information beyond the limits of the Statement Form. 
Groups and individuals could include longer narrations of the history, context and 
causes of violations. 
35. The Commission developed and distributed guidelines to ensure that the 
memoranda incorporated pertinent information such as the names of individuals 
involved and a comprehensive description of where, when, why and how the 
alleged violations occurred. Similar to the Statement Form, the guidelines 
relating to the memoranda also requested a brief outline of the expectations and 
recommendations of the affected groups or individuals. 
36. A memorandum was also a means by which a group of people or community 
developed, through a consultative and participatory manner, an agreed narrative 
of what they had experienced. In the process, harmony was fostered within the 
community. For instance, in Marsabit, the Commission received a memorandum 
prepared by Marsabit Inter-Ethnic Consultative Group which described itself 
as ‘a non-registered entity which was purposely formed to consult on the 
historical injustices that were faced by the people in this county with a view to 
comprehensively presenting them before the Commission’.6  A representative of 
6  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Marsabit/4 May 2011/p. 19.
A group submitting a memorandum to the Commission’s Vice Chairperson, Commissioner Tecla Namachanja 
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the Group explained to the Commission the reason behind its formation and the 
impact of developing a joint memorandum: 
When we drafted this memorandum, we appreciated the fact that the Commission 
is not just a Truth and Justice Commission, but a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission. We valued the inherent good in doing a collective memo because 
we cannot cheat ourselves. If every community were to stand here and present its 
separate memorandum, especially on issues relating to ethnic conflict, there would be 
accusations and counter accusations which may give us the truth and justice, but defeat 
the object of reconciliation. By coming together, we have diffused that tension and we 
believe that our efforts will crystallize towards [reconciliation]. 
37. The Commission continued receiving memoranda beyond the statement taking 
exercise and throughout the hearings phase. In total, the Commission received 
1529 memoranda from individuals, groups, associations and communities.  













Information and Data Management 
Records Management 
38. The ICT and Documentation Department was responsible for the organization and 
management of the Commission’s print and electronic records. The Department 
developed an organization-wide file plan based on an internally developed 
taxonomy to guide the naming and filing of official records.  The development 
of the file plan was informed by the functions and nature of records created and 
used by the various departments of the Commission.  The operational records were 
classified by function while the substantive records by subject. 
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39. The Commission had in its custody records of a sensitive nature such as the 
statements collected from the public, proceedings of both public and in-camera 
hearings, evidence materials and investigation reports. These records had to be 
protected to ensure they were available when needed and that their integrity was 
maintained (that they were not altered).
 
40. The degree of sensitivity or confidentiality of a record was based on the gravity 
of damage which its unauthorized disclosure could likely cause any individual or 
group. Protection against unauthorized access to records or access by unauthorized 
persons required sound procedures for handling access protocols. As such, access 
to records was based on the following classification: 
 Open records: for unclassified records whose access was limited to the 
Commission’s staff;
 Confidential records: for records that required written authority to access 
from the originating department;
 Strictly confidential: for records that required direct written authorization for 
access from the CEO.
 
41. The security classification of records determined how records were stored; the 
confidential and strictly confidential records were secured in disaster proof safes 
in the office and in a vault at a local commercial bank respectively. These security 
measures also applied to electronic records which were stored mainly in shared 
electronic drives with a requirement for access passwords. Moreover, all confidential 
and strictly confidential electronic files were protected by various encryption levels. 
Electronic Database 
42. In order to organise, manage and statistically analyse the information received 
through statements and memoranda, the Commission created an electronic 
database that facilitated the input, storage, retrieval and analysis of data. A team 
brought together by HURIDOCS provided technical support in the creation of 
the database while the United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) offered financial support. 
43. Ideally the design of a database is undertaken either before or simultaneously 
with the design of the Statement-Taking Form and procedures. However, given 
the financial and other constraints that have been mentioned, the Commission 
was unable to prepare the general Statement-Taking Form at the same time as the 
Children’s Statement-Taking Form. The latter was developed near the end of the 
national statement-taking process. 
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 Designing the database
44. The development of the database began with a needs assessment to ensure 
that it was designed to meet the specific needs of the Commission. This was 
undertaken by a project team comprised of three experts from HURIDOCS, Stataid 
and BoldEverything (the ‘Data Team’). The Data Team spent a week in Nairobi, 
from 31 January to 4 February 2011, during which it met with Commissioners 
and staff members (mainly the management team, researchers, IT technicians, 
and the statement manager). 
45. On 1 February 2011, the Data Team reviewed the Statement Form together with 
the Commission’s Researchers. The review discussed the best way to represent in 
the database, the information presented  in the Statement Form. The Statement 
Form was reviewed line by line. For each question, the group discussed whether 
the data should be maintained in the database and, if so, what was the best format 
for the data (qualitative, quantitative, or both). The discussion lasted many hours 
and covered the entire database. 
46. In the end the following tasks related to the design of the database were completed: 
determination of database specifications and requirements; collection of variables 
and initial quality analysis for statements emanating from North Eastern Province; 
a preliminary determination of the human resources required for coding and data 
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 Tracking Log for Statements 
47. Each Statement Form had an identification number, ranging from 00001 to 50000. 
This allowed each statement to be individually tracked. With the initial assistance 
of the Data Team, the Commission prepared an Excel Spreadsheet tracking log 
with a row for each statement using their respective identification numbers. The 
log was used for multiple purposes: 
 Determining the statement status: Statements could either be blank, filled 
out, incomplete, cancelled, damaged, destroyed, or missing. Knowing a 
Statement’s status was helpful for determining how many statements had 
been used at any particular time and whether each statement had been coded 
and entered into the electronic database. 
 Maintaining a record of the physical location of the statement: Because 
almost all statements contained confidential information, it was imperative 
that all statements be returned from the field and then carefully tracked if 
they were not in storage. The tracking log therefore contained a variable that 
indicated the physical location of a statement at any particular time. This 
ensured a greater degree of data security. 
 Organising coding and data entry steps: The tracking log was used to assign 
particular statements to particular coders or data entry staff on particular 
days. It was also used to maintain a record of which statements had been 
coded and which still needed to be coded. It was also used to randomize the 
order in which statements were coded and entered into the database, to allow 
the database at any particular time of its development to represent the full set 
of statements in an unbiased way.  Thus as the coding and data entry process 
continued, statistics could be generated and the emerging patterns in the 
data could be ascertained. 
 Data Coding and Entry
48. Feeding information into the Database was a two-track process. First, the 
information contained in the Statement Forms was transferred into a coding 
sheet. The coding sheet served as a uniform template for feeding data into the 
database. In the second instance, the coded information was entered into the 
electronic database. 
49. The coding process was guided by a Coding Manual. Its main purpose was to 
stipulate fixed data coding, entry, and management practices and protocols, to 
ensure that the Database is based on consistent and reliable standards and that it 
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is independent from external influences or other unforeseen factors. The Coding 
Manual also established principles of confidentiality and addressed matters of 
protection of confidential information handled by the coders. Thus, the Manual 
was designed as a reference by which staff could ensure that high-quality data 
storage practices and the appropriate handling of data were maintained at all 
times.
50. In August 2011, the Commission recruited a total of 30 Statement Coders who 
were trained to convert the qualitative narratives contained in statements and 
memoranda into quantitative parameters that could generate statistical analyses. 
Together with the Database Manager, the Coders and Data Entry Clerks signed a 
Statement of Confidentiality. 
51. The Database Manager oversaw the coding process and the overall functioning 
of the database. She was responsible for ensuring that the procedures outlined 
in the Manual were followed with great care. Any questions, uncertainty, or 
ambiguities that Coders or Data Entry Clerks encountered during their work were 
to be directed to the Database Manager. Caution was crucial for data coding or 
data entry personnel and in a situation of uncertainty were to approach the 
Database Manager  to ensure accuracy of the coding and data entry processes.
52. The coding process took five months from August to December 2011. 
 Evaluating the database
53. Throughout the data entry and coding process, the Database Manager periodically 
reviewed and compared the inputted data with the content of the Coding Sheet. 
She conducted the review at least every two weeks as a matter of course although 
the frequency of reviews depended on her analysis of the work of each individual 
coder. For purposes of quality control, the Database Manager was responsible for 
arranging periodic dual data entry for a random subset of statements. She also 
implemented other methods for testing data quality as she deemed necessary.
54. In December 2011, following the conclusion of the coding process, the Commission 
embarked on the evaluation of the entire database. A two track approach was 
adopted. Firstly, an internal data entry quality analysis was undertaken to check 
for duplication and other errors in the database. In particular, entries were cross-
verified and appropriate action taken where it was found that individuals had 
recorded multiple statements. The evaluation also ensured that all statements and 
memoranda had been fed into the database. This was done by cross-checking the 
entries in the database against a manual statement/memoranda log. 
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55. Secondly, the Database was evaluated by an external independent consultant. 
The evaluation, which was financially supported by ICTJ, assessed the reliability 
of the database through identification of any factors that could affect analysis 
of the collected data. From 12 to 16 December 2011, the independent reviewer 
undertook a data assessment mission to the Commission. He held a series of 
meetings with both the Commissioners and with the technical team in charge of 
the database. In particular, between 13 and 15 December 2011, he worked closely 
with the Commission’s Directors for Research and for ICT and Documentation, 
and the Database Manager to evaluate the data collection and management 
processes and to identify any challenges that could affect the data analysis phase. 
As the Independent Consultant observed, the Commission’s technical personnel 
were, in many instances, well aware of the potential challenges, and using his 
expert knowledge and comparative experience from the Peruvian Commission, 
the independent consultant provided mainly technical guidance on possible 
solutions to address identified challenges. 
56. At the end of the exercise, the independent consultant recommended ways to address 
identified challenges and the Commission acted on these recommendations. 
Research and Investigations 
57. The Commission used both primary and secondary materials in its research into the 
various mandate areas. Primary materials comprised of statements, memorandum 
and exhibits received from victims and witnesses. The Commission also sourced 
materials from the National Archives and from government registries. Secondary 
materials included the works of academics and reports of relevant organizations 
and institutions. The Research Department also organized thematic workshops 
with relevant experts and stakeholders during which various research themes 
were explored. The investigative functions of the Commission were outlined 
under section 6 of the TJR Act. In September 2010, the Commission established 
an Investigation Department with the hiring of two senior investigators. The 
Commission was unable to hire the head of the department until April 2011.  The 
Commission had resolved, early in its life, that the head of investigations would 
be a non-Kenyan. However, the ability to attract an international candidate with 
the requisite skills and experience was dependent on raising funds from donors. 
For reasons discussed in the next Chapter, this was not possible until April 2011 
during which month four additional investigators were also recruited. 
 
58. The primary role of the Investigations Department was to identify and interview 
witnesses whose individual stories would contribute to the historical narrative 
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of gross violations of human rights in the country. The role of the Department 
also extended to the collection and analysis of relevant documentary and other 
forms of evidence.  The strategy for conducting such investigations was robust yet 
flexible enough to adapt to the changing operational environment. For purposes 
of selecting window cases to be heard during the individual hearings (see below), 
the Investigation Department interviewed a total of 919 people across the country 
as shown in the table below. 
Phases of investigations 
59. Investigations were conducted in three main phases: before, during and after the 
hearings.
 Pre-hearing investigations: Pre-hearing investigations were conducted 
ahead of the hearings in each of the eight provinces of the country.  A senior 
investigator appointed as the Investigations Manager for each region was 
responsible for developing a Regional Investigation Plan.  The Plan consisted 
of an overview of the major human rights violations reported in the region. It 
also included a list of potential witnesses and AMPs distilled from Statement 
Forms and from other sources of information available to the Commission. A 
Regional Report was then produced identifying crucial cases to be investigated 
in a specific region and a timeline for conducting the investigations. 
 An investigation team was then deployed to the regions and with the help 
of the Regional Office, located witnesses and obtained detailed statements 
from them, which were then verified and corroborated by other evidence. 
Visible evidence of injuries sustained by witnesses was documented through 
photography. Where possible and in appropriate cases, the investigation 
team visited the sites of violations and took photographs to document the 
scene. They also searched for and collected documents and secured relevant 
physical evidence.
 The Investigation Manager for each region produced a daily report which 
included summaries of the interviews conducted, documentary evidence 
collected, signed copies of the formal statements and details of any other 
investigative activity. These daily reports were the foundation of the final 
Regional Investigation Reports that were developed at the conclusion of each 
regional pre-hearing investigation. 
 Investigations during hearings: Investigations during hearings were 
conducted by an investigator who was present at a hearing session. This 
investigator assessed, with the help of the Regional Coordinator, new 
witnesses and took further detailed statements when appropriate.  He also 
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conducted immediate investigative follow-up of issues emanating from the 
hearings. 
 Post-hearing investigations: Although each regional hearing was conducted 
and concluded in a short span of time ranging from two to six weeks, Regional 
Coordinators continued their field inquiries and were approached by witnesses 
wishing to provide information. This led to identification of further issues for 
investigation and investigators accordingly returned to some areas to conduct 
further inquiries even after the conclusion of hearings. These additional field 
trips were considered on a case by case basis.  The new information collected 
was integrated into the regional investigation reports. 
 
60. The Investigations Department also continued to work in support of the Nairobi-
based thematic hearings. Additionally, investigators played a significant role in 
the identification and collection of information in relation to adversely mentioned 
persons.
Hearings 
61. Section 5(a) and (b) of the TJR Act required the Commission to establish an 
accurate, complete and historical record of gross human rights violations and 
to gather as much information as possible about the causes, nature and extent 
of these violations. Together with research, investigations and other sources of 
information, hearings enabled the Commission to fulfil a major part of this duty.
62. The Commission started its hearings in mid-April 2011 in Garissa and concluded at 
the beginning of April 2012 in Nairobi.  The Commission conducted three kinds of 
hearings: individual hearings, women’s hearings and thematic hearings. 
Individual Hearings 
63. Individual hearings focused on the experience of individuals in relation to gross 
violation of human rights.  Testimony was heard from individuals whose rights had 
been violated, as well as from those who either had knowledge of or allegedly 
participated in acts that resulted in the violations.  The individual hearings were 
designed to achieve three goals, namely: 
 To provide victims, adversely mentioned persons and the general public with 
a platform for non-retributive truth telling;
 To provide victims with a forum to be heard and restore their dignity; and
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 To provide repentant adversely mentioned persons with a forum to confess 
their actions as a way of bringing reconciliation. 
 
64. To a large extent the first two objectives, specifically as they related to victims, 
were achieved. As is described elsewhere in this Report, many of the victims who 
narrated their experiences at the Commission’s hearings did so for the very first 
time.  For them, the forum and platform provided by the Commission had a healing 
or therapeutic effect; and the simple act of speaking out was a big stride towards 
emotional recovery and restoration of human dignity. 
65. However, only limited success was recorded in respect to the third objective. A number 
of adversely mentioned persons who appeared before the Commission claimed that 
they had forgotten details of the events under scrutiny or simply took a defensive 
position. They were not forthright with details. Some were unapologetic about their 
role regarding specific events especially security operations that culminated in the 
massacre of innocent individuals. Others offered apologies, but such apologies were 
usually not combined with any acknowledgement of responsibility.
66. Individual hearings were designed on the basis of a few cases (‘window cases’) 
that were selected for purposes of painting the broader patterns and trends of 
gross violations of human rights in a particular region or area. 
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Selection of Window Cases
67. Due to the large number of statements and memoranda received by the 
Commission, it was impossible to provide a public platform for all individuals who 
wished to testify.  Only a small percentage of victims were given the opportunity 
to testify.  The statement by Commissioner Margaret Shava in response to a 
witness who sought to know the relevance of his testimony summarises the 
rationale of using window cases:7 
We have gone out and asked people who feel that they would like to make a statement 
to the Commission to make a statement. We have collected over 40,000 statements 
but we cannot hear 40,000 people because of the time that we have been given to do 
our work. So we have selected some cases that we feel bring out the nature and the 
patterns of violations which have taken place in this country. We feel that your stories 
demonstrate a very important aspect and that is why we have asked you to come […] 
We hope that by the time we have heard your story, we will gain an understanding 
that we did not have about how these violations have been perpetrated. That 
understanding is going to inform our findings and recommendations in our report.
68. Or as Commissioner Tecla Namachanja explained in Mandera in April 2011: 
Let me also take this opportunity to thank those who recorded statements with the 
Commission. In total, the Commission received over 30,000 statements and 300 memoranda. 
Because of time limitation and the nature of Truth Commissions, we shall not be able to 
conduct hearings for all the statements recorded. The Commission has, therefore, selected 
a few statements to conduct the hearings on what would give a global picture of the 
violations suffered by people from this region. In the next three days, for example, we shall 
hear testimonies on the history of events and violations in Mandera; violations suffered 
by women, testimonies on torture, marginalization, massacres, extrajudicial killings, 
detentions, loss of property, serious injuries suffered during postelection violence and 
police brutality.  Although a few people will be giving testimonies concerning violations 
suffered in Mandera, most of you will relate with the testimonies shared because most of 
you have suffered similar violations. However, I want to assure you that every statement 
recorded will be part of the report when the Commission finishes its work.8
69. To ensure that a representative sample of cases was selected in each region, the 
selection process considered the following factors:
 regional trends and patterns of gross violation of human rights; 
 issues and injustices specific to the region;
 issues and injustices specific to vulnerable and minority groups resident in the 
region;
7  TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Nairobi/22 February 2012/p. 20. 
8  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Mandera/25 April 2011/p. 1-2. 
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 significant events that occurred in the region during the mandate period, such 
as security operations 
 
70. Three departments – Legal, Investigations and Research – were involved in the 
selection of cases.  The Research Department prepared, for each region, a general 
background report describing the regional trends and patterns of human 
rights violations. The Investigations Department searched through statements 
and memoranda in the regional reports for potential window cases.  This was 
followed by the interviewing of potential witnesses and narrowing down their 
number and findings submitted to the legal department. The Legal Department 
assessed the cases further and depending on the suitability of a case prepared a 
final list of window cases. 
71. Regional Coordinators and Statement Takers were also invaluable actors in the 
process because of their knowledge of their respective regions and the issues 
most important to the local community.  The Commission also profiled events and 
violations thought to have particular relevance to the national narrative about 
gross violations of human rights.
Preparation of Witnesses 
72. The Special Support Services Department was responsible for preparing witnesses 
for hearings.  This involved counselling witnesses and managing their expectations. 
In partnership with a number of organisations including Kenya Red Cross Society, 
Kenyatta National Hospital and the Gender Violence Recovery Centre, counselling 
services were provided.  The Kenya Counselling Association and the Kenya Institute 
of Professional Counsellors assisted the Commission to identify locally based 
counsellors who would continue offering counselling services to witnesses and 
victims long after the Commission had concluded its hearings in a specific area or 
region.  
 
73. All witnesses were encouraged to come to the hearings with a relative, friend or a 
person they trusted and who could provide emotional support as they gave their 
testimony. All witnesses who had to travel a long distance to the hearing venue had 
their travel expenses met, and were provided with a modest stipend to cover their 
living expenses while participating in the hearings. The Commission also ensured 
that female witnesses with infants were able to attend the hearings and travelled 
with someone to look after their infants at the expense of the Commission.
 
74. At least a day before the hearing, witnesses were shown the hearing venue 
to give them a chance to familiarise themselves with the hearing setting and 
ask any questions they had about the process. On the day of the hearing, the 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Volume I    Chapter T H R E E  
100
Commission explained to witnesses the hearing procedures and the role of the 
various actors. 
Conducting Individual Hearings 
75. The conduct of the hearings was governed by the Hearing Procedure Rules which 
were published in the Kenya Gazette on 8 April 2011.9 These rules were produced 
after extensive consultations with law-oriented stakeholders, including the Law 
Society of Kenya, International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA-Kenya) and 
the Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ-Kenya).  
76. Often, public hearings began with the testimonies of community leaders who did 
not necessarily testify about specific violations but rather about the general issues 
affecting their particular community, area or region and the broader context of 
violations within that particular area or region. 
 
77. The Commission was established as a quasi-judicial body and its ultimate goal 
was to find the truth and foster reconciliation. As such, its hearings were non-
adversarial in nature. Under the guidance of a Leader of Evidence, witnesses 
were allowed to tell their stories in their own words and style and with minimum 
interruption. Only at the end of a testimony would the Leader of Evidence and 
the Commissioners pose questions to a witness in order to clarify or seek views 
on specific aspects covered in the testimony.  
 
78. The Commission ensured that witnesses restricted their testimony to what they 
had recorded in their written statements, especially those aspects relating to 
adversely mentioned persons. The witnesses were instructed not to adversely 
mention individuals whom they had not already recorded in their statements. 
This allowed the Commission the opportunity in accordance with the rules 
of natural justice to notify individuals in advance if they were to be adversely 
mentioned.  
 79. All adversely mentioned persons were invited before the Commission and were 
informed of their statutory right to be represented by legal counsel. However, 
in accordance with the gazetted Hearing Rules, neither they nor their legal 
representatives were permitted to cross-examine witnesses. They were invited to 
listen to the testimony of witnesses and later given an opportunity to tell their 
version of the story. The idea was to ensure that the Commission’s proceedings 
were not transformed into a rigid, adversarial court-like scenario in which 
witnesses could not express themselves fully and freely.
9 See Appendix 6 for the Hearing Procedure Rules.  
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80. In evaluating the testimony and evidence presented at such hearings where 
adverse testimony was given against individuals or institutions, the Commission 
took into account the fact that these individuals and their counsel were prevented 
from cross-examining witnesses. In this regard Commission hearings borrowed 
from the traditions of civil law legal systems where the decision-maker plays a 
more active role in examining and cross-examining witnesses than is the case in 
common law legal systems.  
81. The hearings were conducted by a panel of at least three or more Commissioners, 
one of whom had to be an international Commissioner, and one of whom had to 
be of the opposite gender from the other two. As a general policy, the Commission 
endeavoured to make sure that that at least one international Commissioner was 
present at all formal proceedings of the Commission. The involvement of foreign 
Commissioners expanded the pool of expertise. It was also the Commission’s 
experience that victims in some parts of the country were more receptive to 
foreign Commissioners than to their Kenyan counterparts. For instance, when 
asked of his expectations of the Commission, a witness in Mandera responded: 
TJRC public hearings at Bungoma County Hall.
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Initially, I did not have any expectation. There was rape and killing. This was normal. I 
now see that there is a Commission which has the intention of doing justice. Now there 
is a ray of hope in my heart. I expect justice. When I see international faces amongst you 
people, I get a glimpse of hope that we may find justice for the rape and the killings that 
took place. I pray that justice prevails and the criminals be brought to book.10
82. The Commission selected venues for the hearings taking into account the 
following considerations:
 capacity of the venue ;
 accessibility of the venue to witnesses and the general public including by 
persons with disabilities;
 neutrality of the venue, especially in regions or areas where  two or more 
groups or communities with a history of conflict or tension reside;
 availability of sanitary services and other social amenities; and 
 security. 
 
83. The Commission held hearings in several locations in each region in an effort to 
facilitate public access and participation and to ensure that diverse voices were 
heard. Simultaneous translation of the proceedings was provided at all public 
hearings including into sign language. 
 
84. The majority of witnesses who testified before the Commission did so in public. 
However, where the safety of a witness or the nature of his/her testimony so 
demanded, the hearing was held in private. 
Table 1: Areas where the Commission held its hearings
Region Hearing locations 
1 Central Nyeri, Muranga, Kiambu and Nyandarua
2 Coast Lamu, Hola, Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale, and Wundanyi
3 Eastern Meru, Embu, Machakos, Makindu, Kitui, Marsabit and Isiolo 
4 Nairobi Nairobi 
5 North Eastern Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, and Moyale
6 Nyanza Kisumu, Kisii and Kuria
7 Rift Valley Kericho, Nakuru, Naivasha, Narok, Kajiado, Rumuruti, Eldoret, Lodwar, 
Kapenguria, Kitale, and Baringo 
8 Western Mt. Elgon, Kakamega, Busia, and Bungoma
9 Uganda Kiryandongo 
10  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Mandera/26 April 2011/p. 36. 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Volume I    Chapter T H R E E 
103
Women’s Hearings  
85. The participation of women and members of other vulnerable groups is a central 
pillar of any comprehensive and inclusive truth-seeking process. Experience 
has shown that due to gender stereotypes and cultural norms, women are 
unlikely to participate in public processes unless proactive measures are taken 
to encourage and facilitate such participation. In the absence of such measures 
in the past, Kenyan women had traditionally been left out of public processes 
that had shaped and defined the country’s socio-political and economic policies 
including those policies that directly impacted their day to day lives.  
86. Not surprisingly, the participation of women in public hearings conducted by 
the Makau Mutua Task Force to gather views as to whether Kenyans desired a 
truth commission was limited.  Therefore, the Task Force made the following 
observation, suggesting as it did, that a truth commission established in 
accordance with its recommendations should pay particular attention to the 
participation of women in its processes:11  
The Task Force was deeply concerned by the low numbers of women who turned up 
at its public hearings to make submissions. Although the Task Force encouraged the 
few women present to speak up, this problem will have to be addressed once the truth 
commission is set up so that the issues that are particular to women are adequately 
dealt with. Kenya, like most countries, has deeply embedded prejudices, policies, 
and traditions that have historically marginalised women and made them invisible 
in the public square. Discrimination against women, violence, rape, and patriarchy 
have consigned women to the margins of society. Human rights violations and the 
economic crimes committed by the state have a special gendered effect on women. 
That is why violations against women have disproportionately multiplied adverse 
effects and are rarely addressed.  A truth commission must pay particular attention 
to the participation of women and the abuses perpetrated against them. Otherwise, 
a truth commission will have little or no beneficial value in addressing the plight of 
women.
 
87. Against this background, the Commission took measures to ensure the participation 
of women in its processes including in the hearings. Indeed, section 27(1) of the 
TJR Act permitted the Commission to put in place special arrangements and adopt 
specific mechanisms and procedures to address the experiences of, amongst 
others, women. 
 
11 Government of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
(2003) 15. 
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88. In particular, the Commission conducted, alongside its public hearings, women-
specific hearings which were exclusively attended by women. The Commission 
was conscious of the fact that while some women were courageous enough to 
testify about traumatic events in front of a general public hearing, restricting 
women to these general public hearings only  would have resulted in many 
women being reluctant to testify. Moreover, the decision to conduct women-
focused hearings was reinforced when a preliminary review at the conclusion of 
the statement-taking process showed that only one third of the total statements 
received were from women. In essence, women had not come forward to record 
statements in numbers proportionate to their representation in the general 
population.
 
89. The hearings were framed as ‘conversations with women’.  They were designed 
to and were  safe spaces where women could freely talk about violations that 
were specific to them. The majority of women who attended the hearings felt 
comfortable sharing their most traumatic memories. The women’s hearings 
enabled the Commission to fill the gap identified in its data bank as well as 
to record violations specific to women. The hearings provided insights into 
women’s perspectives of experiencing injustice and conflict.  They also provided 
the Commission with insights into women’s views as to how they wanted their 
suffering and pain redressed. 
90. The Commission was, however, concerned that while the women’s hearings 
provided a safe space for women to tell their stories, the stories were therefore 
not heard by men or the general public.  Women hearings were justifiable for the 
reasons suggested, but an opportunity was lost to reach out and educate men. 
Some of the men may have been insensitive to or ignorant of the experiences 
of women, including the impact of historical injustices. 
91. But on a balance, the Commission’s choice of holding women-only hearings 
was clearly the correct choice.   Without the hearings the experience of the 
vast majority of women who engaged with the Commission would not have 
been captured.   It is hoped that the inclusion of a detailed discussion in this 
Report of what was learned from those hearings will increase the awareness of 
men about the impact of injustices on women, and thus counter the adverse 
impacts of the exclusion of men from these hearings.  
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Schedule of places where the Commission held Women’s Hearings
Date Region Specific Place Venue 
Wednesday, April 13, 2011 North Eastern Garissa Agricultural Training Institute
Tuesday, April 19, 2011 North Eastern Wajir Raha Palace Hotel 
Wednesday, April 20, 2011 North Eastern Wajir Raha Palace Hotel 
Tuesday, April 26, 2011 North Eastern Mandera Jabane Hall
Sunday, May 01, 2011 Eastern Moyale Arid Lands Resource Management Project 
Guest House.
Thursday, May 05, 2011  Eastern Marsabit Nomad’s Trail Rest House Conference Hall
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 Eastern Isiolo Wabera Primary School Dining Hall
Tuesday, May 24, 2011 Western Mt. Elgon Mount Elgon Council Hall
Tuesday, June 28, 2011 Western Kakamega Sheywe  Conference Hall
Monday, July 04, 2011 Western Busia Busia Country Hotel
Saturday, July 09, 2011 Western Bungoma Tourist Hotel
Saturday, July 16, 2011 Nyanza Kisumu  the Aga Khan Hall
Friday, July 22, 2011 Nyanza Kisii St. Vincent Catholic church Centre
Tuesday, July 26, 2011 Nyanza Kuria St. Matare  SDA Church Kegonga
Tuesday, September 20, 2011 Rift Valley Kericho Kipsigis County Hall
Saturday, September 24, 2011 Rift Valley Nakuru ACK Cathedral
Tuesday, September 27, 2011 Rift Valley Naivasha St Francis Xavier Catholic Church 
Friday, September 30, 2011 Rift Valley Narok African Hope Conference Hall
Tuesday, October 04, 2011 Rift Valley Eldoret Teacher’s Advisory Centre Hall
Tuesday, October 11, 2011 Rift Valley Lodwar St. Teresa Pastoral Centre Hall Lodwar
Saturday, October 15, 2011 Rift Valley Kapenguria Pokot county Council Hall
Saturday, October 22, 2011 Rift Valley Kitale Kitale county Council Hall
Tuesday, October 25, 2011 Rift Valley Baringo Baringo County Council Hall
Tuesday, November 01, 2011 Uganda Kiryandongo Youth Centre Kiryandongo
Tuesday, November 08, 2011 Central Nyeri YMCA Hall Nyeri
Friday, November 11, 2011 Central Muranga Muranga College of Technology
Tuesday, November 15, 2011 Rift Valley Rumuruti Town Council of Rumuruti Social Hall
Friday, November 18, 2011 Eastern Meru Meru Municipal Council Hall
Tuesday, November 22, 2011 Eastern Embu Embu Ack Church
Friday, November 25, 2011 Eastern Machakos Our Lady of Lourdes Catholic church Hall
Friday, December 02, 2011 Eastern Kitui Parkside Villa Kitui
Friday, December 09, 2011 Rift Valley Kajiado Kajiado ACK Church
Tuesday, January 10, 2012 Coast Lamu Sunsail Hotel Lamu
Friday, January 13, 2012 Coast Hola Hola County Council Hall
Tuesday, January 17, 2012 Coast Kilifi Moving the Goal Post Conference Hall Kilifi
Friday, January 20, 2012 Coast Mombasa Wesly Methodist Tononoka Hall,Mombasa
Tuesday, January 24, 2012 Coast Wundanyi Kenya National Library Hall,Wundanyi
Tuesday, January 24, 2012 Coast Kwale Kwale County Council Hall
Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Nairobi Nairobi Charter Hall, Nairobi
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Conducting Women’s Hearings
92. Women’s Hearings were presided over by female Commissioners and female staff 
of the Commission. The proceedings of the hearing were recorded verbatim. 
Translation services were provided to allow participants to freely communicate 
in the language of their choice. Prior to the hearings and with the financial 
support of UN Women, civic education was conducted to create awareness 
about the hearings amongst women and to encourage their participation. 
Women were encouraged to attend and participate in the hearings through 
announcements at local markets, and local radio stations. Leaders of community 
based organizations encouraged women to attend and to participate.
93. Counsellors using group sessions prepared women to give their testimonies 
prior to the start of hearings. They were informed of what to expect during the 
hearing and reassured of the confidentiality of the process. Before the start of the 
hearings they were invited to perform songs and dances. The Commissioners and 
staff of the Commission always joined in the singing and dancing, a gesture that 
fostered confidence and trust among the women and created an atmosphere 
conducive for the candid and open conversations that ensued. 
 
94. The hearings were conducted in all regions of the country and were attended 
by more than 1000 women with an average of 60 women in each hearing. The 
majority of the women expressed appreciation for the opportunity to speak about 
issues that they had hitherto not spoken about in public and in some cases, had 
not even spoken about in private. 
Comments by an independent observer regarding women’s hearing held in Garissa
I informally write to commend, congratulate you and encourage you to continue doing a 
great job as you have been doing at the public hearings and as very well demonstrated this 
morning with the women's private hearings.
Kindly allow me to briefly share my experience today with you on two particular areas I 
observed: managing of the day's women's hearing and strong concluding remarks. 
You are conducting a laborious task for and on behalf of Kenyans, and we appreciate your 
tireless  efforts and great commitment to deliver on this task under [an] immensely busy 
schedule.
Box 1
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Today, you two [Commissioner Tecla Namachanja and Secretary Patricia Nyaundi], supported 
by your team, really managed the hearings well, and demonstrated very high level [of ] 
cultural and emotional intelligence. You connected with the women participants very well in 
the morning session, and set the mood and atmosphere right for the women to openly share 
and narrate their experiences,
I wish to commend you, [firstly], on how you managed the hearings. I observed the following 
positive things]
i)  Letting the women sing and dance to their favourite choice songs at the beginning (and 
also at the end), let them psychologically relax and start bonding as  the women-folk 
gathered for the same agenda. 
ii)  Emphasis on the importance and significance of the hearings for the individual and the 
group, and that each participant narrating their story should be heard with equal respect 
and attention  and by reprimanding the participants laughing at another's story. 
iii)  Your empathy with each of the participants who narrated their story (even when the 
events narrated were very  emotionally difficult or disturbing), and acknowledging and 
letting them enlighten TJRC on their own cultural practices on how to handle certain 
experiences.
iv)  giving each one the opportunity to give their own opinion of what is the best 
recommendation that they would contribute to TJRC.
Secondly, the other notable observations to which I wish to extend my compliments, was in 
your very strong closing remarks.
i)  Helping the women understand the TJRC process and timeframe so as not to raise high 
expectations by giving the assurance that the recommendations and actions will not be 
immediate, but will be included in the TJRC final report, which will also take time and will 
come at the end of the process of public hearings around the country 
ii) Explaining that   healing in the period after the TJRC is equally important and must 
continue; by inviting the women to continue [the process] amongst themselves [by] telling 
or narrating their traumatic stories in an environment where they can be comfortably 
vulnerable enough to allow for the healing process and with the support of CBOs and 
NGOs, [and to] even write these stories for record.
iii) [The] gesture of  friendship and willingness  to continue engaging with public  by 
encouraging those women who did not have a chance to record their statements or have 
a memorandum written to do so and leaving a token (TJRC 'kikoy') of appreciation for 
participants for taking time to support TJRC.
I apologize for the long email, but having only  previously experienced the mock hearings 
and then  Isiolo hearings, I could not resist applauding you and the entire TJRC team- 
Commissioners and Staff for working tirelessly to make the hearings a success.
The journey continues, but be encouraged that TJRC will only do it better!
Email from Naomi Maina,
Social Justice, Reconciliation and National Cohesion Project
Senior Officer, GIZ International 
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Referral Mechanisms 
95. There were high expectations among victims in almost all places that the Commission 
visited that the Commission would at the very least meet their immediate needs 
both in monetary or material terms. This was outside the direct mandate of the 
Commission. Furthermore, the Commission did not have resources beyond what 
was allocated for providing transport and accommodation to victims who testified. 
96. As a stopgap measure the Commission established a referral mechanism. Thus, 
where women raised issues which could be redressed immediately by a specific 
government department or ministry or organisation, they were referred to these 
institutions and also advised on how to access them. For example, women with 
disabilities were referred to the National Council for Persons with Disabilities 
where they were registered and found information on how to access the National 
Development Fund for Persons with Disability. 
 
97. Women seeking to access credit were referred to the Women’s Enterprise Fund 
while those with matters relating to child maintenance were referred to the 
Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development. Others were referred to civil 
society organisations for pro bono legal services amongst other services. 
98. In a few instances, the Commission in collaboration with organisations such as 
the Jaipur Foot Project provided direct support. This included the provision of 
wheelchairs and white canes for witnesses with disability. Similarly, women who 
were found to be suffering from prolonged post traumatic stress disorder were 
provided with treatment as part of a project funded by AMREF and implemented 
in conjunction with the Kenyatta National Hospital and local district hospitals.
Monitoring and Evaluation of Hearings 
99. The hearings were evaluated by independent monitors who submitted periodic 
reports to the Commission pointing out both the strengths and weaknesses of 
the exercise. ICJ Kenya Chapter, Kituo cha Sheria, and KNCHR were among the 
organisations who formally conducted the exercise. The evaluations of these 
institutions were based on observations of the Commission’s hearings and 
interviews of relevant stakeholders including Commissioners and staff of the 
Commission.
100. The Commission received and proceeded to make appropriate changes where 
it was feasible to do so. ICJ Kenya presented to the Commission what may be 
regarded as the most comprehensive evaluation of the Commission’s hearings. 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Volume I    Chapter T H R E E 
109
The evaluation report identified a number of positive aspects about the manner 
in which the Commission conducted hearings. The report concluded that the 
hearings complied with international standards for truth seeking bodies and in 
particular:
 due process protections were afforded to individuals who testified before the 
Commission;
 persons of interest to the Commission were treated with respect and dignity;
 persons of interest were provided with the opportunity to give a statement to 
the Commission laying forth their version of the events in question;
 the Commission made attempts to corroborate information implicating 
individuals before they were publicly named as persons of interest;
 the hearings focused on securing recognition of truths that were formerly 
denied or hidden, such as the Wagalla Massacre. 
101. The evaluation report also raised a number of concerns including that: the 
hearings were legalistic and court-like; the extent of victim participation in 
the planning and conduct of the hearings was unclear; information about the 
Commission’s resources and procedures for provision of psychosocial support 
were not widely and publicly available; and that the Commission’s dissemination 
of information relating to hearings fell below expectation. 
102. The Commission did not take these concerns lightly and took appropriate remedial 
measures. Noting that most of the issues revolved around information sharing, the 
Commission launched a new website on 26 August 2011. The website offered a 
fresh look with enhanced user-friendly navigation which in turn facilitated faster 
access to information. Some of the features that were introduced in the new 
website included the following: 
 Latest News: This feature provided highlights of latest news on what is 
happening at the Commission. This included the Commission’s official 
communication to the public.
 What's New: This feature provided an all inclusive list of the latest additions 
to the website.
 Events Calendar: This feature provided details of events such as hearings, 
workshops, civic education and outreach programs as well as other relevant 
activities.
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Volume I    Chapter T H R E E  
110
 Hearings Guide: This was an electronic map indicating all locations where the 
Commission would hold its hearing or where it had already done so. For each 
location, the map provided a tool tip summary. 
 Audio/ Visual Gallery: This feature provided a collection of Commission’s 
videos classified by region.
 Image Gallery: This feature provided a collection of captioned images 
classified by region and event.
 Resource Centre: This feature provided a collection of documents, policies, 
and publications.
 Newsletter Sign Up and/or Subscription: This feature allowed persons and 
organizations that wished to receive regular communication updates from the 
Commission to sign up for the service. 
 Advanced Search: In addition to the simple search, this feature allowed users 
to easily search and find information on the website. 
 Media Centre: the Media Centre contained news, press releases and 
information relating to the Commission’s coverage in the media.
Post-Hearing Feedback Sessions  
103. Due to time constraints, the Commission was unable to hear testimonies of 
adversely mentioned persons in the specific areas or regions in which they had 
been adversely mentioned. Although some AMPs were heard in the regions, most 
hearings for AMPS were held in Nairobi a few weeks after the individual hearings 
had been concluded in the regions. Therefore, the majority of victims did not 
have the opportunity to be present at the hearings in which AMPs testified or 
gave their version of the story. 
 
104. In mitigation against the inability of victims to witness the testimonies of AMPs, 
the Commission, in partnership with Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
(KNCHR) and German Technical Cooperation (GIZ), organised thirteen public 
feedback meetings in Wajir and Garissa counties in October 2011. The initial plan 
also included sessions in Mandera County. However, due to security reasons those 
sessions were cancelled. Subsequent to its hearings in Mandera, which borders 
Somalia, activities by the Al Shabaab militia group heightened, making the 
Commission’s travel to Mandera impossible for security reasons. 
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105. The feedback sessions involved showing a video summarising individual and 
women’s hearings in the Northern region of Kenya and another video showing 
proceedings of the AMP hearings in Nairobi. The sessions began with a moderator 
explaining the Commission’s mandate and process, including what would 
possibly happen to AMPs (for example, the  possibility that they would be named 
in this Report or recommendation made for their prosecution). After viewing the 
two videos, a public dialogue designed to get feedback from the audience and 
to answer questions followed. 
 
106. Attendance at the sessions in Wajir County was high with audiences ranging from 
150 to 300 people (Women constituted between 20% and 50% of the audience). In 
Garissa County, the attendance was much lower, with audiences between 15 and 
35 people, with women constituting 20% of the audience. 
 
107. The Commission had intended to organise similar feedback sessions in all 
regions in the country but this could not be done because of time and financial 
constraints.
 
Media Coverage of Public Hearings
108. The success of a truth commission partly depends on a nation’s awareness and level 
of its peoples’ participation in its processes.  The media plays a central role given 
its ability and capacity to reach out to the masses. For this reason, and bearing in 
mind the dynamic and positive contribution the media had made in the success of, 
for instance, the South African Truth Commission, the Makau Mutua Task Force had 
envisaged a Kenyan truth commission whose public hearings would be carried 
live on television and radio.12 Indeed, there were some at the Task Force who were 
of the opinion that the public broadcaster, Kenya Broadcasting Television (KBC), 
would be expressly required to carry the public hearings of the truth commission 
live on radio and television.13
109. However, the experience of the Commission was very different from what had been 
envisaged and strongly advocated for. The Commission’s public hearings were 
carried live on television on only two occasions. This led to an analyst to lament, 
justifiably so, that: 
As victims and affected communities engage in the public hearings, what seems to 
be lacking is a national dialogue and engagement in the truth-seeking process. Most 
12 Makau Mutua Report (2003) 35. 
13 Makau Mutua Report (2003), Annexure 6. 
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notable in this regard is the low media coverage of the proceedings. This is most 
aptly demonstrated through a comparison between the media coverage of the public 
hearings (and the TJRC process in general) and past national truth-recovery processes. 
For instance, the Goldenberg Inquiry into embezzlement of public funds elicited great 
public participation and was intensely covered in the media including through daily 
live broadcasts of the Commission’s proceedings in one of the main television stations. 
Given the gravity of the past atrocities that form the subject of the TJRC hearings, one 
would imagine that there would be significant public interest in and robust media 
coverage of the hearings.14 
101. There were several reasons that accounted for this state of affairs. Firstly, 
throughout the period that the Commission held its public hearings, it constantly 
competed for news coverage with more dramatic and unfolding events such as 
those surrounding the International Criminal Court. Secondly, due to its lean 
budget, the Commission could not afford to pay for live coverage of its hearings. 
The media houses, on their part, did not appear to consider the Commission’s 
hearings worthy or suitable for unpaid-for coverage in the public interest. In 
other words, in a commercialized media environment as obtains in Kenya, it is 
in the nature of media houses to amplify mostly that which in their opinion sells 
newspapers or draws audiences. 
111. Since it could not afford to pay for live coverage of its hearings, the Commission 
opted to carry weekly roundups of its hearings in a documentary format. Even so, 
finding a suitable television channel to carry the weekly round-up was not easy. 
Citizen TV could not slot the Commission’s round-up at prime time but offered 
only to do so on Saturdays and Sundays in the afternoon. This arrangement did 
not work for long for it was still expensive. The Commission, therefore, moved its 
round-up to the public broadcaster where the round-ups were transmitted every 
Wednesday’s after the 9 p.m. news at a fee.  
112. However, the Commission’s experience with the public broadcaster, in one 
occasion, was reminiscent of the old days during which the public broadcaster 
was under the control of the state. In particular, KBC failed to air the Commission’s 
round-up on 5 October 2011 without notice. In response to the Commission’s 
demand for an explanation, KBC’s Managing Director, Chris Mutungi, wrote that 
the round-up scheduled for that day ‘was found unsuitable for transmission 
based on KBC’s editorial programming policy’.  The said policy, however, is neither 
in the public sphere nor was it expounded upon. It appears that the round-up 
was censored because a witness appearing in that round-up had mentioned 
14 C Alai ‘Truth, justice and reconciliation’ in L Mute & L Young (eds) Transitional justice in Kenya: Looking forward, reflecting 
on the past (2011) 111, 125-126. 
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President Kibaki in a negative light.  The Commission finally settled on KTN for 
media coverage for the remainder of its tenure.
Locations for hearings, focus group discussions and TJRC offices 
         Legend:
TJRC Regional Offices
Areas where FGDs were conducted
Areas where hearings were conducted
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Thematic Hearings
113. In addition to individual hearings, the Commission conducted thematic hearings 
that focused on specific violations, events, or groups of victims. Thematic hearings 
were meant to elicit public testimony on specific themes that are of particular 
importance in Kenya’s pursuit for truth, justice and reconciliation. 
114. The Commission held a total of 14 thematic hearings focusing on the following 
subjects: 
 Access to justice; 
 Economic marginalisation and minorities; 
 Land; 
 Armed militia groups; 
 Prisons and detention centres; 
 Torture; 
 Ethnic tensions and violence; 
 The 1982 attempted coup; 
 Security agencies, extra-judicial killings and massacres; 
 Persons with disabilities (PWDs); 
 Women; 
 Children; 
 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); and 
 Political assassinations. 
105. In selecting the subject of the hearings, weight was given to significant events 
during the mandate period and to highlighting the experiences of particularly 
vulnerable groups with respect to historical injustices. 
116. Individual experts, associations representing groups of victims, and relevant CSOs 
and state agencies were invited to testify during these hearings. The Commission 
held preparatory consultation sessions with relevant stakeholders prior to some of 
the thematic hearings. In a number of the hearings such as those on children, IDPs 
and PWDs, individual victims of violations were also invited to testify. 
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Media Workshop 
117. The Commission also held a media workshop on 23 February 2012. This workshop 
was similar to a thematic hearing. It brought together journalists, media houses 
and associations representing journalists and media houses. They testified about 
their experiences relating to state control and repression of the media during the 
mandate period. 
Table 2: Schedule of thematic hearings 
Thematic hearing Date(s)
1 Children 13 & 14 Dec 2011
2 Ethnic tensions and violence 2 Feb 2012
3 Internally Displaced Persons 3 Feb 2012
4 Women 8 Feb 2012
5 Economic marginalization and minorities 13 Feb 2012
6 Persons with Disabilities 16 Feb 2012
7 Torture 28 Feb & 7 Mar 2012
8 Prisons and detention centres 29 Feb 2012
9 Access to justice 1 & 2 Mar 2012
10 Political assassinations 5 & 6 Mar 2012
11 Security agencies, extra-judicial killings and massacres 9 Mar 2012
12 Armed militia groups 12 Mar 2012
13 1982 Attempted Coup 21 Mar 2012
14 Land: Historical injustices and illegal/irregular allocation of public 
land 
22 Mar 2012
Thematic Hearing on Children 
118. The thematic hearing on children was based on statements recorded by children 
and was designed to ensure that children gave their testimony in an environment 
in which they felt safe, free and confident to do so. The Commission took several 
measures towards this end. 
 
119. Although the hearing was open to the public, the identities of children who testified 
were concealed. Members of the public could follow the hearing by a video link 
but could not see the particular child testifying before the Commission. Moreover, 
the children were not identified by their names or in any other identifiable way. 
Secondly, the hearing venue was set up such that the Commissioners sat at the 
same level as the children testifying before them. Play and art materials were 
available in the hearing venue to allow the children to play and/or paint even as 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Volume I    Chapter T H R E E  
116
they testified. As was the case with the general individual hearings, children and 
their care givers visited the hearing venue on the eve of the hearing. Similarly, each 
child who testified received counselling before and after sessions. 
 
120. Each child testified for an average of 20 minutes, although the time varied 
depending on the age of the child. A total of 40 children, aged between 6 and 17 
years, from across the country, attended the thematic hearing which was held in 
Nairobi with the Commission paying for the transport of both the children and 
their parents or caregivers, to and from Nairobi.
 
Televised Discussions on Thematic Hearings 
121. In January 2012, the Commission produced a series of 30 minute discussion 
programmes based on the subjects covered during the Commission’s thematic 
hearings which were televised on KTN. The programme entitled ‘Kenya’s Unheard 
Truth’ was launched on 9 February 2012. It was broadcast at 10 p.m. every Thursday. 
A total of eight programmes were aired between February and April 2012.
Focus Group Discussions 
122. The Commission undertook a special data collection exercise on regional perceptions 
about the violations of socio-economic rights and economic marginalisation. This 
special exercise was needed after preliminary analysis of statements and memoranda 
showed that reporting on the violations of socio-economic rights was very low. Despite 
the fact that the Statement Form had a dedicated section on socio-economic rights, 
individuals who recorded statements tended to focus on human rights violations 
relating to bodily integrity and less on violations of socio-economic rights. 
 
123. Between 25 January 2012 and 8 February 2012, the Commission conducted Focus 
Group Discussions (FGDs) throughout the country with a view to documenting 
regional perceptions on violations of socio-economic rights and on economic 
marginalisation. This was done to supplement data collected through statement 
taking.
124. For these discussions, the Commission drafted a questionnaire for guidance.15 The 
questionnaire was reviewed both internally and externally before it was pre-tested 
in Kibera, Nairobi, on 14 December 2011 and revised accordingly to incorporate 
insights gained from the pre-testing exercise. 
15  See Appendix 7 for the FGD Questionnaire. 
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125. The Commission recruited eight facilitators (one in each province) to conduct the 
FGDs. The facilitators were trained on the mandate of the Commission and the 
use of the questionnaire before being deployed to the provinces to facilitate the 
discussions. Each FGD consisted of about 12 to 15 participants drawn from either 
urban informal settlements or rural areas, although the number of participants 
in exceptional circumstances exceeded 15. Participants were carefully chosen to 
ensure there was diversity in the group in terms of age and gender.  Persons with 
disability and members of other vulnerable groups were particularly targeted 
for inclusion in the discussion group. A total of 81 FGD sessions were conducted 
across the country with a total 1192 individuals participating in the FGDs (See 
table below). 
 
Table 3:  Schedule of FGDs on Economic Marginalization and Violations of 
Socio-Economic Rights 
Province Areas where FGD were conducted FGDs Participants
1 Central Ol Kalau, Nyahururu, Nyeri, Othaya, Mwea, Kagio, 
Muranga, Kenol, Kiambu and Lari
10 135
2 Coast Malindi, Garsen, Kilifi, Mtwapa, Mombasa, Kwale, 
Kaloleni, Mariakani, Voi and Taveta
10 170
3 Eastern Machakos, Kitui, Embu, Chuka, Meru, Isiolo, Archers 
Post, Laisamis and Garbatulla
10 137
4 Nairobi Kibera, Starehe, Kayole, Korogocho, Githurai,  





Garissa, Shanta Abak, Wajir, Giriftu, Bura and 
Masalani
5 86
6 Nyanza Kisumu, Ahero, Bondo, Siaya, Kisii, Nyamira, Borabu, 
Migori, Kuria, Homabay and Suba
11 155
7 Rift Valley Lodwar, Kitale, Turbo, Eldoret, Eldama Ravine, 
Nakuru, Kericho, Bomet, Kilgoris, Lolgorian, Narok, 
Isinya and Kiserian
14 246
8 Western Kakamega, Mumias, Bungoma, Cheskaki, 
Kapsokwony, Webuye, Amagoro, Chakol, Busia, 
Funyula, Vihiga and Hamisi
12 118
Totals 81 1192
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Site Visits 
126. The Commission visited a number of sites of importance to its work in several parts 
of the country. These visits enabled the Commission to visualize and contextualize 
violations that had occurred in those sites.  Among the sites that the Commission 
visited include:  
 a mass grave in Turbi, Marsabit, where eight adults and 21 children were 
buried after the Turbi Massacre of 12 July 2005.
 a mass grave in Garbatulla, where individuals killed during the Shifta War were 
buried.
 a mass grave in Kiambaa KAG Church, Eldoret, where 26 people who were 
burnt to death at the church during the 2007/2008 Post Election were buried.
 Kiryandongo Refugee Camp in Uganda which hosts Kenyan refugees, primarily 
from Malaba and surrounding areas, who fled the country during the 2007-
2008 Post-Election Violence. 
 Wagalla Airstrip, the site of what became the Wagalla Massacre. It is here in 
February 1984 that men belonging to the Degodia clan were gathered, tortured, 
and some of them ultimately killed by state security agencies. 
Mr.David Chemiati (extreme left) showing TJRC commiccioners a mass grave site in Mt. Elgon.
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127. Other sites or places visited by the Commission include Langata Women’s Prison, 
Nyayo House ‘Torture Chambers’ in Nairobi, Mandera Prisons, Mandera Law Courts, 
Mawingu IDP Camp in Naivasha, and Kapkota Military Base in Mt. Elgon. 
Reconciliation 
128. The Commission’s reconciliation activities were spearheaded, at the Commissioners’ 
level, by the Reconciliation Committee established in terms of section 22 of the TJR 
Act, and at the Secretariat level, by the Department of Civic Education and Outreach. 
Reconciliation Policy 
129. Reconciliation activities were conducted under the Reconciliation Policy which laid 
out the Commission’s understanding of the notion of reconciliation and its role. In 
particular, the following policy guidelines guided the Commission’s reconciliation 
work: 
 Reconciliation is complex and includes several relationships, levels and actors. 
The various levels or ‘types’ of reconciliation include intra-personal, inter-
personal, inter-community, and national reconciliation.
 In a context where inter-ethnic tension is deep, as is the case in Kenya, the 
mending of social relations is imperative. The role of the Commission in this 
regard is to facilitate dialogue and other activities that mark the beginning of 
inter-community reconciliation.
 Healing is closely linked to reconciliation. The idea of healing invokes the 
idea of remedy, restoration, repair, or mending. National healing entails 
attending to and restoring social relations in communities and inter-ethnic 
relations. At a personal level, healing takes various dimensions, but begins 
with acknowledgement and restoration of dignity.
 Reconciliation is both a goal and a process. As a goal, it is a long term goal. The 
Commission role in this regard is to initiate dialogue and lay the groundwork, 
together with other relevant bodies, for long term processes of reconciliation. 
As a process, reconciliation occurs in various sites and activities. It involves 
numerous actors and the Commission is only one of these. 
 There exists both conceptual and practical links between reconciliation 
and the notion of justice. Justice includes redistributive, retributive and 
reparative justice. Reconciliation is fostered when those who have suffered 
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are restored and repaired, those who were previously excluded are included 
in meaningful ways, and those in dire want as a result of marginalization are 
materially enabled to move forward.
 A relationship exists, too, between reconciliation and truth. While closure 
for victims and the ability to address past violations and prevent repetition 
begins with knowing the truth about past events, truth-telling may open 
wounds in ways that slow or impede reconciliation and healing especially 
at a personal level. The challenge is to engage with both without negating 
either.
 The notion of truth includes at least three versions or types of truth: Personal 
or narrative truth (personal versions of truth by witnesses, including victims 
and perpetrators); factual or forensic truth (the product of investigations, 
verification and corroboration); social truth (the product of dialogue, 
interaction, discussion and debate; and healing and restorative truth.
 To achieve reconciliation emphasis should be put on facilitating dialogue 
and creating space for constructive exchange by and around individuals, 
communities and institutions. 
Reconciliation Activities 
130. In preparation for rolling out reconciliation activities and particularly to ensure 
the participation of relevant stakeholders in such activities, the Commission 
convened two meetings in March 2011. On 3 March 2011, the Commission held a 
Consultative Prayer Breakfast with religious leaders in Nairobi. This was followed 
a week later by a three-day Stakeholders Consultative Workshop in Naivasha. 
131. The Commission also initiated working relations with both governmental and 
non-governmental organisations including with the National Cohesion and 
Integration Commission (NCIC) and the National Steering Committee on Peace 
Building and Conflict Management (established within the auspices of the Ministry 
of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security). The Commission’s 
working relationship with the NCIC resulted in the formation of a Joint Taskforce 
on National Healing and Reconciliation composed of Commissioners and staff 
from the two commissions. Unfortunately, activities which the Joint Taskforce 
had planned to carry out never took off. 
132. Reconciliation is a long term process and given the Commission’s resource 
constraints it embarked on developing a National Reconciliation Agenda to serve 
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as a blue-print for reconciliation activities after the winding up of the Commission. 
Two approaches were adopted for this. First, a Reconciliation Consultative 
Meeting was held on 6 February 2012 bringing together stakeholders involved in 
reconciliation work from across the country.  The outcome was the establishment of 
a Reconciliation Reference Group that was mandated to work with the Commission 
to develop the Agenda. The Reference Group held several meetings between 
February and May 2012. 
133. Second, the Commission undertook countrywide forums on the theme of 
reconciliation. The forums served as avenues to: (a) listen and understand the 
meaning of reconciliation for communities in different regions of the country; 
and (b) find out specific issues in each region that bring about tensions, hostility, 
hatred and conflict.  The forums also gave communities the opportunity to suggest 
specific options and solutions to problems and issues affecting them. They were 
able to share their dreams about the Kenya they want and to recommend ways of 
promoting healing and reconciliation in their regions and ultimately in the whole 
of Kenya.
 
134. From 9 to 20 March 2012, the Commission held a total of 10 reconciliation forums 
around the country. The forums were held in Mombasa, Garissa, Isiolo, Machakos, 
Nyeri, Eldoret, Nakuru, Kakamega, Kisumu and Nairobi. Between December 2012 
and March 2013, the Commission organized a series of workshops on trauma 
healing and strategy formulation. The workshops were held in Cheptais, Eldoret, 
Mombasa, Kilifi, and Kwale. The objectives of these workshops were to: asses 
levels of healing and reconciliation in selected communities; identify local actors 
who could then spearhead trauma healing and reconciliation; and explore local 
mechanisms for healing and reconciliation.  
Report Writing 
135. The final product of the Commission is this Report which was compiled in 
terms of section 5(j) and 48(2) of the TJR Act. These sections essentially tasked 
the Commission to compile a report providing as comprehensive as possible 
an account of its activities and findings together with recommendations on 
measures to prevent the future occurrence of violations. 
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CHAPTER
FOUR 
Challenges in the Execution
of Mandate
Introduction 
1. The Commission encountered many challenges in the execution of its mandate 
some of which were expected and understandable while others were completely 
unanticipated. This Chapter highlights these challenges in an effort to enlighten 
Kenyans of the environment and conditions under which the Commission 
operated. The Commission believes that candid reporting of these challenges 
could help prevent similar situations in future both in Kenya and elsewhere in the 
world. 
2. While there were many impediments to the work of the Commission, only four 
major challenges are discussed here: the controversy surrounding the credibility 
and suitability of the Chairperson; financial and other resource constraints; legal 
challenges; and, the lack of sufficient state and political will to support the work 
and implementation of the objectives for which the Commission was established. 
3. Other challenges generally stemmed from one or more of these four major 
challenges including the disengagement of key stakeholders (notably CSOs and 
donors) from the processes of the Commission.
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Credibility and Suitability of the Chairperson
4. Almost immediately after the inception of the Commission, CSOs and a range of 
other actors raised concerns over the suitability and credibility of Ambassador 
Bethuel Kiplagat to serve as the Commission’s Chairperson. In this section, the 
Commission explains this challenge in detail because of the great impact it had 
on the operations of the Commission. Indeed, it was the single challenge that 
threatened the very existence of the Commission.   
The allegations 
5. Many critics argued, initially, that the fact that Ambassador Kiplagat had served 
in powerful positions in the government of President Daniel arap Moi disqualified 
him from serving on the Commission. The Commission viewed this matter 
differently, pointing out that the mere fact that Ambassador Kiplagat (or any 
other Commissioner) had served in a previous government did not and should 
not automatically disqualify him from serving on the Commission. Given  the 
fact that the ultimate purpose of the Commission was to foster national unity 
and reconciliation, the Commission felt that it was not only acceptable, but even 
desirable, to have such an individual or individuals on the Commission. The 
Commission was not a judicial mechanism, or a purely investigative commission of 
inquiry, where the general conflict of interest that Ambassador Kiplagat presented 
as a former member of President Moi’s government would have been of more 
serious concern.  
6. Some of those raising concerns about Ambassador Kiplagat at this initial stage 
were more specific, asserting that he presented a direct conflict of interest with 
respect to three issues in the Commission’s mandate: he was a beneficiary of 
illegal or irregular allocations of land; he was a key witness to the events leading 
to the murder of the Honourable Dr. Robert Ouko who was at the time of his death 
Kenya’s Minister of Foreign Affairs; and he was involved in one or more meetings 
in Wajir related to the planning of the security operation that ended in the Wagalla 
Massacre.  
7. These three allegations were of particular concern to the other Commissioners. 
The Act required that a Commissioner should not have been ‘involved, implicated, 
linked or associated with human rights violations of any kind or in any matter 
which is to be investigated under this Act’.1  The language of the Act was quite 
broad, prohibiting not just being implicated in or being legally responsible for a 
1 TJR Act, Section 10(6)(b).  
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matter within the Commission’s mandate, but also being involved, associated, or 
even linked to such matters. 
8. At the beginning these allegations were just that, mere allegations. In the first 
six months of the Commission’s existence (from August 2009 to January 2010) 
the Commission received no evidence to substantiate the allegations of the 
three conflicts of interest stated above. Nevertheless significant sections of civil 
society and other actors continued to call for the resignation of Ambassador 
Kiplagat or the disbanding of the Commission. Hostile demonstrations greeted 
the Commission whenever it ventured into the field to perform its core functions. 
Significant sections of civil society refused to work with the Commission, and 
donors – with few exceptions – were unwilling to engage with or support the 
Commission.  
9. It was not until January 2010 that the Commission received documents from 
civil society supporting their allegations against Ambassador Kiplagat. Even 
then, the documents were not in themselves conclusive with respect to each 
of the allegations, but were sufficient for the Commission to decide on further 
investigation to determine the extent, if any, of Kiplagat’s conflicts of interest with 
respect to the mandate of the Commission.  
Ambassador’s Kiplagat’s response
10. In response to the documents submitted to the Commission, Ambassador 
Kiplagat met with all the Commissioners and admitted to having bought the plots 
of land that he was alleged to have received illegally or irregularly (including a 
plot mentioned in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular 
Allocation of Land (Ndung’u Report). However, he insisted that he had followed all 
of the then existing procedures for the acquisition of such land.
11. With respect to the death of Dr. Robert Ouko, Ambassador Kiplagat reiterated 
that he was not involved in any plan or plot to assassinate the Minister (and that 
in fact he was personally and professionally shocked and distraught over the 
assassination). Furthermore, he said he had cooperated with each and every 
investigation undertaken to solve that murder. The Commission noted that at no 
time was any allegation made or evidence presented to the Commission alleging 
that Ambassador Kiplagat was responsible in any way for the murder of the 
Minister. Rather, the allegation was that Ambassador Kiplagat was in possession 
of relevant information and that he had been present at certain events that 
might have been related to the assassination of the Minister. It was also alleged 
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that he had been found not to have been a cooperative witness during some or 
all of the investigations into that murder. 
12. Over the Wagalla Massacre, Ambassador Kiplagat first stated categorically that he 
had never been to Wajir in his entire life and thus could not have attended any 
meeting that may have taken place there related to the Massacre. He noted that at 
the time of the alleged meetings in Wajir he had just returned from his posting in 
London as Kenya’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, and thus could not 
have travelled to attend such a meeting. 
13. A few weeks later, Ambassador Kiplagat told fellow Commissioners and the public 
that he ‘could not remember’ if he had ever been to Wajir or not and thus could not 
recall if he had ever attended a meeting in Wajir. As it later became clear, Ambassador 
Kiplagat had in fact attended a meeting of the Kenya Intelligence Committee in 
Wajir on 8 February 1984 less than forty-eight hours before the start of the security 
operation that resulted in the Wagalla Massacre.
14. The alleged involvement of the Chairperson in these matters and the fact that 
documentary evidence had been presented to the Commission linking him 
to three important areas of the Commission’s mandate, created a conflict of 
interest between him and the Commission. He could not investigate and make 
findings on issues of which he was a suspect without violating the fundamental 
principle of justice that a person should not be a judge in his own case. There 
seemed to be no way in which he could participate in the hearings and other 
public activities in these three areas without creating the appearance, if not the 
reality, of improperly influencing the work of the Commission in matters in which 
he had an interest. His involvement in any way in the Commission’s activities 
related to these three areas raised serious concern that such involvement would 
scare witnesses, including victims, from engaging with the Commission. This 
would irrevocably diminish the effectiveness, integrity and credibility of the 
Commission.   
15. These conflicts of interest presented by Kiplagat, accompanied by demands for 
his resignation and the dissolution of the Commission, almost completely eroded 
the ability of the Commission to garner support from the public, civil society and 
development partners. Development partners and civil society were extremely 
reluctant to provide support, including in-kind support, for the Commission’s 
activities because of Kiplagat’s conflicts which exacerbated the Commission’s 
financial problems (see below) and hindered the implementation of its ambitious 
work plan developed in the first few months of its existence.  
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Finding a solution 
16. From January to April 2010 the Commissioners engaged in a series of internal 
discussions regarding the conflicts of interest presented by Kiplagat. He made it 
clear that he would not resign as chairperson. The other Commissioners respected 
his decision. A number of options were discussed, including the creation of 
an external committee of former Truth Commissioners from around the world 
who would evaluate the matter and present their recommendation on the way 
forward. The Commission retained the services of a professional mediator to 
assist the Commissioners in developing a way forward. The Commission was also 
assisted by the Parliamentary Committee on Legal and Administrative Affairs in 
seeking a solution.  
17. After about three months of discussion, Ambassador Kiplagat indicated that 
he preferred to follow the provisions of the Act concerning the removal of a 
commissioner as set out in Section 17. The Commissioners unanimously agreed 
with the option chosen by Ambassador Kiplagat. On 12 April 2010, all nine 
Commissioners, including Ambassador Kiplagat, wrote to the Minister of Justice 
asking that a formal request be sent to the Chief Justice to establish a tribunal 
pursuant to Section 17 of the Act to enquire into the conflicts of interest raised 
by the presence of Ambassador Kiplagat in the Commission. 
18. Recognising the detrimental effect this controversy was having on the work of 
the Commission, and recognising further that a legal process had now been 
initiated to address the issues raised by his continued participation and presence 
in the Commission, Ambassador Kiplagat agreed to step aside until the tribunal 
process reached its conclusion. This promise was included in the letter of 12 April 
2010 to the Minister of Justice which was signed by all Commissioners, including 
Ambassador Kiplagat.  
19. However, within 24 hours of having signed the letter indicating he would step 
aside, Ambassador Kiplagat met Commissioners and stated that he would not in 
fact step aside. He indicated that he had been advised by the Ministry of Justice 
that he could not legally step aside and thus he would not honour the pledge he 
had made in writing the day before. Meanwhile, the Minister of Justice responded 
to the Commission’s letter of 12 April 2010. He advised that given the provisions 
of the Act, the Commission should write directly to the Chief Justice.  
20. Thus, on 15 April 2010, all eight Commissioners, with the express consent and 
approval of Kiplagat, filed a petition with the Chief Justice requesting a tribunal 
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under Section 17 to determine whether Ambassador Kiplagat had engaged in 
‘misbehaviour or misconduct’ under Section 17(1)(a) of the Act by: 
a) swearing in an affidavit submitted to the Selection Panel that he was not 
‘in any way ... involved, implicated, linked or associated with human rights 
violations of any kind or in any matter which is to be investigated under the 
Act’ as provided in Section 10(6)(b) of the Act; 
b) privately and publicly asserting during his time as commissioner that he 
was not in violation of Section 10(6)(b) of the Act; and 
c) asserting the right to participate in investigations and other related 
activities with respect to matters in which he has a conflict of interest.  
21. After almost a month without a response from the Chief Justice, the Commission 
wrote to him on 14 May 2010 inquiring as to the status of the petition. 
22. On 9 September 2010, in the absence of any decision on the part of the Chief 
Justice to accept or reject the Commission’s petition, a coalition of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) filed a separate petition to the Chief Justice also requesting 
that a tribunal be established under Section 17 of the Act to determine whether 
Ambassador Kiplagat had engaged in misbehaviour and misconduct and 
whether his presence in the Commission violated the newly ratified Constitution 
of Kenya.  
23. There then followed a curious set of letters between the Chief Justice and 
members of civil society concerning their petition and the petition of the 
Commission. On 16 September 2010 the Chief Justice responded to the CSOs 
concerning their petition, and copied the letter to the Commission. The letter 
from the Chief Justice informed the CSOs that a response concerning the petition 
against Ambassador Kiplagat had already been made to the Commission.  
24. The copy of the letter to the Commission included two additional letters that 
the Commission later learned were not included in the original letter sent to the 
CSOs.  First there was a letter dated 7 September 2010 to the Secretary of the 
Commission in which the Chief Justice noted he had forwarded a copy of the 
Commission’s petition to the Attorney General on 3 May 2010. This was curious 
given the fact that the Act did not indicate any role for the Attorney General with 
respect to a request for a tribunal under Section 17. This was also the first time 
the Commission had received such a letter from the Chief Justice.  
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25. Secondly, also attached was a copy of a letter sent from the Chief Justice to 
the Attorney General dated 3 May 2010 requesting that the Attorney General, 
‘in his role as the Principal Legal Advisor to the Government of Kenya’, advise 
the Chief Justice if the grounds listed in the Commission’s petition ‘satisfy the 
requirements of the law precedent to setting up a tribunal as set out in S. 17(1) 
of the said Act’.  
26. By the end of September 2010 the Commission had been waiting for over five 
months for a response to its petition before the Chief Justice.  
27. In October 2010, Ambassador Kiplagat gave a nationally televised interview 
concerning the Wagalla Massacre in which for the first time he publicly admitted 
that he had been present in Wajir for a meeting of the Kenya Intelligence 
Committee on 8 February 1984, because another participant at that meeting had 
confirmed to him that they both had been present. When he was reminded of his 
presence at the Wajir meeting Ambassador Kiplagat declared with certainty that 
the Kenya Intelligence Committee meeting did not discuss a security operation. 
He later asserted that the sole purpose of the visit of the Kenya Intelligence 
Committee to Wajir and to other parts of the then North Eastern Province was for 
development purposes and not security.  
28. In addition, in that same nationally televised interview he stated, in response to a 
question about government responsibility for the Wagalla Massacre, the following: 
I doubt, I find it extremely difficult, no government worth its salt plans to massacre its 
people.  
29. Lessons of history show that far too often governments unfortunately do 
massacre their own people.  By stating a conclusion concerning government 
responsibility for the Wagalla Massacre Ambassador Kiplagat was engaging in 
just the sort of activity that had led to the original concerns about the conflict of 
interest his inclusion in the Commission presented. As the official spokesperson 
of the Commission his statements suggested that the Commission had already 
prejudged an issue that it was in fact still investigating. Even more, he was making 
such a statement about an incident in which he himself had been implicated and 
was under investigation.  
30. In the same month of October 2010 the Parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee 
requested an update from the Commission on how the issues relating to 
Ambassador Kiplagat were being addressed. The Parliamentary Committee 
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announced at the end of that meeting that it was giving the Commission 72 hours 
to find a way forward or the Committee would move to have the Commission 
disbanded.   
31. Thus, on 28 October 2010, the Commission moved to the High Court for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the Chief Justice to set up a Tribunal. Around the same time, 
Commissioner Ronald Slye announced that he would be resigning on 1 November 
2010 because of the impasse the Commission had reached. However, he never 
did resign because on 29 October the Chief Justice announced that he would 
be establishing a Tribunal to inquire into the issues raised about Ambassador 
Kiplagat. On 1 November 2010 the Kenya Gazette published a notice from the Chief 
Justice dated 21 October 2010 establishing the Tribunal pursuant to Section 17 of 
the Act. It was not clear why a decision made on 21 October was never formally 
communicated to the Commission. 
32. The terms of reference for the Tribunal established by the Chief Justice were 
fundamentally different from and far broader than the issues raised by the 
Commission in its petition. Rather than limiting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to 
acts committed by Ambassador Kiplagat in connection with his appointment and 
after his appointment (the subject of the Commission’s petition), the Chief Justice 
interpreted ‘misbehaviour and misconduct’ under Section 17(1)(a) of the Act more 
broadly.  The mandate of the Tribunal as set up by the Chief Justice was as follows:
To investigate the conduct of the Chairman of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission, Ambassador Bethwell [sic] Kiplagat including, but not limited to, the 
allegations that the said Chairman’s past conduct erodes and compromises his 
legitimacy and credibility to chair the Commission; his past is riddled with unethical 
practices and absence of integrity; he has been involved in, linked to or associated with 
incidents considered to be abuse of human rights; is likely to be a witness in the same 
matters that the Commission is mandated to investigate.2  
33. The Tribunal was given six months from the publication of the Gazette Notice to 
investigate and report back to the Chief Justice.
The Legal proceedings
34. Upon the announcement of the creation of the Tribunal and the publication of its 
terms of reference, Ambassador Kiplagat issued a signed media statement on 2 
November 2010 in which he stated ‘I, indeed, very much welcome the decision of 
the Chief Justice to ascertain the truth concerning the allegations that have been 
2 Gazette Notice Nos. 13203 and 13204, Kenya Gazette, Special Issue, Vol. CXII – No. 111 (1 November 2010).
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made against me [by establishing the Tribunal],’ and that he saw ‘the Tribunal as an 
opportunity to finally put any doubts about my credibility to rest once and for all’.
35. Ambassador Kiplagat also announced that he was ‘stepping aside’ from his duties 
as Chairperson and Commissioner ‘in order to allow the Tribunal to carry out its 
mandate’.
36. Before the Tribunal could commence its operations, one of its members declined to 
take up the appointment and the Chief Justice had to appoint a replacement which 
he did in the Gazette Notice dated 9 November 2009.3 However, the individual so 
appointed was not qualified to serve in the Tribunal as he was neither a sitting 
nor a former judge. Thus in December 2009 the Chief Justice published another 
Gazette Notice dated 1 November 2009 correcting that error and appointing an 
individual qualified under the terms of Section 17 of the Act. 
37. In essence, the Tribunal was not properly constituted until mid-December 2010. In 
the meantime, the six months time in which it was to do its work was running out.
38. The Tribunal’s establishment was announced at the end of October 2009, but it 
only began its formal examination of Ambassador Kiplagat’s case in March 2010, 
four months later. The Tribunal spent much of its initial time setting up offices, 
drafting rules of procedure and lobbying for money from the Government.
39. Despite his openly declared promise to cooperate with the Tribunal, Ambassador 
Kiplagat filed an application before the same Tribunal challenging its jurisdiction 
as soon as it rolled out its proceedings. He argued that the Tribunal could not 
investigate his conduct prior to his appointment as the Commission’s Chairperson. 
He added that the only conduct that the Tribunal could investigate, if at all, was 
his conduct while in office (which was coincidentally consistent with the original 
petition filed by the Commissioners). 
40. The Tribunal delivered its ruling on Kiplagat’s application on 12 April 2010 and 
held that it had jurisdiction to investigate his past conduct. It ruled that the scope 
of investigations as stipulated in the appointing instrument (Gazette Notice No. 
15894) extended to ‘the conduct of the subject (Chairperson) during the period 
pre-dating the subject’s appointment as a Commissioner and the Chairman of 
TJRC’. The Tribunal also noted that the fact that ‘the subject was interviewed or 
vetted by other organs did not mean that such organs could not have over-looked 
some aspects of the subject’s conduct prior to his appointment to the Commission’. 
3 Gazette Notice No. 13881, The Kenya Gazette, Vol. CXII- No. 120 (19 November 2010).
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41. A week later, Ambassador Kiplagat moved to the High Court for an ex parte 
application requesting a stay of the proceedings of the Tribunal while he sought 
legal review of the rejection by the Tribunal of his motion challenging its jurisdiction. 
The High Court granted the stay of the Tribunal’s proceedings on 27 April 2010. 
In doing so, the High Court made an important point that initially informed the 
Commission’s decision to petition for the formation of the Tribunal. It stated: 
The issue is not whether the allegations being levelled against him [Ambassador 
Kiplagat] are true. What is material is that the Commission will want to investigate 
the circumstances surrounding the death of Robert Ouko, the Wagalla Massacre and 
the Ndung’u Report on Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land and in each case he 
is being adversely mentioned. He cannot sit in judgment when the issues are being 
discussed. Justice will cry if he were allowed to sit in judgment, be a witness and an 
accused, all at the same time. My advise (sic) is that he should do the honourable thing. 
42. While Kiplagat’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal proceeded in the 
High Court, the six months given to it to complete its work ran out.  The Tribunal 
requested an extension of its life but the newly appointed Chief Justice, Dr. Willy 
Mutunga, refused because, in his opinion, ‘such action would have resulted in a 
wastage of national resources’.  Thus, the Tribunal never completed its work and 
could not advise the President, through the Chief Justice, if Ambassador Kiplagat 
should continue as Chairperson and as a member of the Commission.  
43. When the High Court was to hear arguments in the case challenging the jurisdiction 
of the now-defunct Tribunal in December 2011, Ambassador Kiplagat voluntarily 
withdrew his challenge. The Commission did not oppose this withdrawal as it 
removed the stay against the Tribunal’s work. This would have allowed the Chief 
Justice to revive the old Tribunal or create a new Tribunal to address the claims 
made in the Commission’s April 2010 petition.  The withdrawal of the case in 
effect denied the High Court the opportunity to pronounce on whether the Chief 
Justice acted properly in establishing the Tribunal.
44. After more than a year of legal activity, beginning with the creation of the 
Tribunal in October 2010 to the withdrawal of Kiplagat’s lawsuit in December 
2011, and more than eighteen months after the filing, with Kiplagat’s express 
consent, of the original petition requesting a tribunal, no tribunal or court had 
ruled on the merits of the petition concerning the conflicts of interest and alleged 
misbehaviour and misconduct of Kiplagat.  
45. An issue that had been raised from the first day the Commission was created and 
on which the Commission’s credibility hinged, was still unresolved two years later. 
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The return of Ambassador Kiplagat 
46. On 4 January 2012, Ambassador Kiplagat returned to the Commission offices 
unannounced and proceeded to occupy the office of the Acting Chairperson 
without requesting her permission to do so. When contacted that same day by 
the media, he reportedly replied, ‘I resumed office in the morning and I am back 
with a bang’. 
47. He was in the office for three days in a row, from 4 to 6 January 2012 at a time 
when many of the other Commissioners were in the Coast region preparing for 
public hearings there.   He demanded access to documents related to the Report, 
including documents to do with some of the areas in which he had a conflict of 
interest. He indicated that he had returned ‘to shape the final report’. The staff to 
their credit resisted these demands, correctly noting that the Commission had put 
in place a formal procedure that all individuals, including Commissioners, had to 
follow in order to access such documents. Informed that he could not have the 
documents he was demanding, he reportedly declared that the staff answered 
directly to him as Chairperson and to no one else. If they refused to accede to his 
demands he would have them arrested. Again to their credit the staff resisted such 
demands and upheld the internal policies of the Commission that were designed 
to protect its sensitive information.  
48. Alarmed at the turn of events, and particularly at the reports of Ambassador 
Kiplagat’s attempts to threaten the staff to reveal sensitive information, the 
Commission wrote to the Chief Justice on 6 January 2012 requesting that he either 
reconstitute the old tribunal or constitute a new one to address the allegations 
contained in their petition of April 2010. In that letter the Commissioners informed 
the Chief Justice of the urgency of the matter, particularly given the reported 
actions of Ambassador Kiplagat described above.
49. On the same day, 6 January, the Commissioners wrote to Ambassador Kiplagat 
expressing concern at his reported conduct upon returning to the office, especially 
his demands to access documents related to the Report. The Commissioners 
pointed out that this was in direct contravention of the Commission’s existing 
policy.  
50. Ambassador Kiplagat did not respond to that letter but instead issued a statement 
to the entire Commission declaring, among other things, that he was now the 
centre of power of the Commission. He declared that any Commissioner or staff 
member who was unhappy with this turn of events ‘should raise the matter with 
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the appointing authority or the courts’, and that ‘[a]nything short of this will be 
treated as insubordination, to be dealt with in accordance with the relevant legal 
and disciplinary procedures’. He further stated: 
The Commission and its staff are legally incapable of formulating any “existing policy” to 
withhold the Commission’s documents from the Chairman. Any such “policy,” assuming 
one was put up in the absence of the Chairman, is ultra vires the TJRC Act and hence null 
and void.  Accordingly, the Chairman expects every Commissioner and staff member 
to avail to him all such of the Commission’s documents as the Chairman may from 
time to time require in the execution and functions of his office. Any Commissioner 
or staff member who defies any such request shall be deemed to be engaging in 
insubordination, to be dealt with in accordance with the relevant legal and disciplinary 
procedures. (emphasis in original)
51. Ambassador Kiplagat’s statement to the entire Commission is attached to this Report 
as Appendix 7 not only for reference but also because, in his opinion, it reflects the 
true account of how events unfolded. Faced with Ambassador Kiplagat’s aggressive 
assertion of authority, the Commission was concerned about his clear intention to 
ignore any and all Commission procedures to preserve the integrity and confidentiality 
of the information entrusted to it. The Commission was particularly concerned about the 
confidence and security of the over 40,000 Kenyans who had trusted and engaged with 
it, and so it went to the High Court on 10 January 2012 requesting an order to prohibit 
Ambassador Kiplagat from returning to the Commission unless and until a competent 
tribunal had addressed the allegations in the original petition and also requesting an 
order requiring the Chief Justice to constitute such a tribunal.4  
52. On 24 February 2012, Justice Mohamed Warsame issued his ruling in the case. The 
judge noted that ‘there could be flaws and lacuna in the way [Kiplagat] is going 
back after he agreed to step aside for allegations against him to be investigated and 
determined’, and that ‘none of the allegations [against Ambassador Kiplagat] have 
been considered, investigated and determined’, but he nevertheless dismissed the 
application.  
53. The learned Judge in his ruling stated that suits such as the one brought by the 
Commission should be required to go through the Attorney General. Although he noted 
that such a requirement was not in the TJR Act, he concluded that ‘the applicant could 
and should have sought the opinion and advice of [the] honourable Attorney General 
by listing of all relevant issues and seeking a cogent and clear request, reconsideration 
of their mandate in view of the return of their Chairman [sic]’. As to whether there is merit 
4 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission v The Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya & Bethuel Kiplagat, Judicial 
Review Case No. 7 of 2012 
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in enacting legislation requiring that cases instituted by independent commissions be 
screened in advance by the Attorney General, as suggested by the learned Judge, is 
outside the purview of the present discussion. It is nevertheless necessary to note here 
that the TJR Act contemplated no role for the Attorney General in cases instituted by it, 
and that a requirement that the Commission should have consulted with the Attorney 
General or any other outside body when acting in furtherance of its mandate would 
have compromised its independence.  
54. While the matter before the Judge was very narrow, that is, whether or not 
Ambassador Kiplagat should be barred from the Commission until allegations 
raised against him are determined in a proper forum, the Learned Judge 
proceeded to interpret section 17 of the TJR Act which deals with the removal 
of a Commissioner. He held that section 17 prohibited a tribunal from looking 
at the past conduct of Ambassador Kiplagat – an interpretation that directly 
contradicted that of the Chief Justice who established just such a Tribunal. 
The Judge’s interpretation of section 17, nevertheless, was consistent with the 
position taken in the Commission’s original petition to the Chief Justice.  
55. The learned Judge also admonished the Commission to understand that the 
‘controversy once settled by the authoritative decision of the High Could should 
not be re-opened unless there are extraordinary reasons for doing so’. This was 
a particularly curious statement as the case brought by Ambassador Kiplagat 
challenging the establishment of the Tribunal was withdrawn before the court 
could rule on its merits.  It is thus reasonably presumed that the learned Judge 
was referring to a separate case, Augustine Njeru Kathangu & 9 Others v TJRC and 
Bethuel Kiplagat.  This was the case brought against the entire Commission and 
challenged the constitutionality of the Commission and the validity of Kiplagat’s 
appointment because of an alleged faulty oath. But as will be discussed below, the 
issues in that case were quite distinct from the issues raised in the Commission’s 
petition of April 2010 and all of the subsequent related litigation.5  
56. Finally, the learned Judge in his ruling ordered that the costs of Ambassador 
Kiplagat related to this litigation be paid not by the Commission itself but by the 
Commissioners in their individual capacity. The learned Judge did not explain 
why he took the unprecedented step of imposing such costs on individuals 
who were not party to the suit. In other words, the suit had been filed by the 
Commission in its own name and which was by law a body corporate capable of 
suing and being sued. 
5 See the discussion below of Augustine Njeru Kathangu & 9 Others v TJRC and Bethuel Kiplagat [High Court Misc App No. 
470 of 2009 – unreported] 
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57. The learned judge read out his entire ruling on Friday 24 February 2012 at mid day 
in open court in front of the media and the Commission’s legal representatives. 
However, the Commission’s lawyers were informed that the written ruling was not 
ready as certain typos and other minor edits needed to be made. The Commissioners 
visited the Judge’s chambers that afternoon to receive the ruling, only to be told it 
would not be ready until Monday. 
58. On Monday 27 February 2013, the Commission’s representatives returned to 
the Judge’s chambers again only to be informed the ruling would be ready that 
afternoon. In the afternoon, they were told it would be ready on Tuesday 28 
February 2013. Meanwhile, the Commission learned that Ambassador Kiplagat had 
received a final and signed copy of the ruling from the Court early on the morning 
of Monday 27 February 2013. After the Commission pointed out this anomaly to 
the Court, and after several phone calls, the Commission was finally able to receive 
a copy of the ruling on the evening of Monday 27 February 2013.  
59. The Commission does not wish to speculate about what may have led to the 
delay in the issuing of the ruling, or of the issuance of the ruling to one party and 
not to the other.  It is nevertheless important to point out that such anomalies 
undermines individuals’ and institutions’ access to justice as guaranteed under the 
Constitution of Kenya and relevant human rights treaties to which Kenya is a party. 
60. In March 2012, the Commission filed its appeal against the ruling of Judge 
Warsame and asked for an emergency injunction to keep Ambassador Kiplagat 
out of the Commission’s offices until the legal issues raised by the case had been 
decided. That appeal, including the request for an emergency injunction, is still 
pending as of April 2013.  
Mobilising sectarian support 
61. It is noteworthy that as part of his efforts to push for his return to the Commission, 
Ambassador Kiplagat resorted to mobilising sectarian support. On 3 April 2012, 
he attended a meeting convened by KAMATUSA, an association of Kalenjin, 
Maasai, Turkana and Samburu ethnic communities.  Under the banner of ‘Rift 
Valley leaders’, the meeting demanded the unconditional return of Kiplagat. 
They asserted that:
As the Rift Valley we are very concerned about the ongoing process at TJRC because of 
lack of representation of the interests of Rift Valley region and the community at large. 
Both the Constitution of Kenya and the TJRC Act emphasises the need for regional 
balance in the composition of the Commission. We are perturbed by the manner 
in which the TJRC Commissioners have orchestrated the exclusion of Ambassador 
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Bethuel Kiplagat from the process and the report writing thus denying the people 
of Rift Valley a voice and representation in the commission. Indeed, by posing as 
though they are the appointing authority, the commission and commissioners have 
abrogated themselves powers only preserved for Parliament and the Executive, and 
even in disregard of court’s unequivocal observations.
Going by the manner in which Amb Kiplagat is treated, the Rift Valley has been placed in 
a situation of justified fear that the commission does not mean well for its people. Many 
of the persons summoned are from the Kalenjin community yet adequate time was not 
allocated to hearing their complaints.
We in Rift Valley maintain a demand that Amb Kiplagat be reinstated unconditionally 
to any outstanding proceedings and be involved in the process of writing the 
Commission’s report.
62. This disappointing and unfortunate statement was clearly based on the erroneous 
reading of the law coupled with a lack of proper understanding of the workings 
of the Commission. The claim that the exclusion of Ambassador Kiplagat had 
the effect of ‘denying the people of Rift Valley a voice and representation in the 
commission’ had no basis both in law and fact. Neither Ambassador Kiplagat 
nor any other commissioner was appointed to the Commission to safeguard the 
interests of any specific ethnic community or region. While the TJR Act required 
the composition of the Commission to reflect regional balance,6 it was never the 
intention of Parliament that the Commissioners would represent the interests of 
their ethnic communities in the work of the Commission. If this were the case, 
the Commission would need more than 40 commissioners, each representing the 
interests of his or her ethnic community! 
63. But more importantly, the TJR Act in itself made it clear that once elected, 
Commissioners were enjoined to act independently and to serve in their personal 
capacity. In particular, section 10(7) provided that: 
A commissioner once appointed shall cease active participation in the affairs of any 
political party or other organisation, whether registered or unregistered, propagating 
partisan views with respect to the work of the Commission.
64. Further, section 21(2) of the TJR Act provided that: 
Each commissioner and member of staff of the Commission shall serve in his individual 
capacity, independent of any political party, Government or other organisational interests, 
and shall avoid taking any action, which could create an appearance of partiality or 
otherwise harm the credibility or integrity of the Commission.  
6  TJR Act, sec 10(4). 
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65. In essence, by attending a meeting whose main agenda was to foster sectarian 
interests, Ambassador Kiplagat acted in contravention of the TJR Act. In addition, 
by failing to distance himself from the statement issued by the Rift Valley leaders, 
he acquiesced to the erroneous notion that he was appointed to the Commission 
to give ‘the people of Rift Valley a voice and representation in the commission’.
66. The claim that the majority of persons summoned before the Commission were 
from the Kalenjin community had no basis in fact and was simply inflammatory. 
According to its methodology described in detail in the previous Chapter, the 
Commission summoned individuals pursuant to a set of objective criteria; it 
summoned individuals against whom allegations had been leveled and after 
conducting its own investigations including the gathering of evidence. Factors such 
as race, sex, and ethnic or social status were never and could not be considerations 
in deciding whom to summon before the Commission. 
‘Reconciling’ with Ambassador Kiplagat 
67. Given the High Court decision against restricting Ambassador Kiplagat from 
returning to the Commission, the Commissioners established modalities for his 
participation during the remainder of the Commission’s life. The Ministry of Justice 
(and in particular the Minister for Justice, the Honorable Eugene Wamalwa) and 
the Commission on Administrative Justice (CAJ) assisted the Commission in 
establishing the terms of reference for the participation of Ambassador Kiplagat in 
the remaining work of the commission. 
68. Up until the interventions of the Ministry of Justice and CAJ, the other Commissioners 
had publicly stated that they would honour the High Court judgement and not bar 
Ambassador Kiplagat from entering the Commission’s offices. However, they would 
not work directly with him unless and until the issues raised by his conflicts of interest 
had been properly investigated and adjudicated by an independent process. This 
position was reflected in their press statement of 27 February 2012, which also noted 
that Ambassador Kiplagat had been named adversely by dozens of witnesses before 
the Commission and that he had already appeared as an adversely mentioned person 
before the Commission with respect to the Wagalla Massacre. The Commission also 
planned to call him again as an adversely mentioned person with respect to irregular 
land acquisition and the assassination of the Honourable Dr. Robert Ouko.  
69. This public stand by Commissioners with respect to Ambassador Kiplagat was 
criticised by some as defiance of the court order.  Other critics raised the concern 
that a Commission tasked with promoting reconciliation in the country did 
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not appear to be able to reconcile within itself. This criticism was based on the 
erroneous assumption that there was a personal dispute between Ambassador 
Kiplagat and the rest of the Commissioners and hence the need for reconciliation 
amongst them. However, the real issue was one of principle and the correct 
interpretation of the law and the effect of the legal proceedings involving 
Ambassador Kiplagat and the Commission. It was never at any point about 
the personal relations between Kiplagat and the rest of the Commissioners. In 
any event, while the situation between Kiplagat and the other Commissioners 
illustrated conflict, the disagreement between the parties was pursued through 
existing legal and other legitimate processes. Ambassador Kiplagat was given an 
office, allowed to move freely to and from his office, and the other Commissioners 
met with him a number of times to discuss in a civil manner ways to resolve the 
conflicts created by his presence.  
70. After a series of meetings with the Minister of Justice, Ambassador Kiplagat and 
the other Commissioners, an agreement was reached in principle to involve 
Ambassador Kiplagat in the remaining work of the Commission in a way that 
preserved the integrity of the process.  In particular it was agreed that: 
a) Kiplagat would not be involved in the writing of the final report (in part 
because he had been absent during the period when the vast majority of 
the work of the Commission was done); 
b) he would be allowed to review the final report at the same time and in 
the same manner as the other Commissioners, except that Kiplagat would 
not be allowed to review those sections of the report in which he had a 
conflict of interest. 
71. At a meeting held at the offices of the Ministry of Justice on 12 April 2012 and 
attended by all Commissioners, Ambassador Kiplagat agreed in principle not to 
be involved in the parts of the Report in which he had a conflict of interest. But 
he raised concerns about the definitions of conflict of interest involving him. He 
asked, for example, whether he would be kept out of all sections of the Report 
dealing with land or just those sections dealing with the specific land that is 
claimed he irregularly or illegally acquired. Ambassador Kiplagat and the other 
Commissioners agreed to work out these details among themselves. As a result of 
this agreement, the Minister of Justice immediately announced that Ambassador 
Kiplagat and the other Commissioners had reconciled. 
72. On the same day that the agreement was reached between the Commissioners 
and Ambassador Kiplagat, CAJ issued an advisory opinion on the dispute 
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between the Commissioners and Ambassador Kiplagat. The Advisory Opinion 
correctly set out the history of the various legal processes initiated by and against 
Ambassador Kiplagat and the Commission and concluded, among other things, 
that:
a) Ambassador Kiplagat should be allowed to return and sit in his office in 
accordance with the High Court decision; and
b) Ambassador Kiplagat ‘should not participate or interfere with the 
preparation of the TJRC Report since such participation may have a 
negative effect to the acceptance of the Report’, but that he should 
‘be given an opportunity to review the Report within a short time and 
to script an addendum to the Report wherein he may agree or give his 
dissenting opinion’.  
73. The Advisory Opinion also made reference to the ‘sectarian support’ which 
Ambassador Kiplagat had mobilised to push for his return. The Office of the 
Ombudsman noted that such support ‘ultimately undermines Kiplagat’s authority’ 
and noted that attempts by Ambassador Kiplagat or other Commissioners to 
seek such sectarian support ‘will only seek to erode the integrity of the Report’.  A 
full copy of the Advisory Opinion is attached to this Report.7 
74. Following up on the agreement between Ambassador Kiplagat and the other 
Commissioners facilitated by the Minister of Justice, the Commissioners drafted 
an Aide Memoire that set out the history of the events surrounding Ambassador 
Kiplagat’s conflicts of interest and the many different attempts to address those 
conflicts.8  The Aide Memoire proposed a set of modalities that would govern his 
participation in the work of the Commission during the remainder of its life.  The 
proposed modalities were drafted based upon the meetings facilitated by the 
Minister of Justice, the Advisory Opinion issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, 
and consultations with experts in the area of conflicts of interest.  The resulting 
modalities were four:
a) Ambassador Kiplagat will review drafts of the Report in the same manner 
and at the same time as other Commissioners.  
b) Ambassador Kiplagat will not be allowed to review those sections of the 
Report that concern areas in which he has a conflict of interest, including 
those parts of the Report concerning massacres, political assassinations, and 
7 See Appendix 8 for the Advisory Opinion. 
8 See Appendix 9 for the Aide Memoire. 
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land. Ambassador Kiplagat will be given the same rights and opportunities 
as any other adversely mentioned person. Thus if the Report includes an 
adverse finding concerning Ambassador Kiplagat, he will be given the same 
opportunity as other adversely mentioned individuals to respond to that 
finding and to have his response taken into account in the final drafting of 
that finding.  
c) Since Ambassador Kiplagat has refused to honor a summons to testify 
before the Commission, the Commission reserves the right to pursue legal 
enforcement of its summons as provided for under Section 7(6) of the Act.  
d) Ambassador Kiplagat must agree to comply with the decision-making 
processes of the Commission set forth in the Act and as established by 
resolutions of the Commission.
  
75. Ambassador Kiplagat was given a copy of this Aide Memoire in early April 2012 
and requested to either agree to its contents or submit a counter-proposal to 
the other Commissioners in writing. He never responded to the contents of 
the Aide Memoire, and as such, the other Commissioners and the Commission 
staff operated pursuant to the four modalities set forth in that document.  In a 
Commission meeting in March 2013, almost a year after the Aide Memoire was 
given to him, Ambassador Kiplagat claimed that he did not understand that 
there was any agreement between himself and the other Commissioners as set 
forth in the Aide Memoire, and that he wanted access and the ability to comment 
on drafts of the three chapters in which he has a conflict of interest. The other 
Commissioners refused to renegotiate the agreement at this late date. As such, 
the Commission can categorically state that the final drafts of the chapters of the 
Report dealing with land, political assassinations, and massacres were drafted 
without any input or influence by Kiplagat. As a Commissioner, Ambassador 
Kiplagat was allowed to read these three chapters after they were finalized so 
that he could decide whether or not to write a response or dissenting opinion 
to the Report setting out any differences he may have with the content of those 
three chapters. 
Impact of controversy 
76. The controversy about Kiplagat’s suitability as a Chairperson of the Commission 
and the legal suits that ensued adversely affected the operations of the Commission 
throughout its life.  The controversy diverted and distracted the attention and 
energy of the Commission from executing its core mandate. His initial refusal to 
step aside led to the resignation of Kaari Betty Murungi as the Vice-Chairperson and 
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later as a Commissioner. This was a great loss to the Commission, as Murungi has 
extensive experience in transitional justice, human rights law, gender and historical 
injustices in Kenya. As Vice-Chairperson she provided crucial leadership to the 
Commission as it grappled with the controversies surrounding the Chairperson. 
Unfortunately, and contrary to the express provisions of the TJR Act, Murungi was 
never replaced.  
77. Most importantly, the Chairperson’s refusal to step aside led to the loss of 
important stakeholders to the work of the Commission. Social media outlets 
were awash with calls for the disbanding of the Commission. Donor organisations 
equally refused to fund the Commission, and those that had initially committed 
to fund the Commission withdrew their offers. The general public, CSOs, FBOs, 
CBOs, the media and other relevant stakeholders adopted a policy of ‘non-
cooperation’ with the Commission. Some of these organisations took robust steps 
to paralyse the work of the Commission. They called on funders not to support 
the Commission. Some, mainly under the banner of Kenya Transitional Justice 
Network and Kenyans Against Impunity, planned to engage the Commission ‘in 
as many legal battles as possible’ and ‘decimate or exhaust’  its capacities to move 
on with its activities.
78. The Commission does not question the good faith of many CSOs which acted 
against it, perhaps premised on the idea of seeking a credible truth-seeking, 
justice and reconciliation process. The Commission, however, notes that their 
strategy inadvertently fitted well into the wishes of actors, both political and 
otherwise, who saw the Commission and its work as a threat to the status quo and 
their vested interests. By disengaging from the Commission and taking steps to 
paralyse its work, these CSOs consciously or unconsciously advanced the interests 
of non-reformists. 
79. Many victims, their families, and witnesses similarly refused to participate in 
the activities of the Commission or to be associated with it in any way. When 
the Commission set out to execute its mandate, it was met with hostility and 
confrontation.  In January 2010, for example, the Commission undertook an initial 
civic education tour of the Coast Province. It held public information sessions in 
Voi, Mombasa, Kwale, Malindi, and Lamu.  While the public sessions achieved 
some level of success, the Commission was plagued with demonstrations and 
other expressions of protest at the presence of Kiplagat.  At the Mombasa session, 
dozens of people publicly protested and walked out of the session. In Lamu, 
the Commissioners had to be confined to their hotel rooms while sympathetic 
representatives of CSOs engaged with local community leaders to ensure the 
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Commissioners’ safety at that session. Following this experience, the Commission 
abandoned similar outreach and civic education visits that had been planned. 
80. The stepping aside of the Chairperson in November 2010 dramatically changed the 
situation for the Commission. The general public and a significant number of CSOs, 
FBOs and other stakeholders put an end to their policy of non-cooperation and 
rallied behind the Commission. Buoyed by this massive support, the Commission 
worked with renewed vigour under the leadership of its Acting Chairperson, Tecla 
Namachanja Wanjala, to redeem lost time.  In addition to rolling out a renewed 
civic education programme all over the country, the Commission launched public 
hearings in April 2011. The reception at these hearings was exceptionally positive, 
and when the Commission requested an extension of time to complete its hearings, 
the National Assembly unanimously supported the request. 
81. Kiplagat’s return in January 2012 threatened to erase all the gains that the 
Commission had made during his absence. Stakeholders who had re-engaged 
with the Commission left in droves. CSOs threatened to hold protests and 
demonstrations to bar the Chairperson from attending the Commission’s public 
hearings that were due to be held in Coast Province. In Nairobi, survivors and 
families of the Wagalla Massacre held public demonstrations in front of the 
Commission’s offices protesting the return of Kiplagat. Donors who had expressed 
a willingness to support the process now withdrew their commitments of support. 
It was, for all intents and purposes, a return to square one. 
Other conflicts of interest
82. Conflict of interest issues were not just confined to Ambassador Kiplagat 
alone. There were also allegations that Commissioner Major General (Retired) 
Ahmed Farah had been involved in the security operation that became the 
Wagalla Massacre. These allegations, just like those raised against Kiplagat, were 
supported by similar credible but not conclusive evidence (in this case a sworn 
affidavit). The Commission immediately instituted procedures to keep away any 
information or discussions related to the Wagalla Massacre from Commissioner 
Farah in accordance with the Commission’s code of conduct. Commissioner Farah 
agreed to these procedures and willingly complied.  
83. The Commission also immediately undertook investigations into these allegations 
and established that:
a) the Navy, of which General Farah was a part, was not in fact involved in any 
way with the Wagalla Massacre, and
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b) that General Farah was in fact out of the country before, during, and after the 
Wagalla Massacre.  
84. Nevertheless, the Commission decided to hold a public hearing concerning the 
allegations against Commissioner Farah because of the importance of engaging 
in a public and transparent process addressing such allegations given their 
potential to affect the credibility, integrity, and legitimacy of the Commission.  
85. At the public hearing, the individual who had alleged that Commissioner Farah 
was involved in the Wagalla Massacre publicly repudiated his earlier statement 
and swore, under oath, that he had no knowledge linking Commissioner Farah to 
the Wagalla Massacre.9  
Financial and Resource Challenges  
86. The second great challenge that the Commission faced from inception was the 
lack of sufficient funds and resources to efficiently and effectively conduct its 
operations. Although Parties to KNDR encouraged ‘strong financial support to 
the Commission’,10 the Commission operated on a paltry budget throughout its 
life. The financial situation was so dire that at times it had to seek loans from 
Commissioners.11 The preliminary cost of fulfilling the Commission’s mandate 
effectively and efficiently was estimated to be approximately Ksh 2.2 billion for 
the two-year operational period. This amount is comparable, when adjusted 
for inflation, to the amount expended on the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and significantly less than that spent on the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.  
The first fiscal year (2009-2010)
87. During the Commission’s first fiscal year, its finances were entirely controlled 
and administered by the Ministry of Justice. This situation obtained because 
of government regulations that prohibited the Commission from controlling its 
finances until the Secretary to the Commission, who was also the accounting 
authority and chief executive, had been hired. However, even when the Secretary 
was hired in February 2010, the Commission was not allowed to take control of 
9 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nairobi/
10 TJRC Agreement. 
11 Ironically, as noted before, those same Commissioners who so generously reached into their own pockets to ensure 
the Commission could continue with its work were later falsely accused in the media of stealing such money from the 
Commission.  
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its finances until the start of the next fiscal year, more than five months later in 
July 2010. The Commission lacked financial independence during this period and 
experienced the following challenges as a result:
a) it had to seek the express approval of the Ministry for any expenditure, a 
process which delayed  activities;
b) individual Commissioners had to rely on their personal resources when the 
Commission’s requests were delayed or denied; 
c) it had no authority to approve or disapprove any expenditures made on the 
Commission’s behalf by the Ministry;
d) it had no knowledge of many expenditures made by the Ministry on its 
behalf; and 
e) despite numerous requests, the Commission was never given a complete 
account of the money spent on its behalf by the Ministry during that first 
year.
88. The Commission’s lack of control over its finances during the first year of operations 
was not made public until April 2010 just after the Commission announced it 
would be petitioning the Chief Justice to establish a tribunal with respect to the 
issues raised by Kiplagat. Around that same time the then Minister of Justice, the 
Honorable Mutula Kilonzo, indicated in a number of public statements that the 
Commission may have engaged in inappropriate and perhaps even illegal financial 
activities. As a result of these allegations, the Parliamentary Public Accounts 
Committee and the Parliamentary Committee on the Administration of Justice and 
Legal Affairs undertook an investigation of the matter. In response, the Commission 
submitted detailed financial documents to the respective Committees and noted 
that because it had no control over its own finances any questions concerning the 
finances of the Commission (including questions the Commission itself had raised 
concerning some of the documents it had provided) should be directed to the 
Ministry of Justice. 
 
89. For the 2009-2010 fiscal year, the Commission submitted to the Treasury a budget of 
Ksh 1.2 bn but was only allocated Ksh 190 million, or just under 16% of its proposed 
budget. As with most such allocations, the Ksh 190 million was transferred to the 
Commission’s account with the Ministry of Justice in three quarterly instalments, 
each of which was insufficient to service the Commission’s growing portfolio of 
debts and pay staff salaries, much less finance mandate-related operations. As a 
consequence, the Commission deferred the hiring of staff until August 2010 and 
froze all but the most essential mandate-related operations. 
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The second fiscal year (2010-2011)
90. By the end of October 2010, the Commission had no funds at all to sustain its 
operations and had to seek monthly advances amounting to Ksh 44.2 million from the 
Treasury for the months of November and December to pay staff salaries and continue 
statement taking. Similarly, in order to run its operations, the Commission sought and 
received an advance of Ksh 80 million from the Ministry of Justice. These advances 
kept the Commission going but they were temporary solutions to a chronic financial 
problem. They were uncertain and ad hoc and so the Commission could not plan its 
activities properly resulting in, among other things, inadequate civic education and 
preparation for the Commission’s statement taking and public hearings.  
91. In December 2010 the Commission submitted a request to the Treasury for 
supplementary funding. Without the supplementary funding the Commission 
was unable to launch its public hearings in February 2011 as was initially planned. 
The Commission received Ksh 460 million in April 2011 in response to its request. 
The Commission was thus able to launch and conduct hearings at the beginning 
of April 2011 in North Eastern, Upper Eastern and Mt. Elgon. 
92. In the fiscal year 2010-2011, the Commission was eventually allocated a total 
of Ksh 650 million against a proposed budget of Ksh 1.2 billion. The inadequate 
funding in the first fiscal year, and the late allocation in its second fiscal year, 
placed great strains on the Commission’s operations. In particular: 
 The Commission was unable to start its operations after the statutorily stipulated 
three month establishment phase. For the first six months of its existence, with 
no control over its limited funding, the Commission operated with neither a 
Secretary nor a functional Secretariat. The Commissioners performed most of 
the administrative and organisational work with the assistance of a 17 member 
support staff deployed to the Commission by the Ministry of Justice. 
 Although the Commission finally hired its Secretary in February 2010, it was 
unable to undertake any substantial hiring of staff until the 2010-2011 fiscal 
year.  The operational units of the Commission thus became functional only in 
September 2010 after directors and staff of the various units were hired and 
inducted. But these units remained under-funded and under -staffed, a fact 
that undermined their capacity to function effectively.
 The Commission did not have adequate and appropriate office space 
until January 2011, more than sixteen months after its establishment. The 
Commission delayed the hiring of needed staff until towards the end of 2010 
for lack of office space. As a result some individuals who had applied for jobs 
with the Commission took up other job offers.  
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 The Commission had recurrent delays in paying bills and salaries. Indeed, 
the Commissioners had to loan the Commission money to enable it to 
commence the statement taking process. 
 The Commission had to cut short its provincial outreach and familiarisation 
meetings after conducting such meetings in only two provinces.
 The Commission was unable to conduct intensive training sessions for Statement 
Takers, especially in relation to trauma management and identification. Many 
Statement Takers were subject to trauma but the Commission could only organise 
two debriefing sessions for them. These were during the review meetings and 
at the end of the official statement taking period. The statement taking process 
identified many victims and witnesses who needed counseling but given the 
Commission’s limited financial and other resources, limited counseling services 
were provided. 
 The Commission’s launch of public hearings was delayed, first for one 
year, then for an additional two months. According to the work plan, the 
Commission had intended to hold hearings beginning in April 2010 but this 
was revised when it became clear that the Commission would be unable to 
hire staff until after July 2010, and that no money would be available other 
than for minimal operational activities until that time. The revised Work Plan 
set a hearing period of 7 months from February 2011 to August 2011.  Due 
to lack of funds, the launch of the hearings was delayed again until April 
2011 when the Commission received an advance of Ksh 80 million from the 
Ministry of Justice. This delay in commencing public hearings adversely 
affected the Commission’s schedule which had to be compressed.
 The delay in commencing hearings in turn had an adverse ‘ripple effect’ on 
the general Work Plan of the Commission. The most far-reaching impact 
was that the Commission was unable to hold public hearings in some parts 
of the country and on the entire breadth of issues within its mandate. These 
delays contributed significantly to the Commission’s requests for extension 
of its lifetime discussed earlier in Chapter One of this Volume of the Report. 
93. The Commission’s paltry budget was, towards the end of its term, supplemented by 
external donors, most of whom provided aid in the form of technical support. Initially, 
however, donors had generally refused to fund the Commission in any way. At the 
beginning of the Commission’s life potential donors conditioned their support on the 
establishment of a Special Tribunal for Kenya as recommended by the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), a matter over which the Commission 
had no control. Most importantly, the overwhelming number of donors declined to 
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support the Commission in view of the controversy that surrounded the suitability 
of the Chairperson. In addition, donors expressed misgivings at providing funding 
to a process that was meant to be national but which was so underfunded by the 
Government. As one donor expressed to the Commission, it would have been 
inappropriate for the process to be a donor-driven project.   
Legal Challenges  
94. The Commission was a corporate body with perpetual succession and a common 
seal and was capable of suing and being sued in its own name.12 Soon after its 
establishment, two legal actions were lodged in the High Court, both of which 
sought the dissolution of the Commission. The substance, outcomes and impact of 
the two cases are discussed in this sub-section. 
 Augustine Njeru Kathangu & 9 Others v TJRC and Bethuel Kiplagat 
[High Court Misc App No. 470 of 2009]
95. The Applicants in this case were members of a lobby group, Kenyans Against Impunity, 
which was formed in the aftermath of the 2007/08 PEV. They were also victims of 
violations that fell under the Commission’s scope of inquiry. They raised a constitutional 
challenge on the composition and statutory mandate of the Commission. 
96. They challenged the process of nominating the Commissioners arguing that, 
contrary to the provisions of the TJR Act, the Selection Panel that was responsible 
for their nomination was not properly constituted. In particular, they argued that 
representatives of the Episcopal Conference of Kenya, the National Council of 
Christian Churches of Kenya and the Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers had not 
participated in the selection process. The Court found this contention lacked merit 
in part because some of these organisations were in fact represented in the selection 
process and the absence of specific religious organisations did not invalidate the 
process. Those organisations participated in a process by which the two religious 
organisations among them were represented on the panel. 
97. They also challenged Ambassador Kiplagat’s suitability to serve as the Commission’s 
Chairperson for reasons already discussed earlier. They asked the Court to quash 
his oath of office and prohibit him from running the affairs of the Commission. 
They argued that the Chairperson’s oath of office (and by extension of all the other 
Commissioners) was null and void because it was administered on 3 August 2009 yet 
the Gazette Notice appointing them was published much later on 14 August 2009. 
12  TJR Act, sec 2. 
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In essence they argued that the President had put the cart before the horse. The 
Court found this contention to be without merit. It ruled that what was relevant was 
not the date on which the Gazette Notice was published but the date on which the 
President signed it, and that was 22 July 2009. As such, the Court concluded that ‘the 
issue of putting the cart before the horse as contended by the ex parte applicants has 
absolutely no basis’. 
98. On the Applicants’ prayer to prohibit Ambassador Kiplagat from running the affairs 
of the Commission, the Court based its ruling on a technicality, arguing that the 
Applicant’s request for an order of prohibition was inappropriate given that they 
were not challenging the manner in which Ambassador Kiplagat was running the 
Commission but the authority to appoint him as Chairman of the Commission. The 
Court also noted that such an order of prohibition would only address claims raised 
about the process of Ambassador’s Kiplagat’s appointment and not the merits of his 
appointment, which consequently were not addressed by the Court.  As such, the 
Court concluded that: 
The ex parte applicants are not challenging the decision making process in the 
appointment of 2nd respondent [Kiplagat]. They are challenging the merit of the 2nd 
respondent’s selection and nomination, being of the view that the 2nd respondent was not 
a suitable person for nomination. As we have pointed out the remedy of prohibition does 
not deal with the merit of the decision but with the process. For this and other reasons 
already stated the remedy of prohibition as sought by the ex parte applicants is therefore 
not available to them. 
99. In relation to the statutory mandate of the Commission, the Applicants averred that 
the TJR Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it excluded the periods before 
12 December 1963 and after 28 February 2008 from its temporal mandate. The 
Court did not delve into the merits of this contention. Instead, it ruled that while the 
Applicants raised important issues, they could not challenge the legality of the TJR 
Act in the manner in which they did, that is, through a judicial review process rather 
than through a constitutional reference. 
100. Ambassador Kiplagat and the Commission argued before the Court that the only 
proper procedure for the removal of a Commissioner, which was in part what 
the Applicant’s were seeking, was through the creation of a Tribunal pursuant to 
Section 17 of the Act.  The Court did not comment on this argument, other than to 
note that it had been made.  
101. The ruling of the Court in this case was particularly important in view of the different 
interpretations accorded it by interested parties. As noted above, Ambassador 
Kiplagat returned to the Commission’s offices in January 2012 in part arguing 
that the dismissal of this case meant that he had been ‘cleared’ of all allegations 
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raised against him.  It is also possible, as noted above, that the ruling of the High 
Court in TJRC v Bethuel Kiplagat & Chief Justice denying the Commission the right to 
bar Kiplagat from its offices may also have depended upon this ruling. The media 
accepted this interpretation, and with few exceptions, reported that Kiplagat had 
been ‘cleared’ by the courts.  
102. On the contrary, the Commission held the considered view that the case had neither 
cleared the Chairperson of allegations levelled against him nor did it pronounce on 
the substance of those allegations. In other words, the High Court never dealt with 
the question of whether the allegations levelled against Ambassador Kiplagat were 
true or false. Instead, it ruled that it (the Court) was not the proper forum to address 
those issues and that they had not been properly presented by the Applicants in 
that case. The Court also noted that the Commission and Ambassador Kiplagat had 
argued that the only proper forum for addressing such issues was a Tribunal set up 
under section 17 of the Act. As noted above, notwithstanding this earlier argument 
supported by Kiplagat, when such a tribunal was later established it was challenged 
by Kiplagat. 
 Moraa Gesicho v Attorney General and TJRC [High Court (Kisii) Petition 
No. 1 of 2010] 
103. The petitioner in this case described herself as a victim of the 2007/08 PEV. She 
sought a declaration from the High Court that the Commission had no basis 
upon which to pursue justice for victims of the PEV. She therefore prayed for the 
dissolution of the Commission. Her argument was based on a perceived failure 
by the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) to make 
specific recommendations to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
as expressly required by its terms of reference. The legal instrument that created 
CIPEV (Gazette Notice No. 4473) mandated it to ‘make such recommendations to 
the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission as the Commission [CIPEV] may 
deem appropriate’. 
104. The Commission opposed her petition on simple reasoning. The purported failure 
of CIPEV to make any specific recommendation to the Commission did not bar the 
latter from pursuing justice for victims of PEV. The 2007/08 PEV squarely fell both 
within the temporal and material mandate of the Commission. Indeed, hundreds of 
victims of PEV participated in the Commission’s processes; they recorded statements 
and testified before the Commission. Their statements, testimonies and views were 
taken into account in drawing up the findings and recommendations and compiling 
of this Report.
 
105. The case had not been finalized by the time of submitting this Report. 
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Lack of Political Will
106. The two major challenges discussed above – the response to the controversy 
around the Chairperson and the financial and resource constraints that the 
Commission faced – were products of and symptomatic of a bigger challenge: 
the lack of sufficient political will on the part of the state to give the Commission 
the support it needed and to commit to pursue the objectives for which the 
Commission was established. 
107. The state’s lack of political will to support the work of the Commission was manifested 
in many diverse ways. Firstly, in spite of the express and mandatory provisions of the 
TJR Act, the President failed to fill the position of Commissioner Kaari Betty Murungi 
when it fell vacant in April 2010. This forced the Commission to operate with eight 
Commissioners, and later when Ambassador Kiplagat stepped aside, with only seven 
commissioners. Secondly, despite multiple requests, the state refused to hand over 
to the Commission relevant documents pertaining to its mandate, including the 
reports of previous commissions of inquiry that the Commission was obligated to 
review and evaluate.13 Because of this consistent lack of cooperation, the Commission 
was forced to acquire many relevant documents, including the reports of previous 
commissions of inquiry, through unofficial and informal means.  
108. Thirdly, the state’s failed to support adequately the Commission’s reconciliation 
work. The Commission’ mandate of promoting national unity and reconciliation 
demanded strong political support. By their stature and position in society, 
political leaders, especially the President and the Prime Minister, had key roles to 
play in steering the nation towards national unity and reconciliation. However, 
their support for this particular work was ad hoc and inconsistent. Only a few 
political leaders publicly spoke of national unity and reconciliation within the 
framework of the TJR Act. Political leaders, more often than not, took steps that 
undermined national unity and reconciliation. Many other political leaders 
through their inaction and lack of support contributed to this atmosphere and 
thus lessened the ability of the Commission to perform its functions. Some made 
inflammatory statements that spurred ethnic tension. 
109. Not surprisingly in January 2012, the KNDR Monitoring Project warned that:
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and the National Cohesion 
and Integration Commission (NCIC) have continued their efforts to inquire into human 
rights violations and prevent future violence, respectively. However, without political 
support for the work of these commissions, their impact on ethnic relations and deterrence 
capacity for future dissonance remains uncertain.
13 TJR Act, sec 6(m). 
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110. It is significant that until the handing over of this Report, the Commission was 
unable to secure an appointment to meet with the President. From the earliest days 
of the establishment of the Commission in August 2009 the Commission sought 
an audience with the President but the efforts were in vain. The Commission also 
had difficulty meeting the Prime Minister. It pursued an appointment with the 
Prime Minister both with or without the President but it was virtually  more than 
half way through its work when the Commission was able to pay a courtesy call 
on the Prime Minister. This lack of access to the two Principals was one of the 
many indicators of the lack of interest or indifference to the Commission from 
the political elite.   
111. This lack of political will on the part of the political elite may partly have stemmed 
from the absence of a clean break with the past. It could also be attributed to the 
fact that many state and public officials who served under previous repressive and 
corrupt regimes were also serving in the Coalition Government. They had either 
participated in or oversaw acts of repression and corruption during periods that 
were squarely within the mandate of the Commission. Many of these individuals 
had an interest in maintaining the status quo and a complete break with the past 
could potentially or actually injure their vested interests. 
112. In August 2009, Professor Yash Pal Ghai, a leading constitutional law scholar, 
had already foreseen that anti-reformists would sabotage the country’s reform 
and transitional justice agenda. Writing on the challenges of establishing a 
constitutional order in Kenya, he observed that he had already:
said enough to indicate how vested interests, among politicians, businesspeople, 
and the bureaucracy will sabotage reforms (as they have done ever since Kenya’s 
independence). Despite the ravages wreaked upon the state, it still remains the 
primary means to accumulate wealth and power—and those who are in control of 
it will fight to maintain their control, regardless of the rules of the constitution. It 
is hard to provide the answer to this dilemma, that the very sponsors of reform are its 
principal saboteurs. What we know is that constitutionalism cannot be willed; it must 
be established by deep commitment and sustained activity.14
113. Not surprisingly, despite the numerous institutional and legislative reforms 
(including the enactment of a new constitution and the reform of the judiciary) 
which followed the signing of the National Accord, the government continued to 
exhibit and resort to past practices and tendencies. In a sense, systematic violations 
of human rights and disregard for the rule of law continued way into an era which 
was supposed to be marked by a clean break with the past. It mattered little that 
by signing the National Accord and engaging in the KNDR process, the country’s 
14 Y Ghai ‘Decreeing and establishing a constitutional order: Challenges facing Kenya’, Oxford Transitional Justice Research 
Working Paper Series, 10 August 2009. 
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political leadership had formally committed itself to recreating the Kenyan State 
through a more transparent and accountable form of governance. The renewed 
optimism after the signing of the National Accord was even shorter-lived than that 
which accompanied the entry of the NARC government in 2002.  
114. Examples abound of how, soon after signing of the National Accord, state 
agencies once again started sliding back to past practices. In 2008, for instance, 
in a security operation dubbed Operation Okoa Maisha, the army tortured and 
maimed suspected members of the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) in the 
Mount Elgon region. Reports of economic crimes and grand corruption involving 
top government officials continued to hit the headlines. Between July 2008 and 
January 2009, KNDR Monitoring Project listed at least six cases of corruption in 
which government officials were allegedly or reportedly involved:15 
 In July 2008, the Minister for Immigration was accused of giving work permits 
to foreigners against advice from senior Ministry officials. The Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission detectives revealed an elaborate cartel of brokers 
who were making billions of Kenya shillings at the Ministry;
 In July 2008, the Minister for Finance was accused of flouting public procurement 
rules and irregularly selling the Grand Regency Hotel;
 In October 2008, a saga surrounding the destination of a Ukrainian vessel 
that was hijacked by Somali pirates off the Kenyan coast with 33 T-72 Russian 
made tanks, 23 aircraft guns and ammunition was reported. While the Kenya 
Government insisted that the weapons were for its military, there were 
allegations that the arms were imported on behalf of the Government of 
Southern Sudan;
 In September 2008, Finance Minister Amos Kimunya denied allegations that a 
currency-printing contract was irregularly awarded to De la Rue. The government 
was said to have lost billions of shillings in the deal;
 In October 2008, the National Social Security Fund was said to have lost Ksh3 
billion in pensioners’ funds through dubious investments, including the 
sinking of about Ksh1.5 billion in the stock brokerage firm, Discount Securities 
Limited, which has since been placed under statutory management;
 In January 2009, the Kenya Pipeline Company and Triton Petroleum Company 
Limited were at the centre of a scandal in which financiers risked losing up to 
Ksh7.6 billion;
15 KNDR Monitoring Project Review Report: Agenda Item IV, Long Standing Issues and Solutions (2009); See also ‘Land of 
scandals’ Daily Nation, 15 Jan 2009. 
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 In January 2009, there were allegations that the Kenya Tourism Board Managing 
Director irregularly allocated Ksh 43 million to two private companies;
 In January 2009, it was reported that maize meant to cushion Kenyans against 
rising food prices and looming starvation had been allocated to briefcase 
millers and companies that were colluding with senior government officials. 
This maize was allegedly sold to Southern Sudan at a higher price. Thus over 
Ksh 800 million was reported to have been lost in the fraud.
115. The fact that the state continued to behave in much the same way as it did in the 
past, coupled with the fact that the structures of governance were dominated 
by holdovers from the previous regimes, had a negative impact both on the 
operations of the Commission and the public perception of its work. Many 
people were often doubtful whether the recommendations of the Commission 
would be implemented. They repeatedly expressed their concern that little had 
changed despite the signing of the National Accord and the legislative reforms 
that followed. In an apt metaphor, a witness summarised the concern thus: 
There is a parable which says that a goat was eaten by a hyena and then the goats 
went and said to other hyenas, ‘We were eaten by a hyena. Can you help us?’ The 
hyena went to other hyenas and said: ‘If you ate some goats, why did you not eat all 
of them, so that we could not hear any complaints?’ By this I mean that unless there 
will be another government, but the one I know, the people I hear, are the same 
ones who caused us the pain.16  
Conclusion 
116. The Commission, like many that have gone before it both in Kenya and abroad, 
faced many challenges. Some of these challenges, as described in this Chapter, 
at times threatened the very existence of the organization and took a physical 
and emotional toll on the Commissioners and the staff of the Commission. The 
Commission faced these challenges with courage, conviction, and commitment. 
How well it succeeded in the end is not for it to say.  Instead, the Commission 
hopes that its work, as documented in this Report, will in the end contribute to 
truth, justice, national unity and reconciliation in Kenya.  
16 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Wajir/18 April 2011/p. 66. 
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Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat is a diplomat with 
vast experience having served as am-
bassador to France and Later to United 
Kingdom. He is also an experienced 
peace builder having served as Deputy 
Secretary-General of National Council of 
Churches and secretary to church and 
society committee which dealt with politi-
cal, social and economic issues including 
community relations and reconciliation. 
Having served as Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for close to nine 
years, Amb. Kiplagat initiated peace pro-
cesses for Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanza-
nia, Sudan, Ethiopia and the Great Lakes, 
work which culminated to signing of the 
peace agreements for Somalia and Kenya. 
Amb. Kiplagat has also served as Kenya's Special Envoy 
for Somalia National Reconciliation Conference from 
February 2003 until after formation of Somalia Transi-
tional Federal Government, Chairman of Eminent Person 
of Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)  
- a body which evaluates governance 
with strong emphasis on democratic val-
ue and human rights where he was lead 
panelist for Nigeria, Egypt, Mozambique 
to mention a few.
On 24th February 2006, he was appoint-
ed as Chairman Committee of Eminent 
Persons on Constitution Review Process, 
a committee whose recommendations 
were used by the team of experts to 
implement the writing of the new con-
stitution. 
Amb. Kiplagat is also the Chancellor 
Egerton University,  the Chairman of the 
first Micro Credit Finance Bank in Africa (K-Rep) focus-
ing on alleviation of poverty, the Chief Executive Africa 
Peace Forum, an Ambassador for peace of the African 
Union for the year of Peace and Security Campaign and 
a COMESA Elder.
Appendix 1A
Personal Profiles of the Commissioners 
Ambassador Bethuel A. Kiplagat - Chairperson, Kenya
Tecla Namachanja Wanjala - Vice Chairperson, Kenya
Tecla Namachanja is a peace builder and 
community social worker experienced 
in conflict management, transformation 
and peace building across the region. 
Commissioner Wanjala is one of the three 
women recognized as Pillars of Peace for 
intervening in the Kenya’s 1991-92 and 
1997 ethnic clashes and is globally recog-
nized as one of the 1,000 women nomi-
nees for the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize.
She has an MA in Conflict Transformation 
from Eastern Mennonite University (EMU) 
in Harrisonburg Virginia, USA and is cur-
rently a PhD candidate at Masinde Muliro 
University of Science and Technology, 
studying peace and conflict. During her thirteen years 
peace-building career she has engaged in conflict resolu-
tion processes nationally as well as in Sudan, Rwanda and 
Ethiopia and has conducted numerous regional training 
workshops. Until joining TJRC, Commissioner Wanjala 
headed the Regional Party for Peace in East and Central 
Africa (PEACE 11) Program that aims to en-
hance African leadership in conflict man-
agement in the Horn of Africa.
Commissioner Wanjala also helped the 
Nairobi Peace Initiative train over 500 
workers in basic skills in conflict transfor-
mation in 1997 and 1999. In addition to 
this, she also consulted on peace build-
ing and post-conflict reconstruction in 
Eastern and Southern Africa for Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
2005-2008 and coordinated the Peace 
and Development Network (PEACENET) 
efforts in organizing coalition and advo-
cacy meetings on conflict and peace.
During the infamous Kenya ethnic clashes of 1993 to 
1995, Commissioner Wanjala journeyed with internally 
displaced persons for their humanitarian assistance and 
co-ordinated for relief and rehabilitation for over 40,000 
survivors of ethnic clashes.
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Widely travelled in the world and with a 
very clear picture of the regional and in-
ternational security environment, Major 
General Farah this important perspective 
to his role as Commissioner. Throughout 
his successful military career in the Kenya 
Armed Forces he has worked diligently, 
rising to the highest rank in the military 
command structure. His academic and 
professional qualifications span across 
international training attained from Eng-
land, Australia, America and Israel and 
he has served in numerous positions in 
the armed forces in his capacity as com-
mander. He is well versed in conflict prevention, man-
agement and resolutions at the regional level as well 
as UN peace support operations in the 
international arena.
At his last appointment at Kenya’s Na-
tional Defence College, he was part of the 
directorate and responsible for oversee-
ing strict adherence to the curriculum by 
university lecturers in addition to formu-
lating lecture guides. His emphasis was 
on domestic and foreign policy studies. 
He has a track record as a resourceful, re-
liable and capable manager, whether at 
corporate level in the private sector or at 
strategic and policy level in government. 
After retiring from the Department of Defence, he went 
into business and security consultancy in Mombasa. 
Major General (Rtd) Ahmed Sheikh Farah - Commissioner, Kenya
Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, Commissioner, Ethiopia
Ambassador Berhanu Dinka is a diplo-
mat with 27 years in the Ethiopian For-
eign Service and an illustrious career in 
the United Nations and international 
peace-keeping, Commissioner Dinka 
continues to take on special assign-
ments though now retired. Thus, he as-
sisted in the Abuja talks on the conflict 
in Darfur when requested by the African 
Union, chairing the Power-Sharing Com-
mission until the Darfur Peace Agree-
ment (DPA) was concluded in Abuja in 
March 2006.
Earlier he served in Ethiopian embassies 
in Monrovia, Cairo and Washington, D.C., becoming 
an ambassador in 1975 and heading the Department 
of Africa and Middle East Affairs in the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. He was the first Ethiopian ambassador to 
the Republic of Djibouti (1980-84) and 
then Permanent Representative to the 
UN in New York with concurrent accredi-
tation to Canada. In 1992 he moved to 
the UN and served in Cambodia, South 
Africa and Somalia. He was the Secre-
tary-General’s Special Envoy to Sierra 
Leone 1995-1997; Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for 
the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa 
1997-2002 and SRSG for Burundi 2002-
2004.
Having attained the rank of Under Sec-
retary-General in the UN, Commissioner 
Dinka represented the Secretary General in the Arusha 
negotiations on Burundi and the Lusaka negotiations 
to resolve the conflict in DR Congo.
Judge Gertrude Chawatama - Commissioner, Zambia
Commissioner Gertrude Chawatama is 
a Judge with the High Court of Zambia 
with over 19 years of professional judicial 
experience. Trained in Canada as a judicial 
educator, mediator and trainer of media-
tors, Judge Chawatama, holds a Bachelor 
of Law degree from the University of Lon-
don. Until her appointment to the Com-
mission and in her capacity as a Judge 
of the High Court of Zambia, Judge Cha-
watama’s duties included unlimited and 
original jurisdiction to hear and determine 
any civil and criminal proceedings under 
any law, supervision of any civil or criminal 
proceedings before any subordinate court 
or any court martial and making orders, is-
suing such writs and giving appropriate 
direction for the purpose of ensuring that 
justice is duly administered.
She was a Board member of the Com-
monwealth Judicial Education Institute 
based in Canada and a council member 
of the Commonwealth Magistrates and 
Judges Association for the East, Central 
and Southern African region, Judge Cha-
watama was also the Chairperson of the 
Juvenile Justice Forum in Zambia.
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Margaret Shava - Commissioner, Kenya
Professor Tom Ojienda - Commissioner, Kenya
A committed and accomplished profes-
sional, Commissioner Shava was educated 
in law and democracy in UK and has over 
17 years experience working in law, man-
agement and peacebuilding. An advocate 
of the High Court of Kenya, she has also 
practiced conveyancing and commercial 
law with a leading Nairobi law firm and 
excels in modern corporate and human re-
sources management. With her experience 
in the economic sectors as well as the UN 
and national & international NG0s special-
izing in human rights, governance and in-
ternational refugee law, she brings a very 
special set of skills to her task as Commissioner.
Regional Senior Programme Officer; 1998 – 2003 she 
served with UNHCR in Kenya, the Eastern Horn and Great 
Lakes Region; Geneva and Sudan, driving UNHCR’s core 
mandate of Protection, with regard to asylum seekers 
and refugees from the E. Horn and Central 
Africa. From 2002 she managed the Refu-
gee Status Determination (RSD) exercise 
for Eritrean refugees in Gedaref, North 
Eastern Sudan. Working with various hu-
man rights NGOs has honed her skills – 
she has facilitated civic education work-
shops, developed concept papers and 
been an observer in the 1997 Kenya Gen-
eral Elections. The Institute for Education 
in Democracy, FIDA-Kenya, a women’s 
NGO with UN observer status, and the Ed-
ucation Centre for Women in Democracy 
are among the NGOs she has consulted 
with. Also, while chairing Young Career Women (Kenya), 
affiliated to the International Federation of Business and 
Professional Women, Commissioner Shava spearheaded 
strategic planning of the organisation’s programmes, 
expanding their existing programme of educating girls 
from poor families.
Professor Ronald Slye - Commissioner, USA
Professor of Law in Seattle since 1997 with 
an honorary professorship at the Univer-
sity of the Witwatersrand, Commissioner 
Slye teaches, writes and consults on public 
international law and international human 
rights law. International criminal law is his 
special area of expertise, including legal 
responses to genocide and other mass 
atrocities especially tribunals and truth and 
reconciliation commissions.
Author of dozens of articles and book 
chapters on international law, human 
rights, environmental and poverty law and co-author of 
two books on international criminal law including the 
major textbook in the US, he previously 
served as a legal consultant to the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion 1996-2000. He is currently writing a 
book on that commission and its amnesty 
process.
Having studied and evaluated the re-
sponse to mass atrocities in South Africa 
and Cambodia, Commissioner Slye has 
advised the main repository of documents 
on the Khmer Rouge era, the Documenta-
tion Center of Cambodia, which was instru-
mental in creating the current tribunal that is prosecuting 
former members of that regime.
Commissioner Prof Tom Ojienda is a past 
President of the East African Law Society, 
past Chair of the Law Society of Kenya and 
Financial Secretary and Vice President of 
the Pan-African Lawyers Union (PALU). A 
Chevening Scholar, Ojienda obtained his 
LLB from the University of Nairobi, an LLM 
Degree from Kings College, and an LLD De-
gree from the University of South Africa. A 
seasoned lawyer and land expert, Ojienda 
was a consultant for both the Njonjo and 
Ndungu Land Commissions, and served as 
a member of the Legal and Technical Work-
ing Group in the National Land Policy formulation process.
Over the years, he has been involved in the civil society 
and advocacy networks of Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi 
and Mozambique and was part of a team of fi ve emi-
nent lawyers appointed by the Interna-
tional Bar Association on a mission to the 
DRC. Commissioner Ojienda chairs the 
Land Acquisition Compensation Tribunal, 
sits on the Council of Legal Education, the 
Board of the American Biographical Insti-
tute, the International Bar Association, the 
Kenya Industrial Property Institute and 
has previously chaired Legal Clinics at the 
School of Law, Moi University.
He has written two books on land law, one 
on the Law of the Sea and another on cor-
ruption. He has also edited two books on 
democracy and constitutional change. He has consulted 
for the World Bank, USAID, ACCORD and EAC and contin-
ues to consult in the area of land reform, human rights, 
gender and legal practice. 
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CEO, February 2011– August 2012
Tom Aziz Chavangi 
Director Legal Affairs, July 2010 – August 
2012/CEO, September 2012 – August 2013
Japhet Biegon
Director Research, April 2011– August 
2013
Godfrey Musila
Director Research, July – December 2010 
Juliana Mutisya
Director Finance and Administration, 
July 2010 – October 2013
George Balozi
Director Finance and Administration, 
October 2012 – August 2013
Stellamaris Muthoka
Director ICT and Documentation,
June 2011 – August 2013
Elijah Letangule 
Director Civic Education and Outreach,
 July 2010 - August 2013
Kathleen Openda 
Director Communications, 
June 2011 - August 2013
Nancy Kanyago 
Director Special Support Services, 
September – July 2012 
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Appendix 2
List of Regular Staff 
NAME Department Position Title
Abdirashid Abdinoor Finance/Administration Bodyguard
Abdulaziz Ali Farah Civic Education and Outreach Civic Education and Outreach Officer
Abel Wara Ochieng Finance/Administration Administration Officer
Alex Gitonga Finance/Administration Security Officer
Alfred Muthama Mutisya Investigations Investigator
Amanda Majisu Research Senior Researcher
Amina Adan Mohamud Investigations Investigator
Anthony Otiende Legal Legal Officer
Anthony Pendo Juma Finance/Administration Assistant Director, Administration
Aska Kemunto Birundu Finance/Administration Administration Assistant
Bellinda Akello Legal Legal Officer
Benard Kiplangat Koech Research Assistant, Research
Benjamin Wamalwa Finance/Administration Driver
Bernard Nyandoro Finance/Administration Bodyguard
Bernard Wachira Waheire Legal Human Rights Officer
Caroline Wambui Research Assistant, Research
Catherine Nambisia Finance/Administration Senior Personal Secretary, Chair
Charles Babu Karan Finance/Administration Regional Coordinator, Western and Nyanza
Cletus Muniafu Finance/Administration Driver
Dahir Abdi Adan Finance/Administration Security Officer
David G Mugo Investigations Investigator
David Olubonjo Ambuka Documentation and ICT ICT expert
Dennis Kiwanza Finance/Administration Bodyguard
Dorcas Njeri Kariuki Finance/Administration Receptionist
Elijah L. Letangule Civic Education and Outreach Director
Emily Wambui Kimani Legal Legal Officer
Eric Kiplangat Changwony Finance/Administration Driver
Esther Kiseu Finance/Administration Personal Secretary, Commissioners
Eunia Obonyo Finance/Administration Senior Personal Secretary, Directors
Evans Getenga Finance/Administration Security Officer
Evans Okeyo Investigations Investigator
Faith Ngugi Gitobu Finance/Administration Assistant , HR
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NAME Department Position Title
Felister Wairimu Mutitu Finance/Administration Accountant
Gladys Jeptoo Sitienei Finance/Administration Assistant, Accounts
Gladys Wairimu Mwariri Research Senior Researcher
Godfrey Musila Research Director
Godfrey Muyaya Finance/Administration Bodyguard
Hanney Yusuf Documentation and ICT Senior Clerical Officer, ICT
Immaculate Mulaku Finance/Administration Procurement Officer
Isaac Owuor Ochieng Finance/Administration Bodyguard
Jacqueline Chepkoech Investigations Investigator
James Ndaraiya Magenda Finance/Administration Assistant, Procurement
Jane Wekesa Finance/Administration Senior Personal Secretary,CEO
Japhet Biegon Research Director
Jennifer Kinuthia Documentation and ICT Records Management Assistant
John Kilonzo Mutuku Finance/Administration Senior Clerical Officer, Procurement
John Kiptoo Korir Finance/Administration Bodyguard
John Nguata Wairimu Finance/Administration Administration Assistant
Joseph Ikiroi Mugo Finance/Administration Driver
Joyce Bulimu Investigations Investigator
Judy Kirubi Finance/Administration Security Officer
Juliana N. Mutisya Finance/Administration Director
Julius Chepkwony Finance/Administration Security Officer
Justus Kasoa Finance/Administration Driver
Justus Ong'ondi Finance/Administration Driver
Kathleen Openda Communications Director
Kennedy O Ageji Finance/Administration Bodyguard
Kennedy O Ochieng Finance/Administration Driver
Kule Wario Finance/Administration Assistant Regional Coordinator, North and Upper Eastern
Lameck Omondi Finance/Administration Driver
Lucy Njoki Waigwa Special Support Special Support Officer, Victims and Witnesses
Lucy W Karanja Finance/Administration Personal Secretary, Commissioners
Lydia Mugure Mbaria Special Support Special Support Officer, Gender and 
Minorities
Macdonald Wandabwa Documentation and ICT Assistant Librarian
Martinella Leparmarai Finance/Administration Security Officer
Medline Murumba Finance/Administration Assistant Regional Coordinator, Nairobi, Central and Lower Eastern
Meshack Ambuso Finance/Administration Administration Assistant
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NAME Department Position Title
Michael J Onjiri Finance/Administration Driver
Mohamed Farah Finance/Administration Bodyguard
Mohammed Abdinoor Finance/Administration Regional Coordinator, North and Upper 
Eastern
Mohammed Babaa Finance/Administration Assistant Regional Coordinator, Coast
Mohammed Hussein Hassan Finance/Administration Driver
Muthoni Alice King'ang'i Documentation and ICT Hansard & Reports 
Nancy J. Komen Finance/Administration Receptionist
Nancy Kanyago Special Support Director
Nelly Gacheri Kamunde Research Senior Researcher
Nicholas Sarisar Finance/Administration Assistant Regional Coordinator, Rift Valley
Nkule Laibuta Finance/Administration Regional Coordinator, Nairobi, Central and 
Upper Eastern
Patricia Nyaundi CEO
Patrick Njue Muriithi Legal Legal Officer
Paul Riyes Tobiko Research Senior Researcher
Paul Rotich Finance/Administration Security Officer
Pauline Wanjiru Nyingi Internal Audit Internal Auditor
Peter Kimani Karanja Finance/Administration Driver
Phylis Nyaboke Finance/Administration Assistant, HR
Rahab Robi Chacha Finance/Administration Assistant Regional Coordinator, Western 
and Nyanza
Raphael Alango Nyina Finance/Administration Bodyguard
Rebecca Mutende Mutuku Special Support Special Support Officer, Victims and 
Witnesses
Reuben Kyalo Research Assistant, Research
Richard Chepsergon Finance/Administration Security Officer
Robert Grinstead Investigations Director
Robert Wafula Buke Civic Education and Outreach Civic Education and Outreach Officer
Rosalind Kimani Finance/Administration Chief Procurement Officer
Rosemary Nchinyei 
Paring'iro Communications Senior Public Communications Expert
Samuel Mulumbi Finance/Administration Chief of Security and Logistics
Samuel Owour Ogola Special Support Special Support Officer, Gender and 
Minorities
Shedho Liban Finance/Administration Accounts Assistant
Simon Njenga Legal Clerical Officer, Legal
Solomon Mbuthia Legal Legal
Sophia Mogire Finance/Administration Driver
Stella Muthoka Documentation and ICT Director
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NAME Department Position Title
Stephen Maroa Finance/Administration Driver
Sujata Sanjay Rane Documentation and ICT Data base manager
Susan Atieno Bala Finance/Administration Senior Clerical Officer, Kisumu Office
Sylvia Chidodo Finance/Administration Regional Coordinator, Coast
Symphorosa Oundo Research Assistant, Research
Teresia Mumbi Documentation and ICT Hansard
Timothy Njaaga Documentation and ICT Senior ICT Officer
Tom Aziz Chavangi Legal Commission Secreatry/CEO
Vincent Mutiso Finance/Administration Security Officer
Zaituni Abdi Finance/Administration Senior Clerical Officer, HR
Keli Kilungu Wambua Documentation and ICT Records management officer 
Osore Anziya Documentation and ICT  Librarian
Rita Mukami Kirimi Documentation and ICT Assistant Records Management officer
 Sharon Jepkemboi  Kamar Documentation and ICT Handard
Florence Okore Administration Office Assistant
Elijah N yairo bosire Documentation and ICT Hansard Editor
Goerge Balozi Finance/Administration Director
George Kayesi Administration Accounts Assistant
Dr Godrey Musila  Research UNIT Director Research
Davies Kelmen Investigations Investigator
Cledious Mikoma Administration Driver
Anna Kiprotich Administration Regional Coordinator Rift Valley
Diana Gombe Administration Assistant Director Human Resource
Julius Opala Administration Assistant Director,Finance
Suleiman Orang'o Administration Driver
Burje Juma Burje Administration Bodyguard
Michael Okuma Administration Driver
Carolene Kituku Research Assistant Researcher
Eric Ouma Adur Administration Support Staff
Jacinta K. Ruth Civic Education and Outreach Assistant Researcher
Alex Omondi Finance/Administration Driver
Rose Sabatia Finance/Administration Admin
Marvin Mutuku Finance/Administration Driver
Paul kaloki Finance/Administration Driver
Clara Rotich Research Investigator
Mildred Ngesa Communications Communications 
Benson oketch Finance/Administration Driver
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION164
Volume I    A P P E N D I C E S  
List of Interns and Data Entry Coders
NAME Department Position Title
Tabitha Njoka Communications Communication intern
Abdinassir Ogle Ahmed Legal Intern, Legal
Abdiwahab Abdirahman Documentation and ICT Coder
Alice Nyanganyi Nyaribo Documentation and ICT Records Management Intern
Amina Werar Documentation and ICT Data entry clerk
Angela Ayieko Documentation and ICT Data entry clerk
Boyani Abisage Documentation and ICT Data entry clerk
Christine Mwaniki Documentation and ICT Data entry clerk
Claire Anderson Research Intern
Claudia Hargaten Research Intern
Darleen Seda Research Intern
Diana Nalake Documentation and ICT Coder
Dinah Nkatha Documentation and ICT Hansard & Reports Intern
Elias Maroa Documentation and ICT Coder
Fatuma Ibrahim Legal Intern
Francis Kiilu Musyoka Documentation and ICT Coder
George Nsorani Documentation and ICT Coder
Gladys Mwaniki Documentation and ICT Coder
Irene Mwangi Communications Communications Intern
Jesse Masai Communications Communications Intern
Jilo Dika Documentation and ICT Coder
Kepha Owena Documentation and ICT Data entry clerk
Khoboso Dokhe Civic Education and Outreach Intern, Civic Education and Outreach
Leah Nyambeki Legal Intern, Legal
Leslie Hylton Research Intern
Marc Borg Research Intern
Martin Wanyonyi Legal Intern
Mayesha Alam Research Intern
Mercy Apiyo Were Communications Communications Intern
Muinde Kimuyu Documentation and ICT Data entry clerk
Pius Kamtia Documentation and ICT Coder
Rebecca Cook Research Intern
Shallyne Mwikali Documentation and ICT Data entry clerk
Steve Ogony Documentation and ICT Data entry clerk
Vanessa Mueni Mutunga Documentation and ICT Data entry clerk
Winfred Masinde Documentation and ICT Coder
Ignatius Walubuka Wanyonyi Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Grace Wanja Karanja Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Kelly Wekesa Watulo Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
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NAME Department Position Title
Leticia Njeri Wanyagi Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Rose Omuga Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Marigi Racheal Nduta Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Andrew Kyalo Kasemba Documentation and ICT Records management intern
Susan Mweyeria Mwangi Documentation and ICT Records management intern
Abraham Pkoror Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
David Okute Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Edwin siocha Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Mohammed Dow Legal Intern, Legal
Patrick Kiptoo Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Rachel Muya Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Titus Toroitich Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Lucy Nkatha Legal Intern
Damaris Wambui Documentation and ICT Intern
Desmond Otwal Documentation and ICT Data Clerk
Edger Omondi Documentation and ICT Hansard Intern
Pascal Mwithaga Documentation and ICT Data entry clerk
Elizabeth K. Kioko Administration Intern Human Resource
Maureen Chebet Saina Research Intern
Enoch Otiria Obuolo Research Intern
Patricia K. Kinoti Special Support Intern
Johnstone Cheruiyot Research Intern
Abdullahi Abdinoor Research Intern
Georgina  wabwire Research Intern
List of Consultants and Resource Persons
1. Abraham Waithima 
2. Amriptal Kalsi
3. Center for Minority Rights Development 
(CEMIRIDE)
4. Chacha Berata
5. Connie Mumma 
6. Emmanuel Sayiorri
7. Evelyne Asaala
8. George Mukundi 




13. Jane Kiragu 
14. Jarso Forole




19. Lilian Bogonko 
20. Mercy Kaburu
21. Morris Mbondenyi 
22. Onesmus Masinde
23. Patrick Musembi 




28. Sarah Kinyanjui 
29. Syagga & Associates Ltd 
30. The Consulting House (TCH)
31. Walter Oyugi
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Appendix 3
Audited Statement of Financial Position
for the Years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012
ASSETS 2011-2012     2010-2011 (Restated) 2010-2011
Non-Current Assets
Plant and Equipment 22,158,067.19              22,572,106.31      15,922,556 
Current Assets
Inventories 2,728,918.95                9,454,103.93        9,454,104 
Accounts receivable 2,008,191.75              23,887,719.14      23,887,719 
Prepayments 333,772.80                   253,483.00           253,483 
Cash and Cash Equivalents 109,127,713.87            208,155,155.12    208,155,155 
Total Assets 136,356,664.56            264,322,567.50    257,673,017 
FUND BALANCE AND LIABILITIES
Deferred Income                                  -        4,954,318 
Net Income  136,356,662.39            255,755,444.85    244,151,577 
Total Funds   136,356,662.39            255,755,444.85    249,105,895 
Non-Current Liabilities
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable                        -                8,567,122.17        8,567,122 
Total Liabilities                        -                8,567,122.17        8,567,122 
Total Fund Balance and 
liabilities   136,356,662.39            264,322,567.02    257,673,017 
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Audited Statement of Comprehensive Income 
for the Years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012
KSHS KSHS KSHS
REVENUE  2011-2012 2010-2011 (Restated) 2010-2011 
Exchequer Contribution     527,000,000.00   650,000,000.00    650,000,000.00 
Other Income         8,711,447.25          674,000.00           674,000.00 
Total Income/Revenue     535,711,447.25   650,674,000.00    650,674,000.00 
Operating Expenses
Wages, salaries and employee 
Benefits     168,616,761.69 174,813,632.77    174,813,632.77 
Depreciation Equipment         7,672,184.12 7,736,996.04        7,007,048.82 
Communication, Supplies & 
serv       10,280,590.50 8,471,191.88 8,471,191.88
Domestic travel & other trans       72,728,787.81 25,334,527.79 25,334,527.79
Foreign Travel & subsistence         7,883,758.25 2,006,771.01 2,006,771.01
Printing, Information Supplies       56,463,557.99 38,981,899.33 38,981,899.33
Rentals of produced Assets       90,397,468.51 58,560,656.20 58,560,656.20
Training expenses and 
capacity building                        - 2,313,040.00 2,313,040.00
Hospitality supplies & service       36,519,835.19 18,909,132.20 18,909,132.20
Insurance cost       19,203,276.75 15,615,631.97 15,615,631.97
Specialised materials and 
Supp         4,004,369.00 8,738,259.00 8,738,259.00
Office & Gen Supplies       10,511,229.04 1,366,734.50 3,931,194.85
Fuel, Oil & Lubricants       16,434,087.38 8,478,296.28 8,478,296.28
Other operating expenses       78,358,230.17 30,261,743.20 30,261,743.20
Maintenance exp- motor 
vehicles         2,389,701.94 2,215,540.00 2,215,540.00
Routine maintenance-others         6,199,036.27 883,858.00 883,858.00
Government Pensions and Benefits       67,447,355.10 0
Total expenses     655,110,229.71 404,687,910.17 406,522,423.30
Surplus from operating 
activities     (119,398,782.46)  245,986,089.83   244,151,576.70 
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Cash Flow Statement 
For the Years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012
KSHS KSHS KSHS
REVENUE  2011-2012 2010-2011 (Restated) 2010-2011 
Exchequer Contribution     527,000,000.00   650,000,000.00    650,000,000.00 
Other Income         8,711,447.25          674,000.00           674,000.00 
Total Income/Revenue     535,711,447.25   650,674,000.00    650,674,000.00 
Operating Expenses
Wages, salaries and employee 
Benefits     168,616,761.69 174,813,632.77    174,813,632.77 
Depreciation Equipment         7,672,184.12 7,736,996.04        7,007,048.82 
Communication, Supplies & 
serv       10,280,590.50 8,471,191.88 8,471,191.88
Domestic travel & other trans       72,728,787.81 25,334,527.79 25,334,527.79
Foreign Travel & subsistence         7,883,758.25 2,006,771.01 2,006,771.01
Printing, Information Supplies       56,463,557.99 38,981,899.33 38,981,899.33
Rentals of produced Assets       90,397,468.51 58,560,656.20 58,560,656.20
Training expenses and capacity 
building                        - 2,313,040.00 2,313,040.00
Hospitality supplies & service       36,519,835.19 18,909,132.20 18,909,132.20
Insurance cost       19,203,276.75 15,615,631.97 15,615,631.97
Specialised materials and Supp         4,004,369.00 8,738,259.00 8,738,259.00
Office & Gen Supplies       10,511,229.04 1,366,734.50 3,931,194.85
Fuel, Oil & Lubricants       16,434,087.38 8,478,296.28 8,478,296.28
Other operating expenses       78,358,230.17 30,261,743.20 30,261,743.20
Maintenance exp- motor 
vehicles         2,389,701.94 2,215,540.00 2,215,540.00
Routine maintenance-others         6,199,036.27 883,858.00 883,858.00
Government Pensions and Benefits       67,447,355.10 0
Total expenses     655,110,229.71 404,687,910.17 406,522,423.30
Surplus from operating 
activities     (119,398,782.46)  245,986,089.83   244,151,576.70 
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STATEMENT FORM
S T A T E M E N T
concerning
GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The aim of this STATEMENT FORM is to gather as much information as possible about the gross 
violations of human rights (GVHR) suffered by individuals in various contexts in Kenya between 12 
December 1963 and 28 February 2008. In terms of section 6 of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission Act (2008), gross human rights violations are: 
1. Violations of fundamental. human rights, including acts of torture, extra judicial killings, 
abduction and severe ill-treatment cruel treatment) of any person; imprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty (prolonged imprisonment);
2. Rape or any other form of sexual violence, including defilement, sodomy.
3. Enforced disappearance of persons, including arrest, detention or abduction of persons by state 
agents, or with the authorization, support of the State;
4. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious or gender 
5. Economic Crimes, including fraudulent or unlawful acquisition, disposal, mortgaging, 
charging or damage of public property; tax evasion; offences related to tenders and improper 
procurement; 
6. illegal and irregular acquisition of public land; exploitation of natural or public resources
7. Economic crimes especially grand corruption, including bribery; fraud; embezzlement or 
misappropriation of public funds; abuse of office; breach of trust 
8. Economic marginalisation of communities; Multiple and systematic violations of the right to 
education, health, property (land)
9. Crimes against humanity
10. Any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command, procurement to commit an act 
referred to in (1) and (3) above, and was advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered, by 
any person acting with a political motive.
Appendix 4
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If you have experienced or have knowledge of Gross Violations of Human Rights committed between 
12 December 1963 and 28 February 2008, please complete this statement. Thank you for sharing your 
painful experience with the TJRC. Your contribution will help our country come to terms with the past. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE TJRC:
The objectives of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission are:
•	 Establish a complete historical record of gross human rights violations and past injustices, 
including causes, nature and extent
•	 to restore the dignity of victims/survivors by providing a forum to tell their stories and 
recommending ways and means of redress for them
•	 provide a forum for perpetrators to tell their stories and to create possibilities for national 
reconciliation
•	 Recommend prosecutions of perpetrators as well as amnesty in appropriate cases 
IMPORTANT THINGS TO NOTE:
•	 You are entitled to legal representation at your own cost, both while completing this statement 
and/or when testifying in a possible public hearing. If you require legal aid contact the secretariat 
for information on organisations that offer legal aid.
•	  If you make a false statement willingly and knowingly you could be prosecuted. 
•	 If you complete this statement by yourself, please post (or hand deliver) to the TJRC Offices 
in Nairobi:  
•	 Please attach copies of additional documents (for example, copy of ID, newspaper clippings, 
doctor’s reports, etc.). Do not surrender original documents except at the request of the 
Commission.
•	 Please put your initials (sign) at the bottom of every page of your statement. 
•	 By submitting this statement to the TJRC, your name may appear in the final report of the 
Commission; perpetrators may be informed of any allegations you make; and your medical, 
legal and other records may be made available to the Commission. 
•	 Experience shows that some people, especially women, testify about violations of human rights 
that happened to family members or friends, but they are less willing to speak of their own 
suffering. Please don’t forget to tell us what happened to you yourself if you were the victim of 
a gross human rights abuse.
•	 The Commission is concerned and is committed to the security of all persons that give 
statements. Kindly communicate to the commission your concerns on security at the earliest 
possible opportunity.
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Declaration
I, .......................................................................................................................... solemnly declare that the 
information I am about to give the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, is true and correct to the best 
of my knowledge, information and belief.
Signature / Finger Print / Mark      Date
Witness signature  (can be Statement Taker, or any other person)
Would you be prepared to testify during one of the Commission’s hearings? YES / NO [circle]
If yes, would you prefer to appear in a public or private (in camera) hearing? PUBLIC / PRIVATE [circle]
Do you feel you would be endangered by giving testimony at a hearing? YES  /  NO [circle]
Do you have any disability? YES   / NO
If yes, describe? ..........................................................................................................................
Which language would you prefer to use at the hearing? …………...........................................
Details of the person HELPING to fill in the statement
Please fill in this section if somebody is helping you to make the statement.
Full name of person helping: ………………….................………………………………….




Signature of helper: ........................................................................ Date: .............................. 
1. DETAILS OF STATEMENT GIVER
Surname: ……………………………….… Title: ………………………
(for example, Mr., Ms., Mrs., Dr., Prof.)
First Names: ..............................................................................................
Other names: ............................................................................................ 
(for example, clan names, code names, pseudonyms, nicknames, aliases) 
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Identification: National ID, Passport or Driving Licence, Refugee ID Number: …………………………….
Date of birth: (age)…………………………………Sex: Male / Female [circle]
Citizenship: ............................................................
Contact Address:








What is the best and easiest way the TJRC can contact you in future? 
(Could be the same address as above or could be a friend or relative with whom there is regular contact)
Name of Contact person: (if relevant) ………………………………………………
Contact address: ……………………………………………………………
Contact telephone (include code if landline): ………………………………… 
2. WHOSE STORY ARE YOU GOING TO TELL THE COMMISSION?
Are you going to tell the Commission about what happened to you? YES / NO [circle]. If NO, indicate your 
relationship with the victim(s).
....................................................................................................................................................
Give reason(s) why victim cannot record his/her own statement (eg she is dead; very old; displaced; sick etc)
………………………………………………………………………………………………….
3. DETAILS OF VICTIM(S) (If statement giver is the Victim, there is no need to repeat details here)
If statement is on behalf of a family or group, provide details of the head of family/group then list the rest in 
the space provided.
Surname: ………….…………………….… Title: ………………………
(for example, Mr., Ms., Mrs., Dr., Prof.)
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First Name(s): ………………………………………...
Identification: National ID, Passport or Driving Licence: …………………………….
Date of birth: (age)…………………………………Sex: Male Female [Circle]
Relationship to maker of statement: ................................................................ (eg son, mother, aunt, mother)
Occupation at time of violation: .......................................................................
Contact Address:
Postal Address: (P.O Box and Postal Code)
................................................................................................................................................................................
Physical address [Estate/Village)
Province:      Location: 
District:      Sub-Location: 
Mobile or Telephone No (of victim):   Email: 
LIST more victims if any:
4.  PLEASE PROVIDE SPECIFIC DETAIL ON VIOLATIONS
In this section, provide all the relevant information needed by the TJRC concerning the specific gross human 
rights violations. The Commission may use information to make findings, so provide as much verifiable detail 
as possible when responding to questions 
Please mark the boxes below relating to which violation(s) were suffered, and then turn to the sections that 
follow and answer the questions with as much detail as you can. 
The table below provides a list and brief description of the different types of gross human rights violations as 
defined by the Act. You are requested to: 
•	 indicate which categories are relevant to your experience by marking a cross (X) in the appropriate box. 
If you have experienced more than one type or category of violation please indicate this by putting a cross 
(X) in the appropriate boxes. 
•	 If your experience does not fit exactly into any one of the types/categories of violations listed below, please 
use the ADDITIONAL PAGES at the end of this form to write down your story. 
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5.1 GROSS VIOLATIONS (Mark with an X)
LIST OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
Extra Judicial Killing/Murder
The person died as a result of a violation(s) (for example, shot by police at a political funeral, 
died as a result of torture in detention). 
 
Serious Injury or Severe Ill-Treatment 
Does not result in death. Examples include bombings, shootings, stabbings, burnings, sexual 
abuse, attempted killings. These may have occurred in demonstrations, political conflict between 
groups, armed combat, castration etc. 
 
Torture 
Systematic and intentional abuse with a particular purpose, for example, to get information, 
intimidation, or punishment. This happens in captivity or custody by the state or other groups. 
The person, however, survived the ordeal. 
 
Abduction or Disappearance by state agents
There is evidence that someone was taken away forcibly and illegally, or the person vanished 
mysteriously and was never seen again. 
 
Prolonged detention/severe deprivation of liberty
This relates to unlawful detentions: detention without trial, deprivation of liberty beyond legal 
sanction
Rape and other sexual violence, including defilement and sodomy
Violations related to Administration of Justice
Including discrimination, denial of access, prolonged legal process, lost files
Persecution/ Discriminatory denial of basic rights 
Against any group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender
LIST OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Economic Crimes
Including fraudulent or unlawful acquisition, disposal, mortgaging, charging or damage of 
public property (including money); tax evasion; serious offences related to tenders and improper 
procurement
Grand corruption
Including bribery; fraud; embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds; abuse of office; 
breach of trust; offences related to procurement and tendering 
Multiple and systematic violations of the right to property (land)
Including forced removal (evictions), title violations, non-compensation, illegal and irregular 
acquisition/allocation of land 
Multiple and systematic violations of the right to education
Including systematic discrimination as well as legal, policy and administrative obstacles
Multiple and systematic violations of the right to health
Including failure to access emergency services; allocation of resources and distribution of centres
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Employment
Systematic discrimination in access to employment, discriminatory use of minimum requirement 
in recruitment
 
5.2 EVENT(S)/INCIDENT(S) (VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS)
In this part, the Commission would like to obtain the following information with respect to specific violations 
and incidents related to Civil and Political Rights:
What happened? Who was affected and How? When did it happen? Where did it happen? Who did it? Why did 
it happen, how did it happen? Were there any witnesses? Do you have any documentation?
To whom did it happen? 
Name of Victim(s): 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
VIOLATION 1 (from the list of CPRs above): 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
When  did it happen? Date and time of violation: 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Where did it happen? Place/location of violation (give as much detail as possible including town, area, 
building as is  relevant): 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Please describe how violation occurred (e.g. how the person was killed or tortured. Include details of what 





Reason for violation? ..................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................Was there any 
investigation, inquiry, post-mortem or inquest, court case, intervention by elders? Etc If yes, what was the 
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outcome? (for example, did a doctor examine the victim or, body? Did you find out how the person was killed, 
tortured etc? Did you go to court to find out what happened? Was anybody found responsible for the death?)
...............................................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Did this violation affect other people you know? Members of the community?  If yes, please provide list here.
...............................................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES
Describe briefly the situation at the time of each incident (of alleged violations). 
(for example, Shifta War (Wagalla massacre); Burnt Forest violence (1993); Mt Elgon violence 
(police operation, SLDF attack etc); there was a demonstration, political rally during, police 
disarmament, floods, strike or stay-away; Kikambala evictions (1997), elections (1992); voting 









Is the perpetrator(s) known? Known / Unknown [Circle]
Can you identify the perpetrator(s) in any way? Give names, rank and title, and physical description:
(for example; Mr. Mrefu, OCS Milimani; four masked men; a big man with a scar called Jichopevu; Mr Soja, 
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Do you think they were state agents/officials or private citizens? State agent / private citizen [circle]
...............................................................................................................................................................................
How do you know who he was/who they were? (for example. I saw them; my neighbour told me; there was a 
court case; they drove a government ca, I know the registration number; I saw him wearing the same shirt two 
days later; he threatened me or bragged about his actions a week after the event )
...............................................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Can you specify who did what? Who was in charge? Who gave orders, if any? Who was with him/her/them? 






Where and when did you last see the perpetrator(s)? 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Do you know where the perpetrator(s) live or operates from? 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Would you like to meet the perpetrator(s)? ..........................................................................................................
WITNESSES
Is there anyone else who knows what happened to you or the alleged victim either before, during or after the 
violation?
If yes; please answer the following questions as fully as possible.
Name......................................................................................................................................................................
Contact Address and Telephone Number: 
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What did each of the witnesses see, hear or do? (e.g. he/she was at the scene, she heard screams from the 
adjoining room, Mwendapole witnessed the event, Daktari treated me when I went to hospital; Nguvuyetu 





VIOLATION 2 (from the list of CPRs above): 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
When  did it happen? Date and time of violation: 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Where did it happen? Place/location of violation (give as much detail as possible including town, area, 





Please describe how violation occurred (e.g. how the person was killed or tortured. Include details of what 
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Was there any investigation, inquiry, post-mortem or inquest, court case, intervention by elders? Etc If 
yes, what was the outcome? (for example, did a doctor examine the victim or, body? Did you find out how 
the person was killed, tortured etc? Did you go to court to find out what happened? Was anybody found 
responsible for the death?)
...............................................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................





CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES
Describe briefly the situation at the time of each incident (of alleged violations). 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
(for example, Shifta War (Wagalla massacre); Burnt Forest violence (1993); Mt Elgon violence (police 
operation, SLDF attack etc); there was a demonstration, political rally during , police disarmament, floods, 
strike or stay-away; Kikambala evictions (1997), elections (1992); voting day; natural disaster, stay-away; 
boycott; march; political rally; existing laws etc.)




Is the perpetrator(s) known? Known / Unknown [Circle]
Can you identify the perpetrator(s) in any way? Give names, rank and title, and physical description:
(for example; Mr. Mrefu, OCS Milimani; four masked men; a big man with a scar called Jichopevu; Mr Soja, 
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Do you think they were state agents/officials or private citizens? State agent / private citizen [circle]
...............................................................................................................................................................................
How do you know who he was/who they were? (for example. I saw them; my neighbour told me; there was a 
court case; they drove a government ca, I know the registration number; I saw him wearing the same shirt two 
days later; he threatened me or bragged about his actions a week after the event )
...............................................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Can you specify who did what? Who was in charge? Who gave orders, if any? Who was with him/her/them? 






Where and when did you last see the perpetrator(s)? 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Do you know where the perpetrator(s) live or operates from? 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Would you like to meet the perpetrator(s)? ..........................................................................................................
WITNESSES
Is there anyone else who knows what happened to you or the alleged victim either before, during or after the 
violation?
If yes; please answer the following questions as fully as possible.
Name......................................................................................................................................................................
Contact Address and Telephone Number: 
What did each of the witnesses see, hear or do? (e.g. he/she was at the scene, she heard screams from the 
adjoining room, Mwendapole witnessed the event, Daktari treated me when I went to hospital; Nguvuyetu 
rescued me from etc)
...............................................................................................................................................................................
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5.3  VIOLATIONS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
In this part, the Commission would like to obtain the following information with respect to specific violations 
and incidents related to Socio-Economic Rights: (Land; grand corruption; economic crimes; education; health; 
access to employment): 
VIOLATION 1 (from list of SERs above)
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Name of Victim: ..................................................................................................................................................
When did it happen? Date and time of violation? 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Where did the violation happen? Place/location of violation (give as much detail as possible including 





Please describe how violation occurred (eg were forcibly evicted/removed by armed youth; Mr Mkonomrefu, 
the CDF manager used CDF money allocated for clinic to build his own house; children constantly fall ill in 





Reason for violation? (eg Mpenda Vitu said the land was his; they said we don’t belong there; Mkubwa 
wanted to employ his own people; we had no ability of questioning the use of LATF or CDF money)
...............................................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
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.Is it a continuing violation? (Eg you are still a squatter, an IDP, yet to get justice; the stolen money is yet to 





Was there any investigation, inquiry, court case, intervention by elders? ETC If yes, what was the outcome? 
(for example, was the matter reported to Anti Corruption Commission, Department of Lands, police?  Did 
you go to court over ownership of the land? Was the alleged discrimination reported to the Education Officer 





Did this violation affect other people you know? Members of the community? (note that violations relating 
to land, education, health, grand corruption, systematic discrimination tend to affect communities and groups 






CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES
Describe briefly the situation at the time of each incident (of alleged violations) 
(for example, Shifta War; Company XY acquiring land; XX Settlement Scheme; I went to the public office 
to process XX document for my daughter; Structural Adjustment Program; Airport/Airtrip expansion; Burnt 
Forest violence (1993); Mt Elgon violence (police operation, SLDF attack etc);  floods;  Kikambala evictions 
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PERPETRATOR(S)
Is the perpetrator(s) known? Known / Unknown [Circle]
Can you identify the perpetrator(s) in any way? Give names, rank and title, and physical description(for 






How do you know he was/who they were? (for example. I saw them; my neighbour told me; there was a 










Can you specify who did what? Who was in charge? Who gave orders, if any? Who was with him/her/them? 
(for example, Mr. Mwenyenguvu led the eviction exercise; a band of youths burnt our houses and destroyed our 





Where and when did you last see the perpetrator(s)? ...........................................................................................
Do you know where the perpetrator(s) live or operate from? 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
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Would you like to meet the perpetrator(s)? ..........................................................................................................
WITNESSES
Is there anyone else who knows what happened to you or the alleged victim either before, during or after the 
violation?
If yes; please answer the following questions as fully as possible.
Name......................................................................................................................................................................
Contact Address and Telephone Number: 
...............................................................................................................................................................................
What did each of the witness see, hear or do?.......................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
VIOLATION 2 (from list of SERs above)
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Name of Victim:....................................................................................................................................................
When did it happen? Date and time of violation?
...............................................................................................................................................................................
Where did the violation happen? Place/location of violation (give as much detail as possible including 





Please describe how violation occurred (eg were forcibly evicted/removed by armed youth; Mr Mkonomrefu, 
the CDF manager used CDF money allocated for clinic to build his own house; children constantly fall ill in 
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Reason for violation? (eg Mpenda Vitu said the land was his; they said we don’t belong there; Mkubwa 





Is it a continuing violation? (Eg you are still a squatter, an IDP, yet to get justice; the stolen money is yet to 





Was there any investigation, inquiry, court case, intervention by elders? ETC If yes, what was the outcome? 
(for example, was the matter reported to Anti Corruption Commission, Department of Lands, police?  Did 
you go to court over ownership of the land? Was the alleged discrimination reported to the Education Officer 





Did this violation affect other people you know? Members of the community? (note that violations relating 
to land, education, health, grand corruption, systematic discrimination tend to affect communities and groups 






CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES
Describe briefly the situation at the time of each incident (of alleged violations) 
(for example, Shifta War; Company XY acquiring land; XX Settlement Scheme; I went to the public office to 
process XX document for my daughter; Structural Adjustment Program; Airport/Airtrip expansion; Burnt Forest 
violence (1993); Mt Elgon violence (police operation, SLDF attack etc);  floods;  Kikambala evictions (1997), 
elections (1992); natural disaster)
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Is the perpetrator(s) known? Known / Unknown [Circle]
Can you identify the perpetrator(s) in any way? Give names, rank and title, and physical description(for 






How do you know he was/who they were? (for example. I saw them; my neighbour told me; there was a 










Can you specify who did what? Who was in charge? Who gave orders, if any? Who was with him/her/them? 
(for example, Mr. Mwenyenguvu led the eviction exercise; a band of youths burnt our houses and destroyed 




Where and when did you last see the perpetrator(s)? ...........................................................................................
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Do you know where the perpetrator(s) live or operate from? 
..............................................................................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................................................................
Would you like to meet the perpetrator(s)? .........................................................................................................
WITNESSES
Is there anyone else who knows what happened to you or the alleged victim either before, during or after the 
violation?
If yes; please answer the following questions as fully as possible.
Name.....................................................................................................................................................................








6. CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXPERIENCES 
The following questions are specific to the victim who experienced the violation.
6.1  What was the harm suffered? (E.g. if the violation(s) caused permanent physical injury, please describe the 
injury, details of loss; we lost a bread winner; there is high mortality rate; majority of youth are uneducated 




6.2  Were any steps taken to address the harm suffered ( e.g.what treatment did the victim get for the injury?) 
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6.3 Any other harm suffered e.g. psychological, emotional, change of behaviour etc (eg I am constantly 
depressed; I need constant counselling; he is depressed all the time; she feels like dying; I am always angry; 




6.4 Describe any other effects of the violation(s) (e.g. displacement;  we depend on aid from well wishers; I lost 




6.5 Please explain how the victim coped with the suffering/these effects: (for example, did somebody help you 
deal with the pain of the event? Did you see a therapist or your priest, or a traditional healer? community 




6.6 Did the violation affect relationships with friends, family, partner or children? (for example, we are no 
longer on talking terms with our neighbours; we don’t mix with outsiders anymore; I have lost contact with 





6.7 How did the violation affect the health, education, accommodation, finances of the victim’s family and 
what is the current status? 
6.9.1 Health  (for example, since the death of my daughter, we have been suffering from depression; I was 
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6.9.2 Education (for example, since my husband died, my son had to leave school to earn money; our school 





6.9.3 Accommodation (for example, since my son died, we are living in this shack; we are still squatters; 






(for example, before I was imprisoned/tortured/lost my land, I was able to work and take care of my family, 







An important part of the TJRC’s proposals to the government will be about reparations including symbolic acts 
(targeting individuals and communities) which will help us remember the past, honour the dead, acknowledge 
the victims and their families and further the cause of reconciliation. 
Please give us your opinion on what should be done:
7.1 For individuals: (for example compensation; prosecution identification of perpetrators; exhumation and 
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7.2 For the Community: (for example, a peace park; build a school; exhumation and proper burial of the 





7.3 For the Nation: (for example, monuments; recovery of stolen funds; prosecution; apology; legal and 






Have you already made one or more statements about this incident? YES NO [circle]
If yes, please specify:
To WHOM statement was 
made?





CONTACT details / 
person
(for example, the Chief, DO, 
Mrs Haki tel.......................... 
Action taken
(for example court case 
filed)
What legal action did you, the victim or representatives take? Please give dates and the name of the lawyers, 
court case details etc (for example, did you report to the authorities? was there a court case about the violation? 
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What was the result?
...............................................................................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................
If no action was taken, why? (eg I did not have money to file a case; the Chief refused to act; Mwenyenguvu 





Do you have any documents that will help the Commission understand the situation and experience you have 
described? YES NO [Circle]
(for example, Doctor’s Certificate, Membership card, Diary, Newspaper clippings, Legal Documents, Post-
Mortem report, Hospital records, Police records, Court records, Title Deeds, Allotment Letters, Receipts etc).
Type of 
Document 
Doc. No/ Title No/
Serial No/Ref No.
Attached YES/NO Where is this 
document at the 






No At home can be availed on 
request
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CHECK LIST FOR STATEMENT TAKER
This page is to help check that the statement has been completed as fully as possible.
YES/NO OTHER COMMENTS
Were all the questions either asked or considered?   
Is the DECLARATION signed?   
Is the RELEASE FORM signed?   
Are all the relevant pages (including the additional pages 
used) initialled? 
  
Are relevant DOCUMENTS (at section 9) attached?
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
To be completed by ALL Statement Takers 
Full Name of Statement Taker:................................................................................................................ 
Signature of Statement Taker: ................................................................................
Date of Interview: .................../............... /................................................... (day / month / year ) 
Name of Victim: …………………………………………...........................………
Place and Town of Interview: ..................................................................................................................
Language of Interview: ..............................................................................................................................
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I, ………………..………………………………………….... (name of person giving permission 
hereby grant permission for the Investigation Unit of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
to obtain copies of all documents, including medico-legal records related to my case/the case 
of............................................................................................................................(name of victim)  who is 
..........................................................................................., (relationship to victim, for example, myself, my son, 
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Appendix 5
Children Statement
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Details of Statement Giver: 
Surname:             
First Names:         
Other Names:        
Date of Birth:              Sex: Male [      ]             Female  [      ] 
Do you know if you were born at home or at hospital?                    
Place of birth (district):              
Place of living (district and location):                       
 
Who do you trust or who would you like to be present as you give your statement?     
Name the person and their relationship with you:           
 
Best way for TJRC to contact you:  [    ] Phone [    ] E-mail [    ] Postal address [    ] Contact person  


























2. Current Status  
a. You live with your: Father [      ] Mother [      ] Both [      ] Other            
If you do not, live with your parents, why?             
 
b. Do you have siblings (brothers, sisters) Yes [      ]  No [      ]              
    Do you all live together?                        Yes [      ]           No [      ]              
 
c. There are lots of ways that people are different from each other. Some can’t hear, some find it  
difficult to learn at school, do you experience similar incidents like this, for example like  
physical restrictions that you feel like make you different from others?  Yes [      ]             No   [      ]              
If yes, describe         
  
 
d. Are you in school?  Yes [      ] No   [      ]     
     If yes, name school and class:               
      If no, state why:             
e. Are there days during the week, other than weekends, when you don’t go to school?            
    Yes [      ]             No   [      ]                         
 If so, why?              
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d. Is there anything that happened to you that that would you like to tell us in regard to the work of the 
Commission?    
  
  
e. When did this happen?   
f. Where did it happen?_____________________________________________________________________  
g. Would you like to illustrate this with the help of a drawing? Yes [      ]  No [      ]              
h. How do you feel when you think about it (angry, sad, afraid etc.)?  __________________________________ 
i.  Can you describe the person who did this? ____________________________________________________ 
j.  Has something like this happened to you before? Yes  [      ] No [      ]    
k. Did you or others tell anyone about it? Yes  [      ]         No [      ]              




4. Type of Violation 
a. Do you have water in your home? Yes [      ]  No [      ]    In your school?  Yes [      ]No [      ]                   
b. If yes, how frequent, is the water clean? 
    If not, where do you get water from?    
c. Do you fetch the water? Yes [      ] No [      ]            Other _____________________________ 
    If you fetch the water, at what time do you do so: mornings [       ]; afternoon [          ]; evenings [       ] 
d. Do you have to go far to fetch water?        
Explain______________________________________________________________________________ 
c. When you get sick, do you get treatment?      Yes [      ]       No [      ]                                                                           
If yes, where do you get treatment?                                                                                                                   
Is it free or there is some payment?        
If you are not able to get treated, why?      
 5.  Capability & Type of Violation 
a. Have you ever heard about the Truth Commission?               Yes [      ]       No [      ]                                                                                                                                                     
b. Can you tell us, what you know about the Truth Commission?          
                                                                                                                     
c. What do you think the Commission does?         
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 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)                                               Statement Form for Children 
 
4 
l.  Were there other people affected/violated?  If yes please explain : 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
m. Did you notice any changes in your life, after this happened (health, school, home, family or friends)? 
       
 
n. Are you in a position to tell others (maybe the Commissioners) what happened to you? Yes [      ]  No [      ]              
o. Has something like this happened to any other child that you know? Yes [      ]           No [      ]              
p. Who else may have seen what happened to you?        
8. Expectations 
a) W
hat do you think should/could the Commission do for you in respect to the violation?         
  
b) I
s there anything else you would like to share with us?         
  




 STATEMENT TAKER 
 What was your impression of the child?          
               
Is the child traumatized?                                                                                     Yes [      ]           No [      ]              
Does the child have any visible injuries?                                                           Yes [      ]           No [      ]              





Name:      -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ID:       -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Date and Signature:   -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Telephone number:    -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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8th April, 2011
Gazette Notice 3930 of 2011
THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION ACT
(No. 6 of 2008)
 
THE TRUTH JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION (HEARING PROCEDURE) RULES
PURSUANT to section 29 of the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Act, 2008, the Truth Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission makes the following Rules to govern the 
procedure at its hearings:
1. These Rules may be cited as the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation (Hearing Procedure) Rules.
2. These Rules shall come into force on the date of 
publication in the Gazette.
3. In the Rules, unless the Context otherwise requires—
“Act” means the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act, 
2008;
“Commission counsel” means counsel appointed by the 
Commissioners to assist the Commissioners;
“Commission offices” means the headquarters of the 
Commission located in Nairobi and any other office that the 
Commission may designate as its office either generally or for 
a particular purpose;
“Commission staff” means staff hired by the Commission 
or with the authority of the Commission are performing 
functions of the Commission;
“document” means any record made or stored in physical 
or electronic form and include written, electronic, audiotape, 
videotape, digital reproductions, photography, maps, graphs, 
microfiche or any other data and information recorded or 
shared by means of any device;
“interested person” includes participant, party or witness
“participant” means any person or organization who is 
given the right by the Commission to participate in hearings 
held by the Commission;
“person” means a natural person;
“witness” means all persons and organizations giving 
evidence or testifying before the TJRC, including survivors, 
victims, experts and perpetrators;
“organization” means any group, institution, government 
or agency or other representative entity that is not a natural 
person;
“party” means a person granted full or partial standing as a 
party by the Commissioners.
4. The Commission shall conduct the following types of 
hearings—
(a) individual hearings, which shall focus on individual 
cases, and the experience of individuals relating to 
violations being investigated by the Commission.
(b) institutional hearings, which shall focus on the role 
played by an institution or institutions relating to 
violations being investigated by the Commission.
(c) thematic hearings, which shall focus on types of 
violations and other broad themes relating to the 
mandate of the Commission.
5. (1) Subject to the Act, the conduct of and the procedure to 
be followed during the hearings shall be under the control and 
discretion of the Commission.
(2) The Commission shall sit on such days, at such times 
and venue, as it may determine and shall conduct its hearings 
in accordance with these rules.
Appendix 6
Gazette Notice
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 199
Volume  I    A P P E N D I C E S 
6. (1) The languages of the Commission shall be Kiswahili 
or English.
(2) The Commission shall, taking into account all the 
circumstances, provide competent interpreters for spoken or 
sign language, as the case may be, for parties or witnesses 
appearing before it.
7. (1) Any person or organization wishing to participate in 
the hearings shall make an application in the prescribed form 
to the Commission at least fourteen days before the date of the 
hearing they wish to participate in:
Provided that the Commission may where the circumstances 
of any particular case demand, allow an application to be 
made within a shorter time limit.
(2) The Commission may upon scrutiny of statements and 
questionnaires completed by the public, invite persons or 
organizations to participate in its hearings.
(3) The Commission may summon any person, including a 
serving or retired officer, whether adversely mentioned or not, 
to appear in person and testify, produce any document, thing 
or information relevant to the Commission’s mandate.
(4) The Commission shall determine any special conditions 
under which a person or organization may participate in 
its hearings and the parts of the hearings that a person or 
organization may participate in.
(5) The Commission shall set the priority for participation 
based on—
(a) whether the person or organization is directly and 
substantially affected by the matters covered by the 
Commission’s mandate; or
(b) the relevance of the testimony in relation to the mandate 
of the Commission.
(6) The Commission may in the interests of justice revoke 
the right of a person or organization to participate in its 
hearings.
8. (1) A witness shall give his evidence or testimony under 
oath or upon affirmation unless otherwise directed by the 
Commission.
9. (1) The Commission shall ensure that it preserves the 
integrity of witnesses at its hearings and maintains its standing 
as a nonjudicial, non-retributive and non-adversarial form to 
foster truth, justice, healing and national reconciliation.
(2) The witnesses who are to testify before the Commission 
may be accompanied by a friend or family member of 
their choice during the proceedings, subject to reasonable 
limitations imposed by the Commission.
(3) The Commission may request witnesses and other 
participants to advise the Commission on the names and 
particulars of any other persons whom they believe have 
relevant information relating to the mandate of the Commission.
10. (1) The hearings of the Commission shall be conducted 
by a hearing panel and the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson 
shall determine the composition of each hearing panel.
(2) A hearing panel shall consist of not less than three 
Commissioners, of whom one shall be an international 
Commissioner, and not less than one third of the composition 
of each panel shall be of either gender:
Provided that the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson, may 
constitute a hearing panel whose composition differs from that 
specified herein as long as the other Commissioners and all 
witnesses appearing before the panel are informed in writing 
of the reason for such deviation.
11. (1) Any interested person may, at least seven days 
prior to a hearing, request a member of the hearing panel to 
disqualify himself from the hearing and set forth the reasons 
for the request, and provide supporting documents, where 
applicable.
(2) Upon receipt of a request for disqualification, the 
Chairman shall establish a panel of three Commissioners 
to consider the request, but the panel shall not include 
the Commissioner who is the subject of the request, and 
shall include at least one international Commissioner and a 
Commissioner of the other gender.
(3) In the case of a request for disqualification of the 
Chairman, the Vice-Chairperson shall constitute the panel to 
determine such a request.
(4) When determining whether to grant a request for 
disqualification, the panel constituted under paragraph (3) 
shall consider the interests and comfort of witnesses appearing 
before the Commission, and actual and perceived conflicts of 
interest, and shall be guided by a commitment to fairness and 
impartiality.
(5) The decision of the panel determining requests for 
disqualifications shall be final.
12. (1) The Commission may examine and consider any 
source or type of information it considers relevant to its 
inquiries.
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(2) The Commission may make site visits to any location to 
ascertain and clarify any fact, issue or other matter arising out 
of its processes.
(3) The Commission shall have access to any site of relevance 
to its work, and collect information from such sites, subject to 
the negotiation for permission under the Protected Areas Act.
(4) The Commission may request the assistance of the 
police and other Government officials to facilitate its work and 
enforce its powers under this provision.
13. (1) The Commission shall arrange with the relevant 
Government agencies for protection for persons placed in 
danger by reason of their testimony (whether already given or 
not), or other interaction with the Commission.
(2) Any individual or representative of an individual or 
organization may make an application in writing to the 
Commission for protection.
(3) A person who requires protection may present himself 
to the Commission offices and make a request for protection, 
setting forth the reasons for such request, to an officer of the 
Commission.
(4) The Commission shall make arrangements to address 
any concerns of witnesses arising out of their testimony, 
including the need to receive counselling before or after their 
testimony, or both before or after giving their testimony.
14. (1) Upon application, and in accordance with section 
25(2) of the Act, the Commission may order that no person 
shall publish the identity for any witness.
(2) For the purposes of the hearing, an order under paragraph 
(1) may include the right of any person to have his identity 
disclosed only by way of non-identifying initials, and, if the 
Commission so orders, the right to testify before the Commission 
in camera, together with any other privacy measures which the 
Commission may grant.
(3) In making such a determination under paragraph (2), 
the Commission shall consider the reasonable privacy and 
security concerns of such a person, as well as the need for 
the Commission’s proceedings to be public and transparency.
(4) The media shall ensure that any reports relating to a 
person granted personal confidentiality or allowed to testify 
anonymously, avoid references that might reveal the identity 
of the person.
(5) No photographic or other reproduction of a person 
granted the right to testify anonymously shall be made by any 
person or organization other than the Commission, except 
with the express written permission of such person.
(6) The Commissioners and staff shall not disclose the 
identity of protected witnesses or information included in 
a personal confidentiality order, and any disclosure shall 
cause disciplinary or termination proceedings against that 
Commissioner or staff member.
(7) Proceedings under paragraph (6) shall not be a bar 
to criminal or civil proceedings against the offending 
Commissioner or staff member.
(8) Any person who testifies anonymously shall take an oath 
or make affirmation to tell the truth using the non-identifying 
initials given for the purpose of their testimony and such an 
oath shall be regarded as equivalent to an oath given using that 
person’s full and proper name.
(9) Any participant or witness may apply to the Commission 
to have financial or personal information which is not relevant 
to the subject matter of the hearing removed from documents 
proposed to be introduced into evidence.
(10) When determining whether to remove such information, 
the Commission shall balance the legitimate privacy and 
personal interests of the applicant against the general principle 
that Commission proceedings shall be public and transparent.
15. (1) A person may apply to the Commission to be 
considered for amnesty in accordance with Part III of the Act.
(2) An application for amnesty shall—
(a) be in writing;
(b) state the violation for which the amnesty is sought;
(c) state the reasons why the applicant believes he or she 
should be considered for amnesty; and
(d) state any other relevant information that the applicant 
may wish to bring to the attention of the Commission 
regarding the application for amnesty.
(3) The Commission may request an applicant to provide 
additional information where it considers it necessary.
16. (1) A person may apply to the Commission to be 
considered for reparation in accordance with Part IV of the 
Act on such terms as prescribed by the Commission.
(2) An application for reparation shall—
(a) be in writing; and
(b) state the violation for which the reparation is sought.
17. (1) The Commission may convene public and private 
consultations to hear submissions relating to any matter raised 
at any phase of the public or in camera hearings.
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(2) The participants in the consultations under paragraph 
(1) shall include any persons whom the Commission considers 
may contribute to the process.
(3) The Commission may invite or grant leave to a person, 
organization or state agency to submit, in writing or orally, any 
observations on any issue it considers desirable for the proper 
understanding or a particular issue the discovery of truth, the 
fulfillment of justice, or in the furtherance of national unity or 
reconciliation.
18. (1) The hearings of the Commission shall be open for 
media coverage, including live television coverage, except in 
respect of hearings the Commission decides to hold in camera.
(2) The media may contact the Commission to make prior 
arrangements for coverage.
(3) The Commission may bar the media from the testimony 
of a witness granted confidentiality status, taking into account 
the reasonable interests of the witness, the public and the 
general principle that the Commission’s proceedings shall be 
public and transparent.
(4) Whenever the Commission decides to proceed in 
camera, or issue an order forbidding publication, disclosure 
or broadcasting of its proceedings, it shall issue an order in 
writing to all media outlets which have been permitted to 
cover proceedings under this Rule.
(5) Media representatives shall abide by these Rules relating 
to confidentiality.
(6) The Commission shall deal with a breach of the rules 
relating to confidentiality as it sees fit, which may include 
exclusion from part of or an entire hearing, or exclusion from 
some or all future hearings.
19. (1) The Commission shall not be bound by the provisions 
of the Evidence Act but shall be guided by the ordinary rules of 
evidence and procedure, including the rules of natural justice.
(2) The Commission may recommend the prosecution of any 
person in any matter which in its view should be handled by the 
courts, and in so doing shall be guided by existing statutes and 
support the recommendation with evidence showing that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed 
by that person.
20. (1) The Commission shall call and examine witnesses 
during a hearing.
(2) When examining the witnesses, the Commission shall—
(a) consider the need to preserve the integrity of the 
witnesses and their testimony;
(b) be sensitive to the concerns of the victims; and
(c) maintain the non judicial, non adversarial, and national 
reconciliatory nature of the process of the Commission.
(3) Subject to compliance with rule 7(1), interested parties, 
including adversely mentioned persons or their representatives, 
shall at the individual, thematic and institutional hearings have 
a right of reply.
(4) Cross examination of the victims or witnesses for the 
victim shall be limited to hearings relating to applications for 
amnesty or requests for reparation.
(5) The cross examination under paragraph (4) shall, in 
any case, be limited to the actual interest of the person or 
organization requesting for amnesty or being requested for 
reparations.
(6) The Commission shall not allow the cross examination 
of witnesses in circumstances other than those set out in 
paragraph (4).
(7) Notwithstanding paragraph (4), the Commission may, 
suspend or limit the cross examination during a hearing, if it 
has reasons to believe that—
(a) a person is conducting the cross examination in bad 
faith;
(b) the witness being cross examined is being unduly 
stressed or otherwise suffering harm as a result of the 
cross examination; or
(c) it is prudent and in the interest of truth, justice and 
reconciliation to limit or suspend the cross examination.
21. (1) A participant or witness shall provide the Commission 
with any documents which he intends to submit as an exhibit 
or otherwise refer to during the hearings not less than seven 
days before the hearing.
(2) The Commission may make copies of any relevant 
documents produced by a witness.
(3) The Commission shall inform any person adversely 
mentioned in a document submitted as evidence to the 
Commission for the purpose of a hearing and allow the person 
reasonable time to study and respond on the document before 
the hearing.
22. A member of staff of the Commission may interview any 
person who has information or documentary evidence relating 
to the subject matter of a hearing, and may recommend to the 
Commission that such person be given the right to participate 
or testify at a hearing.
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23. (1) All participants and their representatives shall abide 
by these Rules.
(2) The Commission shall deal with a breach of these Rules 
as it considers fit, including, but not limited to, revoking the 
right of participation, and imposing restrictions on the further 
participation in or attendance at (including exclusion from) 
the hearing by any participant, representative, individual, 
organization or members of the media.
(3) The Commission may cite for contempt any person 
or organization refusing to fully comply with a summons to 
appear, or to produce information, or otherwise obstructs the 
work of the Commission in any manner.
(4) The Commission may request the assistance of the police 
and other Government agencies and officials, including the 
judiciary, in enforcing relevant sanctions against any persons 
conducting themselves contrary to the provisions of these Rules.
24. The Truth Justice and Reconciliation (Hearing 
Procedure) Rules published on the 20th August, 2010 are 
revoked.
Made on the 6th April, 2011.
T. N. WANJALA,
Acting Chairperson,
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
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Appendix 7
Ambassador Kiplagat’s Statement 
on Resumption of Office
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Guide for Focused Group Discussions on the Nature 
and Extent of Violations of Socio-Economic Rights and 
on Perception of Economic Marginalisation 
November 2011
[Target Groups: inhabitants of regions; members of ethnic minority group/indigenous group (mixed men +women or 
separately); women; the poor (urban and rural)]
  
A: Introduction
The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) is mandated to inquire into economic marginalisation. In particular, it 
is required to inquire into perceptions of economic marginalisation by different sectors of society — regions, ethnic minorities, 
women, the poor (urban and rural) and youth — and to make appropriate recommendations for this to be addressed. 
Aim of the FGDs
The Commission is organising countrywide Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) targeting the listed groups in various regions 
in order to elicit views and therefore enhance the Commission’s understanding relating to: 1) whether the groups perceive 
themselves to be economically marginalised and if yes, how; 2) any facts/evidence they may have that supports their perceived 
marginalisation; 3) what recommendations the Commission should make in relation to any perceived economic marginalisation.
Economic Marginalisation
Marginalization is the social process of becoming or being made marginal (especially as a group within the larger society). 
Those who are marginalised exist on the periphery of society often not just in terms of distance from the centre (of economic and 
political power in Nairobi) but they also lag behind an expected level of performance in economic, political and social well being 
compared with average condition in the society as a whole.
Economic marginalization is produced by the process through which groups are discriminated directly or indirectly, in the 
distribution of social goods and services such as healthcare, education, social security, water and food, housing, land and 
physical infrastructure (roads, schools, health facilities): in general, expenditure on development. While in the economic sphere 
individuals and groups could be pushed to the margins by the operation of market forces and this is found perfectly legal, it is the 
intervention of the state and its agents in a variety of ways to tip the balance unfairly in favour of particular regions or groups — or 
its failure to intervene in favour of the vulnerable that is blameworthy and therefore subject of this inquiry.
For our purposes, discrimination is understood as ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on any ground such 
as race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of rights or social goods and services.
While economic marginalisation is a distinct concept, it is linked with social and political marginalisation. Economically 
marginalized groups tend to be socially marginalized as well: they are disadvantaged with respect to both resources and power.
The Idea of ‘Perception’
Perception relates to how one views, interprets or ‘perceives’ a particular situation, for our purposes, whether one is economically 
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included or marginalised. From an individual perspective, how one views or understands a situation is a form of personal truth. 
From a group/society’s perspective, this would amount to societal truth.  Because of the subjectivity involved (in personal and 
societal truth), a perception is in essence a belief, rather than tested reality, which is factually proved/provable and is related 
to or amounts to forensic/factual truth. While perceptions about something or a situation (by an individual or group) could be 
unfounded, it is not always the case because perception could in fact reflect (provable) reality which is established when that 
belief/feeling is investigated.
The purpose of this study (FGDs) is not necessarily to tease out the reality (factual) about economic marginalisation. Rather, it 
aims to elicit views held by the designated groups from their perspective whether they believe/feel they have been economically 
marginalised. These are personal or societal truths that the TJRC needs to acknowledge and validate while of course presenting 
another (factual) narrative (to the extent that it exists and is at variance with perceptions held) about economic marginalisation. 
B: General Instructions for the FGD Facilitator
•	 Introduce yourself and the note-taker in the language that the members are conversant with. 
•	 Explain the importance of the TJRC’s work in particular that relating to economic marginalisation and the importance 
of the FGD.
•	 Inform participants that the information they will provide is particularly useful to the Commission: it will form part 
of the Final Report (the main product of the Commission’s work) and; it will assist the commission in formulating 
recommendations to address economic marginalisation.
•	 Answer all questions the participants have  to ask before you start the session
•	 Let them know about how long the session will last
•	 Tell them that all answers are correct. There are no wrong answers
•	 Remind them that participation is voluntary. They can withdraw from the process if they like.
•	 Remind participants that the information collected from them shall be treated with utmost confidentiality and shall not 
be used for any other purpose other than the Commission’s purposes research
C: Classifying Information
1. Brief description of FGD participants: (eg women, rural poor, inhabitants of Coast etc)…
2. Attach list of FGD participants: ------------------------------------------------
3. Province/Region:-------------------------------------------------
4. County:------------------------------------------------
5. Name of ethnic community: ______________________________
6. Date of FGD:_______________________________________
7. Name of Facilitator:________________________________
D. FGD Question Items (Disaggregated)
I. GENERAL QUESTIONS RELATED TO ECONOMIC MARGINALISATION (FGDs for regions)
1. There is often the belief that some regions or groups in Kenya have been marginalised, especially economically. 
What is your understanding of (economic) marginalisation?
•	 Probe (use probing or substantiating questions) to establish participants’ understanding of related 
concepts such as political marginalisation and social (exclusion) marginalisation.
•	 Once views are expressed on this issue, validate key views from participants and share the TJRC’s 
vision/understanding of economic marginalisation. 
2. Do you believe that as a region you have been marginalised economically?
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•	 Probe to establish in relation to what issues they feel marginalised:
o Is it the distribution of physical infrastructure such as roads, schools, hospitals etc? 
o Distribution of social goods and services such as health facilities and healthcare; housing; 
education (schools); social security; water and food?
o Representation in public employment (public/civil service)?
o Probe further to establish whether it relates to distribution of land (or other injustices 
around land), a primary means of production?
o Other things done/not done?
•	 If the language of ‘historical injustice’ is used, probe to establish what participants think it means and 
whether they think it was intended or has had the effect of marginalising them economically
3.  Who do you blame/who do you believe is responsible for your marginalisation?
•	 Probe to establish whether they have any specific actors in mind (this can be the government; 
specific ethnic group; rich neighbours; local MP; colonial government; NGOs; Local leaders etc)
•	 Probe to establish who in their view they think is the most responsible for their economic 
marginalisation. 
•	 Clarify that government refers to the three arms of government as well as other state institutions 
(like parastatals). Clarify further that government relates not only to central government in Nairobi 
but also local government (local authorities). 
4. Why do you think that you are marginalised?
•	 Because we want to get some specifics on why they feel marginalised (which is general), probe 
to obtain some facts on things that make them reach the conclusion that they are marginalised 
economically.
•	 Ask them to describe/ provide any information they may have on the status of Socio-Economic 
Rights.
5. What do you think are the reasons (political, economic or cultural) for your economic marginalisation?
•	 Let discussion flow freely but probe appropriately to establish whether it is their culture? Lifestyle? 
Unsustainable economic activity? Examples can be: reliance on rain-fed agriculture; pastoralism (other 
than being unsustainable economically, it interferes with children’s education etc)? Is it customs that bar 
members of their community from owning land or engaging economically?
•	 Is it their politics (remember Moi’s ‘siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya’ meaning don’t support me and you will 
suffer)?
•	 What about poor leadership, including among local leaders?
 
6. How have you (as a group) coped with economic marginalisation?
•	 Probe to establish how their marginalisation made them feel. Did they feel unwanted, as foreigners? 
•	 Probe to establish how their marginalisation affected their view of things, how it affected how they viewed 
and related to others (members of other communities?)
7. What do you think should be done to address the legacy of economic marginalisation?
•	 Elicit views freely without going into what the new constitution provides unless it comes up early in the 
discussion.
•	 Probe to establish how they think the new constitution has changed their situation.
•	 Probe further to establish specific things about the new constitution that should be emphasized. These 
can relate to: the Bill of Rights; Devolution; Equalisation fund; land reforms etc
8. What do they see as their role in addressing economic marginalisation?
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II. QUESTIONS RELATED TO ECONOMIC MARGINALISATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES
1. There is often the belief/perception that ethnic minorities in Kenya have suffered marginalisation, especially 
economic marginalisation. What is your understanding of (economic) marginalisation?
•	 Probe (use probing or substantiating questions) to establish participants’ understanding of related 
concepts such as political marginalisation and social (exclusion) marginalisation.
•	 Once views are expressed on this issue, validate key views from participants and share the TJRC’s 
vision/understanding of economic marginalisation. 
2. Do you believe that as an ethnic minority/indigenous group you have been marginalised economically?
•	 Probe to establish in relation to what issues they feel/have felt marginalised: 
o is it with respect to citizenship and legal recognition; 
o the distribution of physical infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, schools and health 
facilities? The distribution of social goods and services such as health facilities and 
healthcare; housing; education (schools); social security; water and food?
o Representation in public employment (public/civil service)?
o Probe further to establish whether it relates to distribution of land (or other injustices 
around land), a primary means of production and survival for certain ethnic minorities 
and indigenous people?
o Other things done/not done?
•	 If the language of ‘historical injustice’ is used, probe to establish what participants think it means and 
whether they think it was intended or has had the effect of marginalising them economically
3. Who do you blame/who do you believe is responsible for your marginalisation?
•	 Probe to establish whether they have any specific actors in mind (this can be the government; 
specific ethnic group; rich neighbours; local MP; colonial government; NGOs; Local leaders etc)
•	 Probe to establish who in their view they think is the most responsible for their economic 
marginalisation considering different periods in history. 
•	 Clarify that government refers to the three arms of government as well as other state institutions 
(like parastatals). Clarify further that government relates not only to central government in Nairobi 
but also local government (local authorities). 
     4. Why do you believe that you have been marginalised?
•	 Because we want to get some specifics on why they feel marginalised (which is general), probe 
to obtain some facts on things that make them reach the conclusion that they are marginalised 
economically
•	 Ask them to describe/ provide any information they may have on the status of Socio-Economic 
Rights.
5. What do you think are the reasons (political, economic or cultural) for your economic marginalisation?
•	 Let discussion flow freely but probe appropriately to establish whether it is their culture? Lifestyle? 
Unsustainable economic activity? Examples can be: reliance on rain-fed agriculture; pastoralism (other 
than being unsustainable economically, it interferes with children’s education etc)? Is it customs that bar 
members of their community from owning land or engaging economically?
•	 Is it their politics (remember Moi’s ‘siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya’ meaning don’t support me and you will 
suffer)?
•	 What about poor leadership, including among local leaders?
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•	 Do you think lack of adequate political representation contributed to your economic marginalisation? How?
6. How have you (as a group) coped with economic marginalisation?
•	 Probe to establish how their marginalisation made them feel. Did they feel unwanted, as foreigners? 
•	 Has this changed?
•	 Probe to establish how their marginalisation affected their view of things, how it affected how they viewed 
and related to others (members of other communities?)
7. What do you think should be done to address the legacy of economic marginalisation of ethnic minorities and 
indigenous people?
•	 Elicit views freely without going into what the new constitution provides unless it comes up early in the 
discussion.
•	 Probe to establish how they think the new constitution has changed their situation.
•	 Probe further to establish specific things about the new constitution that should be emphasized. These 
can relate to: the Bill of Rights; Devolution; Equalisation fund; land reforms etc
8. What do they see as their role in addressing their (previous) economic marginalisation?
III. QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE ECONOMIC MARGINALISATION OF WOMEN
1. There is often the belief/perception that women in Kenya have suffered marginalisation, especially 
economic marginalisation. What is your understanding of (economic) marginalisation?
•	 Probe (use probing or substantiating questions) to establish participants’ understanding of related 
concepts like political marginalisation and social (exclusion) marginalisation.
•	 Once views are expressed on this issue, validate key views from participants and share the TJRC’s 
vision/understanding of economic marginalisation. 
2. Do you believe that women have been marginalised economically?
•	 Probe to establish in relation to what issues they feel/have felt marginalised: 
o is it with respect to citizenship and legal recognition; 
o the distribution of social goods and services such as health facilities and healthcare; 
housing; education (schools); social security; water and food?
o Representation in public employment (public/civil service)?
o Probe further to establish whether it relates to discriminatory land ownership laws (or 
other injustices around land)?
o Other things done/not done?
•	 If the language of ‘historical injustice’ is used, probe to establish what participants think it means and 
whether they think it was intended or has had the effect of marginalising them economically
3. Who do you blame/who do you believe is responsible for your marginalisation?
•	 Probe to establish whether they have any specific actors in mind (this can be the government; 
specific ethnic group; rich neighbours; local MP; colonial government; NGOs; Local leaders etc)
•	 Probe to establish who in their view they think is the most responsible for their economic 
marginalisation. 
•	 Clarify that government refers to the three arms of government as well as other state institutions 
(like parastatals). Clarify further that government relates not only to central government in Nairobi 
but also local government (local authorities). 
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4. Why do you believe that you have been marginalised?
•	 Because we want to get some specifics on why they feel marginalised (which is 
general), probe to obtain some facts on things that make them reach the conclusion 
that they are marginalised economically
•	 Ask them to describe/ provide any information they may have on the status of 
Socio-Economic Rights.
5. What do you think are the reasons (political, economic or cultural) for your economic marginalisation?
•	 Let discussion flow freely but probe appropriately to establish whether it is their culture? Lifestyle? 
Unsustainable economic activity? Examples can be: reliance on rain-fed agriculture; pastoralism 
(other than being unsustainable economically, it interferes with children’s education etc)? Is it 
customs that bar members of their community from owning land or engaging economically?
•	 Is it their politics (remember Moi’s ‘siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya’ meaning don’t support me and you 
will suffer)?
•	 What about poor leadership, including among local leaders?
•	 Do you think lack of adequate political representation contributed to your economic marginalisation? 
How?
6. How have you (as a group) coped with economic marginalisation?
•	 Probe to establish how their marginalisation made them feel. Did they feel unwanted, as foreigners? 
•	 Has this changed?
•	 Probe to establish how their marginalisation affected their view of things, how it affected how they 
viewed and related to others (members of other communities?)
7. What do you think should be done to address the legacy of economic marginalisation of ethnic 
minorities and indigenous people?
•	 Elicit views freely without going into what the new constitution provides unless it comes up early in 
the discussion.
•	 Probe to establish how they think the new constitution has changed their situation.
•	 Probe further to establish specific things about the new constitution that should be emphasized. 
These can relate to: the Bill of Rights; Devolution; Equalisation fund; land reforms etc
8. What do they see as their role in addressing their (previous) economic marginalisation?
IV. QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE ECONOMIC MARGINALISATION OF THE POOR (RURAL AND URBAN)
1. There is often the belief/perception that the poor in Kenya have suffered marginalisation, especially economic 
marginalisation irrespective of ethnicity or origin. What is your understanding of (economic) marginalisation?
•	 Probe (use probing or substantiating questions) to establish participants’ understanding of related 
concepts like political marginalisation and social (exclusion) marginalisation.
•	 Once views are expressed on this issue, validate key views from participants and share the TJRC’s 
vision/understanding of economic marginalisation. 
2. Do you believe that the poor have been marginalised economically? How?
•	 Probe to establish in relation to what issues they feel/have felt marginalised:
o is it with respect to citizenship and legal recognition; 
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o the distribution of social goods and services such as health facilities and healthcare; 
housing; education (schools); social security; water and food?
o Representation in public employment (public/civil service)?
o Probe further to establish whether it access to land, a major means of production?
o Taxation and labour laws?
o Other things done/not done?
•	 Probe to establish whether factors such as poor education/illiteracy; discrimination (re labour 
market); location (remoteness); lack of (adequate) social spending on poverty etc have contributed 
to their situation.
3.  Who do you blame/who do you believe is responsible for your marginalisation?
•	 Clarify that government refers to the three arms of government as well as other state institutions 
(like parastatals). Clarify further that government relates not only to central government in Nairobi 
but also local government (local authorities). 
•	 Probe to establish whether it has been the same or have they been better or worse under:
o a) the Kenyatta Government; 
o b) Moi government and
o c) Kibaki government
•	 With respect to each of these governments, are there periods when you felt not economically 
marginalised? Or when things were better?
4. How to rate government interventions, if any? These include labour laws, minimum wage; education, public 
spending and poverty eradication programs?
5. Other than the government, are there any other entities that you blame for your economic marginalisation?
•	 Probe to establish what specific roles they assign to any of the entities named in their marginalisation? 
These entities could be colonial government; foreign governments; society (your own); Politicians/leaders 
(including church religious leaders); NGOs? 
•	 Do you think lack of adequate political representation contributed to your economic marginalisation? How?
6. What do you think has been the impact of the economic marginalisation of the poor on the poor, society?
7. What do you think should be done to address the legacy of economic marginalisation of the poor?
•	 Elicit views freely without going into what the new constitution provides unless it comes up early in the 
discussion.
•	 Probe to establish how they think the new constitution has changed their situation.
•	 Probe further to establish specific things about the new constitution that should be emphasized. These 
can relate to: the Bill of Rights; Devolution; Affirmative action; Equalisation fund; land reforms etc
8. One of the main challenges experienced by the poor attempting to fight for their rights is access to justice, both 
in terms of cost and distance. 
Probe to establish what interventions by government can be made in this regard? Probe to 
establish what interventions can be made by civil society to enhance access to justice for the 
poor. What is the role of informal justice systems?
9. What do they see as their role in addressing their (previous) economic marginalisation?
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THE COMMISSION ON ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
ADVISORY OPINION ON THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
The Commission on Administrative Justice (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) is a Constitutional 
Commission established pursuant to Article 59 (4) and Chapter 15 of the Constitution of Kenya, as read 
with The Commission on Administrative Justice Act, 2011. Under Article 252(1) (b) of the Constitution, the 
Commission has the powers necessary for conciliation, mediation and negotiation. Further, Article 59 (h) 
and (i) of the Constitution which is replicated by Section 8 (a) and (b) of the Act grants the Commission 
powers to investigate any conduct of State Officers, or any act or omission in Public Administration that is 
alleged or suspected to be prejudicial or improper, or to result in any impropriety or prejudice. Section 8(h) 
of the Act provides as one of the functions of the Commission to provide Advisory Opinions on proposals on 
improvement of Public Administration.
Under Section 26(c), the Commission is empowered to adjudicate on matters relating to administrative 
justice. Section 29(c) grants the Commission power to investigate any matter arising from the carrying out 
of an administrative action, upon a complaint to the Commission, or on its own initiative. Under section 2 
(1),the Commission is empowered to deal with a decision made or an Act carried out in public service, or a 
failure to act in discharge of a public duty required of an officer in public service.
In light of the above Constitutional and Statutory mandate, the Commission, of its own motion invited 
the TJRC Chair Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat and the TJRC Commissioners, for a mediation process. Owing to 
reluctance by some of the parties, the mediation process did not achieve fruition, and the Commission 
therefore elected to consider the matters and render an Advisory Opinion.
At the outset, we wish to state that we have duly warned ourselves that certain aspects of this matter 
have been the subject of judicial proceedings, and have taken due regard of such pronouncements. It 
is important to note that this opinion is not a result of investigations conducted by the Commission. 
In any event the matters that were before the Courts have been concluded and the issues that fell for 
determination have been determined. This Opinion is therefore picking up from the resultant effect of 
the judicial decisions in so far as it relates to Administrative Justice and Public Administration and to offer 
possible avenues for completion of the TJRC tasks without interferences with the Courts’ Orders.
The TJRC is a Statutory Commission established by the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, Act No. 6 
of 2008 (The TJRC Act). The TJRC Act was enacted after considering the fact that there have been gross 
violations of human rights, abuse of power and misuse of public office, and that there was need to give the 
people of Kenya a fresh start where justice is accorded to the victims of injustice and past transgressions. 
The framers of the TJRC Act were conscious of the fact that some of the transgressions against the Kenyan 
people could not be properly addressed by our judicial institutions due to procedural and legal hindrances. 
The Commissioners of the TJRC were duly appointed in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
TJRC Act and no issues arose as to the suitability of any of the Commissioners at the time. Thereafter, an 
issue arose as to the suitability and/or credibility of the Chairperson of the TJRC continuing to serve as 
such. The dispute ended up in Court through Misc. App No. 470 of 2009 Republic vs. Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission and another Ex-parte Njeru Kathangu and 9 Others. In this suit the ex-parte 
Applicants alleged that:
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a) Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat was unfit to be appointed as a Commissioner and Chairman of the TJRC on 
account of his past record as he was alleged to have been involved in defending torture, abuse of 
judicial process and policies of dictatorship in Kenya during the period he served as a diplomat and as 
the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
b) the TJRC Act specifically excluded holders of public office, both serving and retired, from membership 
of the TJRC because the actions of public officers are the subject of the investigations being undertaken 
by the TJRC and therefore the forwarding of the TJRC chair’s name for appointment to the TJRC was 
therefore against the spirit and letter of the TJRC Act.
c) the Oath of Office taken by the TJRC Chair was null and void as it was taken before publication of the 
notice of his appointment in the Kenya Gazzette . 
In short, the Applicants were questioning the recommendation by the Selection Panel and nomination 
of Amb. Bethwel Kiplagat for appointment as Commissioner and Chairman of the TJRC. These allegations 
were also supported by a section of members of the public including a section of the civil society who 
questioned the suitability of the TJRC Chair to continue as such.
The Applicants sought an order of Certiorari, to quash the “Oath of Office” of Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat 
on account that it was irregularly administered and that the Selection Panel that proposed his name 
for appointment was not properly constituted. The Applicants contended that the Chief Justice had 
administered to the Chairman of the TJRC the oath of office on 3rd August 2009 before the appointment 
or publication on the 14th August 2009 which was done vide Gazette Notice Number 8737, and therefore 
it was irregular and called for questioning.
The Court found that according to the Gazette Notice, the appointment was made on the 22nd July 2009 
before the oath of office was administered and it was only the publication that was done on the 14th 
August 2009 and therefore declined to grand the order of Certiorari by holding that “there was nothing 
wrong with the publication of the notice of appointment after administrating the oath”. It was also found 
that the selection panel was properly constituted.
The second prayer sought was that of prohibition, to prohibit Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat from running the 
offices of the TJRC as Chairman or participation in any way in the affairs of the TJRC. The Court looked at 
the jurisprudence that informs the issuance of such an order of prohibition, and found that the remedy 
of prohibition as sought by the Applicants was not available to them. The Application was dismissed with 
costs on the 28th November 2011.
 
As this matter was pending litigation, Amb. Kiplagat had joined the other Commissioners and signed a 
letter requesting the establishment of a tribunal to investigate the allegations against him. This was done 
on the 12th of April 2010 through a unanimous decision by TJRC. On 10th December 2010, the Chief 
Justice appointed a tribunal under Gazette Notice Number 15894 to investigate the conduct of the TJRC 
Chairperson, including, but not limited to, the allegations that his past conduct eroded and compromised 
his legitimacy and credibility to chair the TJRC.
Amb. Kiplagat had, on 2nd November 2010 released a signed media statement welcoming the decision 
of the Chief Justice to appoint a tribunal. After the appointment of the tribunal, Amb. Kiplagat filed an 
application before the tribunal challenging its jurisdiction to investigate his past conduct. The motion was 
however found by the tribunal to be fatally defective and incompetent and was struck out. The tribunal 
also found that it had jurisdiction to inquire into the past conduct of Amb. Kiplagat. He then moved to 
the High Court and filed HC Misc. Civil Application NO. 95 of 2011 Bethwel Kiplagat Vs. The Chief Justice 
and Others and sought to challenge the proceedings of the tribunal by way of Judicial Review. The matter 
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came before His Lordship Justice Muchelule to determine whether to grant Leave, and whether the Leave 
granted to institute the proceedings should operate as a Stay of the proceedings before the tribunal. The 
Judge held that the Leave should operate as a stay after taking into account the matters that the tribunal 
was going to investigate. Nonetheless, the Judge did make some observations obiter, which we shall make 
reference to later in this Opinion. 
This matter was however withdrawn by Amb. Kiplagat on the 1st day of December 2011. In the meantime, 
the tribunal’s timeline had expired before it had released its report which prompted the TJRC to institute JR 
Case No. 7 of 2012 The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Vs. The Chief Justice of the Republic 
of Kenya and Bethwel Kiplagat. The Applicant sought an Order of Mandamus compelling the Chief Justice 
to appoint a tribunal pursuant to Section 17 (2) of the TJRC Act. In the alternative, they sought an Order of 
Mandamus compelling the Chief Justice to reconstitute the tribunal appointed on 2nd December 2010 and 
an Order of Prohibition to prohibit/restrain Amb. Kiplagat from acting and or resuming office as Chairman 
and Commissioner of TJRC and/or entering the offices of TJRC. It is important to note that at this point 
Amb. Kiplagat had since ‘‘stepped aside’’.
 In a lengthy and reasoned ruling delivered on 24th December 2012, His Lordship Justice Warsame 
determined that the TJRC had no legal capacity or authority to bring the present application against 
Amb. Kiplagat. The judge also held that much as a member of the TJRC may be removed from office 
for misbehavior or misconduct, the misbehaviour or misconduct must have arisen at the time the 
Commissioner or Chairman was in office. On the pertinent question before the court, the judge held that 
there is no statutory power imposed upon the Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya to appoint a tribunal 
to investigate and inquire into the past conduct of the TJRC Chair or any other Commissioner. He also held 
that the former Chief Justice had no powers, authority and/or jurisdiction to appoint a tribunal to inquire 
into the past conduct of the Chair of TJRC. He went ahead to dismiss the Application with costs against 
TJRC, which costs were to be borne by the Commissioners personally.
It is clear from this rather sad and unfortunate history of the TJRC that the allegations levelled against 
Amb. Kiplagat were never determined upon their merits. Indeed Justice Warsame after castigating TJRC 
Commissioners for filing the Application which he considered frivolous nonetheless observed at Page 32 
of his ruling that “none of the allegations have been considered, investigated and determined”. But it is 
equally clear that those allegations, insofaras they relate to alleged conduct before appointment, cannot 
be legally used to bar Amb. Kiplagat from occupying the office of chair to the Commission.
After the aforementioned Ruling, Amb. Kiplagat returned to office to conduct his duties as the Chair of 
TJRC. He did not get a warm and generous reception from the rest of the Commissioners resulting in a 
standoff between the two. The other Commissioners were of the view that since the matters against Amb. 
Kiplagat had never been determined upon their merits, he could not sit and participate in the preparation 
and pronouncement of the TJRC Report.
Following this stalemate, the Commission, wearing its conciliation hat, sought to provide a forum for 
mediation between the two parties. Amb. Kiplagat attended to the Commission’s offices on the 5th March 
2012 and in a lengthy discussion lasting almost three hours gave his points of view of the whole matter. He 
agreed in the said meeting, to a reconciliation and mediation process to be steered by the Commission.
The other Commissioners of TJRC were also invited to a meeting with the Commission on the 6th March 
2012. They elected to send the Chief Executive Officer, Mrs. Patricia Nyaundi who, after explaining that the 
Commissioners sent apologies as they were having formal hearings, also gave an account of the position 
as Viewed by the TJRC Commissioners. What followed were formal letters from the Commission dated 6th 
March 2012 addressed to Amb. Kiplagat and the Chief Executive Officer of TJRC, seeking formal concurrence 
of both Amb. Kiplagat and the other Commissioners to a mediation process. On the 14thMarch 2012, 
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the Commission received a letter dated 12th March 2012 from the Chief Executive Officer of TJRC Mrs. 
Patricia Nyaundi informing the CAJ that the other Commissioners were consulting on the contents of the 
Commission’s letter of 6th March 2012 and would as soon as possible revert to the Commission. The 
Commission has since not received further communication from her. On his part, Amb. Kiplagat called 
the Commission’s offices on the 9th March 2012 and politely declined engaging in any further processes 
concerning the matter since, he noted, he was now settled in the TJRC offices and therefore saw no need 
of engaging in the mediation intended by the Commission.
In light of the commission’s powers and functions as already highlighted, and in view of the clear reluctance 
to engage in mediation by the parties, the Commission elected to switch from its mediative role under 
Section 8(f), 26 (c) and 29(2) to its Advisory role under section 8 (h) of the Commission on Administrative 
Justice Act 2011. Thus, to the extent that Amb. Kiplagat moved to resume office on the one hand, while the 
rest of Commissioners are determined to thwart his move on the other hand, these constitute “action” and 
“omission” respectively as defined in Section 2 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act. In the interests of the country, the 
Commission thus proceeds to render this Advisory Opinion as mandated by law. 
The Commission has with abundant caution and care, considered the facts relating to this matter and the 
effect that the continuing stalemate would have on the integrity of the TJRC report due to be released. We 
have also carefully analyzed the judicial pronouncements that have been made concerning some aspects of 
this matter. Nonetheless, whilst the Commission respects the decision of the Courts and concurs with the 
basis of the decision therein, the same do not preclude the Commission from making its Recommendations 
from the perspective of public administration.
It is our view that the cumulative Court interventions have blurred the determination of a very important 
question, namely, whether Amb. Kiplagat, in light of the allegations levelled against him concerning his past 
conduct, is suitable to hold office as Commissioner and Chair of TJRC. The judicial pronouncements while 
sound in law, have effectively stopped inquiry and determination of the said question. Indeed, the law is 
clear and the Court is right on the question of which period the tribunal may investigate the conduct of the 
Chairperson. It cannot be the period prior to the enactment of the TJRC Act and before his appointment. 
However, the Integrity of the outcome of the TJRC’s report must be protected and guarded in view of the 
enormous task that has been granted to the TJRC.
In our view, the contest is one between Legality and Integrity. While the legality favours the return of the 
Amb. Kiplagat to TJRC, it is up to the Commission itself to protect the integrity of the process. The question 
as to whether Amb. Kiplagat should participate in the remaining process of TJRC is a question not of legality 
but of integrity. What effect would he have on the integrity of the report if he substantively participated 
in its preparation?
The question is not about who is right in law but what effect his participation is going to have on the 
strength of the report? We reiterate and agree with the observations that had been made much earlier by 
Justice Muchelule in HC Misc. No.95 of 2011 which we quote below in extenso; 
“For me, the applicant is faced with a serious moral issue. His appointment was on the basis that his 
conduct, character and integrity were beyond reproach, and that he was going to be an impartial 
arbiter in whatever proceedings that were going to be conducted by him. It was expected that he was 
not involved, implicated, linked or associated with human rights violations of any kind or in any matter 
which the Commission is supposed to investigate. But now, he is faced with a situation where his past has 
allegedly been dug out and his own Commission may very well be seeking to investigate him. The issue is 
not whether the allegations being levelled against him are true. What is material is that the Commission 
will want to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of Robert Ouko, the Wagalla Massacre 
and the Ndung’u Report on illegal/irregular allocation of public land and in each case he is being adversely 
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mentioned. He cannot sit in judgement when the issues are being discussed. Justice will cry if he were 
allowed to sit in judgment, be a witness and an accused, all that the same time. My advise is that he should 
do the honourable thing”.
We agree fully that Amb. Kiplagat cannot be a judge in his own cause. We further observe that Amb. 
Kiplagat falls on the right side of the Law but on the wrong side of Integrity.
We therefore advise as follows:
1. That Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat should be allowed to return and sit in his office in accordance with the 
Court Orders.
2. That having assessed the time left within which the TJRC is required to prepare and submit its 
report vis a vis the time it would take for any appeal filed by the TJRC to be determined, it would 
be ill advised for the TJRC Commissioners to believe that such determination will be made in time 
before preparation of their Report.
3. That Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat should not participate or interfere with the preparation of the TJRC 
report since such participation may have a negative effect to the acceptance of the Report. He 
should however be given an opportunity to review the report within a short time and to script an 
addendum to the report wherein he may agree or give his dissenting opinion. This is precented. 
In the Report of the Independent Electoral Review Commission (IREC or Kieggler Commission), 
two Commissioners duly expressed their dissent, and reasons thereof, which was included as an 
addendum to the report.
4. That Amb. Kiplagat be paid the entire difference in salary for the period in which he had stepped 
aside since he was on half salary.
5. Amb.Bethuel Kiplagat should however, in a show of good faith, waive the costs that had been 
granted to him by the Courts in the judicial processes between him and TJRC. Indeed, Amb. Kiplagat 
had indicated to the Commission that he was not keen in pursuing the costs granted to him by the 
Courts and only wanted reconciliation. If, however, he should elect not to do so, it would be worth 
pursuing an Appeal in light of S.32 of the TJRC Act which grants immunity from personal liability
6. It has also not escaped our attention that the afflictions in TJRC have also been the subject of 
political interference. A threat by a section of Rift Valley Members of Parliament to reject the 
report of the TJRC if Amb. Kiplagat is excluded in the remaining process is unfortunate since it 
demonstrates sectarian support which ultimately undermines Amb. Kiplagat’s authority. Seeking 
sectarian support by Amb. Kiplagat or any of the Commissioners, will only seek to erode the 
integrity of the Report. 
We do observe that the hardships experienced by the TJRC have struck a sad and solemn note in public 
administration in Kenya. It is ironical that the very institution established to achieve lasting peace and 
harmonious co-existence among Kenyans, by providing for them a forum to discuss such matters freely 
and in a reconciliatory manner, should be the same one engulfed in wrangles. We believe the TJRC 
Commissioners have the courage, wisdom and ability to pull through this task, and we invite them to do so.
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Aide Memoire
•	 The Commissioners are concerned about the conflicts of interest presented by Ambassador Kiplagat.  
o Ambassador Kiplagat was present at a meeting of the Kenya Intelligence Committee in Wajir two 
days before the start of what became known as the Wagalla Massacre;
o Ambassador Kiplagat was an important witness to events leading up to the assassination of 
the Honorable Robert Ouko, and was recommended for further investigation and noted as an 
uncooperative witness by previous inquiries into that assassination;
o Ambassador Kiplagat has admitted to having been involved in land transactions that were labeled 
by the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry as irregular and illegal.  
•	 The Commissioners are also concerned that Ambassador Kiplagat swore under oath before the panel that 
selected the Commissioners that he “has not in any way been involved, implicated, linked, or associated with 
human rights violations of any kind or in any matter which is to be investigated” by the Commission.  (See 
Section 10(6)(b) of the Act.)
•	 The Commission is required by its mandate to investigate all three of the areas listed above in which 
Ambassador Kiplagat is involved or linked:  massacres, political assassinations, and irregular and illegal land 
transactions.  
•	 All three of the areas listed above have been the subject of numerous statements and memoranda to the 
Commission, and many of these statements (over three dozen) have specifically mentioned Ambassador 
Kiplagat as linked to these and other violations within the mandate of the Commission.
•	 The Commissioners are united in the position that the conflicts of issue raised by Ambassador Kiplagat need 
to be addressed in a credible and transparent process that is consistent with the rule of law.  
History
•	 The Commissioners, including Ambassador Kiplagat, with the assistance of an external facilitator and mediator, 
engaged in a series of internal consultations from February to April 2010 to come up with a mechanism to 
address the conflicts of interest of Ambassador Kiplagat.
•	 After much discussion and consultation, Ambassador Kiplagat insisted that the only proper mechanism to 
address the issues raised by his presence was a tribunal established pursuant to Section 17 of the Act.  The 
other Commissioners agreed with this approach, and all nine Commissioners, including Ambassador Kiplagat, 
agreed in writing that the Commission would request such a tribunal and that Ambassador Kiplagat would 
step aside until such a tribunal had finished its work.  
•	 The Commissioners filed a petition with the Chief Justice in April 2010 asking that a tribunal be established 
to determine if Ambassador Kiplagat had engaged in “misbehavior or misconduct” under the Act by signing 
a false affidavit claiming that he had no involvement with matters to be investigated by the Commission and 
by continuing to privately and publicly claim that he was not involved with any matter to be investigated by 
the Commission. 
•	 At the time the Commission submitted its petition Ambassador Kiplagat had already changed his position 
on the meeting in Wajir, first asserting that he had never been to Wajir in his life, and then claiming that he 
did not remember if he had attended a meeting in Wajir or not.   Since the filing of the petition Ambassador 
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Kiplagat has been reminded by others that he had in fact been present at a meeting in Wajir two days before 
the start of the Wagalla Massacre.  Having been reminded of his presence, Ambassador Kiplagat now asserts 
confidently that no security operation was discussed in the meeting he attended over 27 years ago.  
•	 The Chief Justice announced the establishment of a tribunal in October 2010.  
•	 The Chief Justice in exercising his proper legal authority under the Act adopted an interpretation of the phrase 
“misbehavior or misconduct” that was broader than that asserted by the Commissioners in the petition, and 
created a tribunal to look into issues of integrity and credibility throughout Ambassador Kiplagat’s life. 
•	 A three judge tribunal began its work in earnest in December 2010 following the “stepping aside” by Amb. 
Kiplagat.  
•	 While Ambassador Kiplagat first welcomed the creation of the tribunal as a forum before which he could 
assert his innocence, Amb. Kiplagat filed a challenge before the tribunal questioning its jurisdiction.  
•	 The tribunal rejected Ambassador Kiplagat’s challenge and continued with its work.    
•	 Ambassador Kiplagat then went to the High Court to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal.  The High Court 
granted a temporary stay of the proceedings of the tribunal so that Ambassador Kiplagat’s arguments could 
be heard without prejudice.  
•	 While Ambassador Kiplagat pursued his matter in the High Court, the life of the tribunal expired in April 2011.
•	 The tribunal never had an opportunity to finish its work, and thus did not rule either in favor or against 
Ambassador Kiplagat.
•	 In November 2011 Ambassador Kiplagat withdrew his case before the High Court before the Court could 
reach a decision.
•	 The High Court never ruled on Ambassador Kiplagat’s challenge to the legality of the creation of the tribunal.
•	 A group of former MPs brought a case in the High Court in August 2009 challenging, inter alia, the creation 
of the TJRC and the selection of all of the Commissioners.  Ambassador Kiplagat retained separate counsel 
in that case, and argued that the only proper procedure for questioning the appointment of a Commissioner 
was through a tribunal under Section 17 of the Act.
•	 The High Court dismissed the challenge brought by the former MPs, and in its opinion noted that the proper 
avenue for challenging the presence of a Commissioner was found in Section 17 of the Act.  
•	 In January 2012 Ambassador Kiplagat returned unannounced to the TJRC offices asserting that he had been 
“cleared” by the courts.  
•	 The Commission requested that Ambassador Kiplagat honor the pledge he made to the people of Kenya and 
to the Commission that he would step aside until the tribunal finished its work.
•	 Ambassador Kiplagat rejected the appeal of his fellow Commissioners and insisted, contrary to the history of 
the court proceedings, that he had been cleared by the courts.  
•	 The Commissioners went to the High Court to, inter alia, enjoin Ambassador Kiplagat from returning to the 
TJRC unless and until a tribunal addressed the issues raised in the Commission’s petition.
•	 Judge Warswame of the High Court in his decision noted that no process had yet been completed concerning 
the issues raised in the Commission’s petition, yet the learned judge nevertheless ruled against the Commission 
before providing the Commission an opportunity to argue the merits of the matter.  
Current Situation and Way Forward
•	 The Commission has appealed the decision of Judge Warswame.  
•	 Ambassador Kiplagat has now returned to the TJRC.  The CEO vacated her office in order to provide Ambassador 
Kiplagat with an office.  
•	 The Commissioners met with Ambassador Kiplagat on 30 March 2012. At that meeting the Commissioners 
reiterated to Ambassador Kiplagat that the differences with him were not of a personal nature, but were 
differences based on principle.  The Commissioners explained that the issues involved the integrity of the TJRC 
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process, including the final report, and the conflicts of interest presented by Ambassador Kiplagat in three areas 
within the mandate of the Commission.  
•	 The Commissioners expressed disappointment that the conflicts of interest raised by Ambassador Kiplagat 
had yet to be addressed, and asked Ambassador Kiplagat to honor the pledge he made to the Commission 
and the people of Kenya in November 2010 – viz., that he would graciously stand aside while his conflicts of 
interest were addressed by a tribunal set up under our Act.  
•	 The Commissioners concluded by noting that until a process addressing Ambassador Kiplagat’s conflicts of 
interest was concluded, the Commissioners would continue to be reluctant to work with him.  
•	 The Commissioners exchanged views with Ag. PS Mr. Kibara on April 3rd 2012 on the possibility of involving 
Ambassador Kiplagat in the remaining phase of the TJRC work, in particular the review and approval of the 
Commission’s final report.  
•	 In the meeting with the Ag. PS the Commissioners reiterated that the issues we have with Ambassador 
Kiplagat are not of a personal nature, but concern issues of principle and the integrity and credibility of the 
TJRC process.
•	 The Commissioners noted that allegations linking Commissioner Farah to matters to be investigated by the 
Commission were raised.  The Commission, with the full cooperation of Commissioner Farah, investigated 
those allegations and found clear and convincing evidence absolving Commissioner Farah of the allegations. 
Commissioner Farah declined to request a tribunal pursuant to Section 17 of our Act.  
•	 The Commissioners are of the view that the following could be the basis of such involvement:
1) Ambassador Kiplagat will review drafts of the final report in the same manner and at the same time 
as other Commissioners.  The final report is being prepared by a technical team of experts under the 
supervision of a committee of the Commission.  Once a draft of the report is ready, Commissioners 
will be given an opportunity to review and comment on the draft.  The technical team will then 
redraft the report taking into account the comments of the Commissioners.  
2) Ambassador Kiplagat will not be allowed to review those sections of the report that concern areas 
in which he has a conflict of interest, including those parts of the report concerning massacres, 
political assassinations, and land.  Ambassador Kiplagat will be given the same rights and 
opportunities as any other adversely mentioned person.  Thus if the report includes an adverse 
finding concerning Ambassador Kiplagat, he will be given the same opportunity as other adversely 
mentioned individuals to respond to that finding and to have his response taken into account in the 
final drafting of that finding.  
3) Ambassador Kiplagat has refused to honor a summons to testify before the Commission.  He is the 
only person to date who has so refused a summons.  Unless Ambassador Kiplagat agrees to testify 
before the Commission pursuant to this summons, the Commission reserves the right to pursue 
legal enforcement of its summons as provided for under Section 7(6) of the Act.  
4) Ambassador Kiplagat must agree to comply with the decision-making processes of the Commission 
set forth in the Act and as established by resolutions of the Commission.   The Commission 
has operated successfully for over fifteen months with these procedures, and all of the other 
Commissioners to date have abided by them.  
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K E N Y A
